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
BY C. S. HENRY, D.D.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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AN
E P I T O M E
OF THE
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

BEING
THE WORK ADOPTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF FRANCE
FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE COLLEGES AND
HIGH SCHOOLS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH,
WITH
ADDITIONS, AND A CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY
FROM THE TIME OF REID TO THE
PRESENT DAY.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

NEW-YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, CLIFF-ST.

1841.

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P R E F A C E.

THE work here offered to the American public was published a few years since by the Directors of the College of Jully, and has been adopted by the University of France. The translation has been made under the impression that it might prove a useful book for students, and for readers in general who feel an interest in such subjects. We have no English book embracing a comprehensive, and, at the same time, elementary and didactic view of the history of philosophical opinions ; and the present work seemed to the translator to be, on the whole, the best that could be adopted to supply the want. The expositions are in general clear and adequate, and the spirit of the work is just and candid, comparatively little affected by systematic bias.

The space devoted to Oriental Philosophy is perhaps too great, and out of proportion with the rest of the work ; only it may be said that it is a subject of some curious, if not of intrinsic interest, and the sources of information respecting it are less generally accessible than those which relate to the other portions of the history of Philosophy. As to the rest, it will be perceived that the work gives a simple exposition of Oriental systems, without going into the literary and

historical questions respecting their authors, their antiquity, and their relations to each other : questions which have been discussed with much learning and acuteness, and with different conclusions, by various authors, among the most recent of whom is Ritter.

A thorough, comprehensive view of the philosophy of the Christian Fathers is a thing hardly to be expected in a work like this. It connects itself in so many respects with so many and nice theological questions, as to require an extended volume for any complete and thorough treatment of it. Some general views on the leading points are all that is attempted.

In preparing these volumes, the translator has ventured to insert into the body of the work some notices and expositions which he thought should properly make a part of the work, and which at all events will make it more complete, and may add to its interest and value for the student of English Philosophy. Thus, between the articles on Spinoza and Leibnitz, he has interposed a notice of Cudworth, Henry More, and some others ; and between the exposition of the German and that of the Scottish philosophy, he has inserted an account of the views of a considerable number of English writers, from the time of Locke to that of Reid, whose works form an important part of the history of English Philosophy. All these insertions, as well as an occasional note or two, are included in brackets.

The original work ends with the account of the system of Reid. The translator has added an Appendix, in which he has attempted to bring down the history from the time of Reid to the present day, on the same general plan as the rest of the work. How delicate and difficult a task he has undertaken, will be best comprehended by those who are most thoroughly acquainted with the subject. Besides the writings of the authors of whose views he has attempted an analysis, he has made use of all the assistance which other (critical and historical) sources could supply. Those who are familiar with these sources will perceive what his obligations are: a more particular acknowledgment would be scarcely possible, and is not necessary, except that he should say he has in some cases relied wholly upon the authority of Tenneman, Krug, or Damiron. He hopes that no material mistake or error will be found in his statements, as he is certain he has endeavoured that they should be clearly and fairly made.

C. S. H.

University of New-York, Nov., 1841.

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AN EPIHOME
OF THE
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS.

Christian Views respecting the Origin of Science.

IF, as the most ancient recollections of the human race attest, man originally received the truth by revelation from God, man must, from his origin also, have been intelligent and moral; he must have possessed at the commencement of his existence those notions which constitute the intellectual life, as well as those which are necessary to the preservation of the physical life. And, since reason is essentially active, it must, in exercising itself upon this fund of primitive cognitions, which are not the product of its own activity, at an early period have wrought out an explanation of things more or less analogous to what we designate by the name of *Science*.

The character of that primitive science, so far as we can judge of it through the veil of sixty centuries, was determined by the concurrence of causes peculiar to that constituent epoch of humanity; for that epoch must have been governed in some respects by laws different from those which have governed the subsequent periods: periods, not of creation, but simply of development.

In the first place, independently of sacred history, it is philosophically probable that primitive man, who

had just drawn his life from its first source, would possess a wonderful degree of energy and organic activity; and it may also be conjectured, from the intimate relation between organization and intelligence, that the intellectual force corresponded to this high degree of vital energy, and that a great power of intuition was then the endowment of humanity.

But, whatever were its primitive faculties, humanity was not the less in a state of infancy; and this state has necessities peculiar to itself. Take two infants, the one endowed with the liveliest intellect, the other belonging to a race the most idiotic; the former, no less than the latter, requires to be subjected to the regimen of education. Such must have been, such was the condition of humanity. Sacred history teaches us that man at first formed with more perfect beings an exalted society. He conversed with superior intelligences at the same time that he lived with inferior creatures. As an intellectual being he was no more solitary than as an organic being: there was neither break nor chasm in the communications which united the different orders in the hierarchy of beings.

Sin broke up this primordial society. There remained, however, some relics of it as long as relations of this kind were necessary to the first education of humanity. Under this supernatural tuition it must have been initiated into secrets which it would not have penetrated by its own intelligence. But this higher knowledge, and the means of action corresponding to it, must, at the same time, through the abuse of which it was capable, have placed at the disposal of man an immense destructive force. The perversion of this kind of knowledge must needs give birth to crimes which our thoughts are scarcely able to represent.

In the plans of Providence, which makes the catastrophes of physical nature concur with the necessities of moral government, the Deluge, that baptismal purification of the earth, had for its object to abolish not only that gigantic corruption, but probably, also, the science which rendered it possible, and to bury it in the ruins of the Old World.

Accordingly, after the Deluge we see humanity recalled at once to the state of simple faith. The human mind recommenced. In this light, in particular, the patriarchs are presented to our view: such, likewise, was the character of the Jewish people, from whom one day was to spring the Divine development of the primitive revelation, and whose special mission, on this account, it was to preserve the deposite of this revelation free from all alloy. It was needful, therefore, that they should be eminently a traditional, and not a philosophical people.

But in other countries of the East philosophical conceptions soon arose. Some of them, and, above all, the primitive philosophy of India, appear to ascend to an epoch so near the Deluge; they exhibit, at the same time, such a character of grandeur and elevation, as to make it scarcely probable that in the midst of their physical wants and of their continual conflicts with the animals and the forces of a disordered nature, men could so rapidly have risen to speculations so lofty if they had not been supported by some relics of the anterior science. In what way was this scientific tradition handed down? We are entirely ignorant. Yet always, in hearkening to the philosophy of the Vedas, one seems to hear the echo of a great voice which sounded out in the primeval world.

Division of the History of Philosophy.

SETTING out from the ancient conceptions of which India appears to have been the cradle, the history of philosophy, as it unfolds itself, may be divided into FIVE PERIODS.

I. The period of the Oriental Philosophy, which embraces whatever is known of the speculations of the human mind in India, China, Persia, Chaldea, Phœnicia, and Egypt.

II. The period of the Grecian Philosophy, which begins with Thales and Pythagoras, and continues to preserve its distinctive character down to the time of Sextus Empiricus, towards the end of the second century of the Christian era.

III. The period which embraces the first five centuries of that era : laying out of view the purely Grecian movement, which was coming to an end, two principal facts predominate in this period ; namely, first, the change wrought by the propagation of the Oriental philosophy, and its fusion with the most elevated portion of the Greek theories ; secondly, the rise and development of the Christian philosophy.

IV. The period of the Middle Ages. Christian philosophy in this period divides itself into two branches ; the one has some analogy to the Oriental speculations ; the other, and more important, has its roots in the Greek philosophy, and is known by the name of Scholasticism. On the confines of Christianity appears the Arabian philosophy.

V. The Modern period, or the philosophical movement which succeeded to Scholasticism. It begins in the fifteenth century, particularly in Italy, and extends to the present time. Its three principal centres have been England, France, and Germany.

It should be observed, that the epochs just indica-

ted form intellectual rather than strictly chronological periods ; they correspond less to spaces of time precisely determined, than to grand developments of the philosophical spirit. The one often begins before the other is ended. The philosophy of India did not die on the day of the birth or of the death of the Greek philosophy ; it has been perpetuated to the present day. The Old Greek philosophy had still its expounders at the time when the Græco-Oriental philosophy was springing up, and when the Christian philosophy was making conquest of the human mind. The abstractions of the Scholastic philosophy maintained a kind of inert and passive power long after the activity of the minds which opened the new routes had begun to display itself in another sphere.

These epochs, besides, notwithstanding the profound differences by which they are distinguished, are intimately connected. In the history of philosophy we see, first, the influence of the East upon Greece ; then Greece disengages itself and proceeds alone. At a later period the East and Greece unite for mutual support in the Roman world ; and the Christian philosophy, although it has its own proper basis, is seen borrowing methods and conceptions from both. These three philosophies, in their turn, act upon the Middle Ages ; and, finally, Modern philosophy should not forget that all the laborious and earnest schools of the Middle Ages formed, as it were, a great college, in which the modern mind has received a fruitful, because a strict and severe education.

FIRST PERIOD.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

• PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

UNDER the name of Oriental philosophy is commonly included two orders of ideas, which ought to be carefully distinguished, since they are to be referred to two different aspects of the human mind.

In the first place, among many cultivated nations of the East we find at the remotest antiquity a small number of conceptions, which, however diverse in certain respects, form, nevertheless, in other relations, a sort of homogeneous intellectual whole. For, on the one hand, they fall within the same circle, having for their scope and object the explanation of the primitive formation of things; and, on the other hand, these genetical speculations present the appearance less of artificial combinations than of rapid intuitions, the first gleams of philosophical thought. These we designate by the name of *primordial conceptions*. It is not easy to discriminate very precisely among the documents of the Oriental nations that which forms this primitive philosophy, because it is intimately blended with doctrines preserved by popular tradition, and is frequently enveloped in poetic and mythic symbols. In regard to these we shall therefore limit ourselves to some general notices.

In the second place, philosophical systems may be discovered in the East which reveal another age of the intelligence. They embrace a great variety of questions, and evidently exhibit traces of laborious investigation. Pure intuition begins to yield to reasoning, and polemics soon takes the place of the

frank and simple utterance of the primordial philosophy. These systems constitute what we call the *philosophical development*.

China, Persia, and Egypt form, as it were, the three angles of a luminous triangle, within which the Oriental genius exerts its activity, and of which Chaldea and India occupy nearly the middle.

Neither of these angles, in the actual state of our historical knowledge of the Oriental mind, presents any traces of a philosophical development on a large scale. To find this we must go to India. This magnificent country, which extends through every degree of temperature, from the icy summits of the Himalaya to the burning seas of the Polynesia, has been the scene of a vast and long-continued philosophical conflict, of which some monuments have already passed into the domain of European science.

I N D I A.

I. PRIMORDIAL CONCEPTIONS.

Historical Notices.

INDIA has been subject from the remotest antiquity to the domination of *castes*. The Brahmins, or sacerdotal caste, possessed a body of doctrines, particular branches of which have been connected together into divers philosophical systems.

The most ancient writings in which to investigate the primordial philosophy of India, are the sacred books known by the name of the Vedas, which is a Sanscrit form of the Sanscrit word *vidga*, *science*, *law*. The Hindu legends attribute their compilation and collection to Vyasa.

This collection is distributed into four books. The

first, the Rig-Veda, contains prayers and hymns in verse ; the second, Yadjour-Veda, prayers in prose ; the third, Sama-Veda, prayers that are to be chanted ; the fourth, Atharvan, liturgical formulas. Each Veda comprises in general two parts, prayers, *mantras*, and precepts or doctrines, *brahmanas*.

After the Vedas—which contain particularly the doctrine concerning God, the creation, the soul and its relations to God—come the Pouranas, which comprise a mythological theology and cosmogony. These poems, also attributed to Vyasa, are eighteen in number.

The third place is assigned to the great epic or historical poems : the Ramayan, in which are celebrated the exploits of Rama, and which, they say, was composed by Valmiki ; the Mahabharata, composed by Vyasa, who has here sung the heroic wars of the Kourous and the Pandous, two families belonging to the race of the children of the Moon. The Bhagavat-Gita, of which Schlegel has given a Latin translation, is a philosophical episode of the Mahabharata.

Lastly, the Manava-Dharma-Shastra, or collection of the Laws of Menu, completes the series of sacred books to which the philosophy of the Hindus was originally consigned. But the doctrine of the Vedas is the source of most of the conceptions contained in the other and later sacred books. These latter were only emanations from the philosophy of their prototype, and probably, also, more or less corrupted.

Exposition.

1. Brahm existed eternally, the first substance—infinite—the pure unity. He existed in luminous shadows ; shadows, because Brahm was a being indeterminate, in whom nothing distinct had yet appeared ; but these shadows were luminous, because

being is itself light. Brahm is represented also as originally plunged in a divine slumber, because the creative energy, as yet inactive, was, as it were, asleep.

2. When he came out of this slumber, Brahm, the indeterminate being, of the neuter gender, became the creative power, Brahma, of the masculine gender. Brahm became also the light, determinate intelligence, and pronounced the fruitful Word which preceded all creation.

3. There came forth besides from the bosom of Brahm, the Trimourti: Brahma, the creator, Vichnu, the preserver of forms, and Seeva, the destroyer of forms, who by this very destruction causes the return of beings to unity and their re-entrance into Brahm. But the Trimourti does not develop itself in Brahm until he has produced another principle, Maya, of which it is now necessary to speak.

4. In Brahm there was originally existent Swada, or the golden womb, the receptacle of all the types of things, when he produced Maya, *matter* or *illusion*, the source of all phenomena, and by means of which individual existences made their appearance. Maya existed at first as a liquid element: the primitive water, which in itself has no particular form. In Maya reside three qualities, goodness, impurity, obscurity.

5. From the union of Brahm, which contained the types of all things, with Maya, the principle of individualization, and under the influence of the three qualities, resulted the whole creation. But the universe existed at first in two original productions, which were, so to say, the two great germes of it; these were Mahabhouta, which is the condensation of all souls, all the subtle elements, and Pradjapati, which is the condensation of all the gross elements.

6. From Pradjapati, combined with Mahabhouta, sprang all the genii, and the human race in particular. Pradjapati was thus the primitive man, who, dividing himself into two, produced man and woman.

7. Human souls are subject, as also the genii themselves, to the universal law of transmigration, which consists in passing successively into bodies more or less perfect before being finally united to the great soul, Atma. The object of religion is to procure more favourable transmigrations, or to abridge the duration of them, or to secure even a complete exemption from them, provided one has followed with perfect fidelity the prescriptions of the Vedas. The reunion of the soul with Atma constitutes its final salvation.

We observe here, once for all, that the doctrine of transmigration is common to all the philosophical schools of India, of which we are to give an exposition. Each school has for its object to furnish by its teachings an effectual means of deliverance from the necessity of transmigration.

Observations.

The philosophy of the Vedas has been often regarded as a rigorous system of Pantheism. But, in the first place, there are many strong reasons for believing that these ancient books have been interpolated by the Brahmins; and, in the next place, the grounds on which this charge of pantheism rests are by no means unassailable. Must the strong expressions which occur in the Vedas, and which represent God as the sole being, and creatures as illusory, unreal beings, necessarily be taken in an absolute sense? May they not have a relative meaning, and signify merely that creatures have only an imperfect, a derived, a sort of unreal being *in comparison with*

God, who alone possesses completely and perfectly truth and reality of being? Similar forms of expression are met with even in Christian writers the farthest removed from pantheism. Do we not say, speaking of *God*, that feeble mortals are all before his eyes as though they were not? The ancient Oriental genius, with its bold and vivid language, might still more naturally adopt these strong forms in order to characterize strikingly what we ourselves call the nothingness of the creation in the presence of *God*, without intending to express pantheism; although it is, as to the rest, an unquestionable fact, that these expressions became, in subsequent systems, the proper and official formulas of pantheism.

However this may be, it is certain that, starting from the conceptions of the Vedas, which in our opinion have been corrupted, we come very soon to pantheism properly so called. The *Bhagavat-Gita*, that brilliant episode in the poem of the *Mahabharata*, develops the system in all its metaphysical strictness and in its principal moral consequences. Having taken the ground that the Infinite is the sole existence, and, consequently, the only being that wills and acts, or, rather, seems to act, the author of the *Bhagavat-Gita* infers not only the uselessness of works, but their absolute indifference, or the nullity of all distinction between virtue and vice.

This metaphysical work, which clothes the deductions of reflection in the forms of poetry, may be considered as forming the transition from the intellectual state represented by the Vedas to that other state which we have designated by the name of philosophical development. This transition is likewise reflected in the *Institutes of Menu*.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT.

The Roman Catholic missionaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had already made some contributions to the knowledge of the philosophy of India, when the investigations of the Calcutta Academy, in Bengal, began gradually to throw new light upon this important portion of the history of the human mind. But the most extensive and the most accurate information which Europe possesses on this subject has been furnished by the Essays of Mr. Colebrook, published from 1824 to 1829, in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of London. This learned Orientalist has drawn his knowledge of the philosophical systems of India from the fountain head. His residence in that country, and his relations with the Brahmins, enabled him to consult a great number of Sanscrit works, which he has interpreted with a rare talent for exposition. We shall analyze these essays, and give an outline of the systems in question; and we shall add some observations intended to facilitate the understanding of them, and to determine their characteristics.

The Hindus divide philosophical theories into two classes, orthodox theories, or those which are considered as conformed to the doctrine of the Vedas, and heterodox theories, or those that are contrary to that doctrine. These two categories have given rise to a third, including systems which are partly orthodox and partly heterodox.

The two Mimansa systems are orthodox. The first, which is called *Pourva*, teaches the art of reasoning applied to the interpretation of the Vedas. The second Mimansa, attributed to Vyasa, and which is designated by the title of *Vedanta*, deduces from

the sacred books of India a subtle metaphysics, which results in the denial of a material world, and even of all individual existence.

Under the head of systems which are partly orthodox and partly heterodox belong :

1. The Sankhya, which consists of two systems, the one retaining properly the name of Sankhya, the other being called Yoga.

2. The Nyaya, which is a sort of logical philosophy, and the Vaisechika, which is closely connected with the former, and is a physical philosophy.

The systems of the Djainas and the Buddhas are arranged in the category of systems entirely heterodox.

FIRST CLASS.

SYSTEMS CONFORMED TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE VEDAS.

1. MIMANSA SYSTEM.

Historical Notices.

THE ancient doctrine, which is particularly designated by the name of Mimansa in order to distinguish it from the new Mimansa, more specially known under the title of Vedanta, is attributed to an author of the name of Djaimini. It is comprised in aphorisms or *soutras*, which are said to have been put in form and arranged by some of his disciples. As they are very obscure, they are commonly accompanied with commentaries, the most celebrated of which are those of Sabara-Swami and those of Koutarila-Swami.

The object of the Mimansa is to give rules by means of which the Vedas may be correctly inter-

preted, and the true sense of revelation accurately seized. It is divided into two parts : the one practical, Karma-Mimansa, which treats of works ; the other theological, Brahma-Mimansa, which relates to points of belief.

Avoiding more particular details of this casuistical philosophy, which constitutes a sort of theological jurisprudence, we remark upon the following points :

1. *In respect to its method*, each case is treated under five heads or topics, very analogous to the method of many of the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages.

2. *In respect to the sources of knowledge*, the Mimansa admits that verbal communication or testimony alone can lay the foundation for a duty. The Vedas contain a supernatural testimony ; but, besides this revelation, there exist human testimonies, and these, in so far as duties are concerned, are contained in the traditions of the ancient sages, preserved from age to age without interruption. The tradition must, however, be substantially conformed to the Vedas, and, in case of opposition, tradition must yield to the sacred text.

3. *In respect to the notion of virtue*, the Mimansa admits, in the first place, of merit, that is to say, that invisible efficacy which subsists independently of an external action that has ceased, and which continues in another world to connect the consequence of an act with its past cause ; and, secondly, of the efficacy of sacrifice, as an act of the highest merit, and which, as to the rest, has four forms : oblation, the death of a victim, the offering of the juice of a plant called *soma*, and, lastly, the destruction of an object by the flames.

4. *In a theological and cosmological relation*, in the

Mimansa the breath of God is represented as the primary Divine emanation, from whence proceed the sounds which produce letters. These sounds, these letters are, as it were, an ethereal word or writing, of which beings are the grosser forms. The Mimansa hence concludes that the relation of articulate sounds to ideas is not conventional, but original and necessary, human speech being itself a reproduction of the creative word. Hence the efficacy of invocation and of incantation.

2. THE VEDANTA SYSTEM.

Historical Notices.

COLEBROOKE has postponed the publication of his memoir on the Vedanta philosophy, and for want of this assistance we must glean elsewhere what information we can find in the most recent investigations.* The original sources of this philosophy are the Oupanischads, ancient extracts from the Vedas. According to the Hindu legends, the founder of this system was Vyasa; but probably this is a collective or generic name given to several ancient philosophical masters, and perhaps it represents an entire epoch. The legends also give other names, which may belong to the early times of the Vedanta school, but in general there is great uncertainty in regard to their origin. Many learned men have thought that the Laws of Menu (the Manava-Dharma-Shastra) were anterior to the conquest of India by Alexander the Great; and since several passages in this collection seem to contain allusions to the Oupanischads, the priority of which is, besides, confirmed by many other considerations, they have concluded that the

* See *Hug. Windischmanni*, de Theologumenis Vedicorum, Bonnæ, 1833.

Vedanta school dates from a still earlier period than the code of Menu.*

Since the Christian era numerous writings have been devoted to the exposition and defence of this philosophy ; it makes a brilliant figure in the writings of Sancara, who appears to have lived about the seventh or eighth century ; and it has been prolonged to the present day. The celebrated Ram-Mohun-Roy, who died in England in 1833, had belonged to the Vedanta school.

Exposition.

Man aspires to perfect repose, and seeks, accordingly, to attach himself to something fixed and absolute, that he may be freed from all vicissitude and all transmigration. There are but two ways to attain this, science and good works. But good works, transient in their nature, can produce only a transient satisfaction ; science, devoted to the contemplation of that which passes not away, can alone elevate man above all change.

What are the means of attaining this science ? The senses are insufficient, for sensation apprehends nothing but that which is ever changing ; reasoning is insufficient, for this faculty, being in proportion to the endowment of each individual mind, is essentially relative, and can never be the measure of the absolute. It is necessary, then, to ascend to the revela-

* [The date assigned to the Institutes of Menu by Sir William Jones is 880 B.C. A still higher antiquity is attributed to the work by Schlegel, who places it at a period earlier than the Homeric poems. The Vedas are supposed by Colebrooke to have been compiled in the fourteenth century before Christ, by Sir William Jones in the sixteenth.

Ritter, in his History of Ancient Philosophy, comes to a conclusion precisely the opposite of the one given in the text ; and, in general, rejects the pretensions to high antiquity advanced in behalf of the Hindu philosophy.—*Ed.*]

tion of the absolute, immutable Being ; a revelation preserved from age to age by the masters of doctrine.

But, in order that the disciple may be initiated into this science, preparatory dispositions are requisite. He must divest himself of all desire for that which is temporal, whether it be earthly enjoyments, or whether it be the happiness, transient at its longest duration, which in other worlds will be the reward of works done in this in fulfilment of the precepts of the Vedas. He must close the gates of his soul against all external objects ; recall his senses within himself, and become absorbed in pious meditation. In fine, he must stir up in himself a strong desire for science. As the sick man comes to the fountain to cool his burning brow, so the disciple, tormented with the burning anguish imposed on man by the eternal law of transmigration, must come to the instructed master, bringing in his hand a gift as the symbol of the desires of his soul.

After this preparation the disciple can receive the revelation of science ; and that science is all comprised in this formula : *Brahma alone exists ; everything else is an illusion.*

The Vedantists prove this capital axiom by setting out from the very idea of Brahma. He is the one eternal, pure, rational, unlimited being. If there existed out of him realities, manifold, limited, compounded, they must have been produced by Brahma. But the production of them would be impossible except so far as Brahma possessed in himself the real principle of imperfection, limitation, multiplicity—things which are all repugnant to his very essence.

It follows from this that the mind of man in relation to truth exists in two states, the one corresponding to the condition of sleep or dreaming, the other

to that of being awake. When he regards the world, men, and himself as beings distinct from Brahma, he is in the state of dreaming, he realizes phantoms : when he recognises that Brahma is everything, he rises to the waking state, and science is this awaking of humanity.

The images which man perceives in the illusion or dream-state of the intelligence, may aid him to comprehend how nothing exists but Brahma. He is like a mass of clay, of which particular beings are the forms ; the eternal spider, which spins from its own bosom the tissue of creation ; an immense fire, from which creatures ray forth in myriads of sparks ; the ocean of being, on whose surface appear and vanish the waves of existence ; the foam of the waves, and the globules of the foam, which appear to be distinct from each other, but which are the ocean itself. To borrow other images, Brahma is like an infinite man ; the fire is his head, the sun and the moon his eyes ; he has for his ears the resounding vault of the heavens, his voice the revelation of the Vedas ; the winds are his breath, universal life his heart, the earth his feet. But all these images are very imperfect ; the variety of beings can, at the most, be conceived only as multiplied names of Brahma, and these names are also as false as names can be ; for they are not like words spoken in the intercourse of life, but only like the fantastic and arbitrary words which belong to the language of dreams.

When, contemplating Brahma through the veil of illusion, it is asked how the spectacle of creation goes on, Brahma appears at once active and passive : active, because he produces the phenomenal transformations ; passive, because he who transforms is at the same time he who is transformed. These

transformations follow a diminishing progression from more perfect to less perfect, that is to say, the distinctive forms which constitute the illusory world are more and more definite. Brahma desired to be multiple, and he produced light. The light desired to be multiple, and it produced water. The water desired to be multiple, and it produced the terrestrial or solid element. The more visible things are, the greater is the predominance of forms, and the more intense is the illusion. Brahma sees, but is altogether invisible; the human intelligence sees, but, invisible in its essence, it is visible only in the qualities which affect it; the material eye sees and is visible; the forms of things are visible, but see not.

But when we come out from the state of illusion and contemplate the universe, all forms, all names, all distinctions vanish, and we perceive no longer anything but substance, without distinction, without name, without form, the pure unity where the knowing and the known are identical.

When man has attained to this superior knowledge, he is at once freed from all error and all ignorance: from all error, because error is a particular affirmation which implies the distinction of beings; from all ignorance, because in affirming Brahma he affirms everything.

He is free, likewise, from all sin and all possibility of sinning, as well as from all obligation whatever, because all these things suppose the distinction of right and wrong, which does not exist and cannot exist in Brahma.

He is freed from all activity, because activity supposes two terms: something that acts and something acted upon, a duality which is illusory, since it is the negation of the unity, the absolute identity of all things.

He is freed from all emotion, all desire ; for he knows that he possesses everything.

Before the phenomenon of death, the soul of the wise man who has attained to the knowledge of Brahma continues, indeed, to perceive the illusory impressions, as the man who is aroused from a dream recollects when awake the impressions he received in sleep. But at death the soul of the sage is freed entirely from the dominion of illusion ; he is disenthralled in all respects from every vestige of individuality, from every name, from every form ; he is blended and lost in Brahma, as the rivers lose their names and their forms when swallowed up in the ocean,

Observations.

1. The Vedanta philosophy is an exhibition of pantheism in its greatest metaphysical strictness. It has given a complete formula of it. All the systems of pantheism which have since been imagined have added nothing fundamental.

2. It is very clear that, from the processes followed by the Vedanta philosophy, pantheism is a strictly necessary result. Refusing to admit as an ultimate truth and an article of simple belief the existence of contingent or finite beings, it would rest this truth only on demonstration. But the elements of this demonstration can never be drawn from the only notion it admits—the notion of the absolute, which implies in itself nothing finite.

3. In order to avoid misconception of the Vedantist reasoning, it must not be forgotten that this philosophy employs simultaneously two languages, the language of illusion and the language of science. From hence result series of propositions, which are only in appearance contradictory ; for the one ex-

press what is apparent, the other what is real ; the one have a relative, the other an absolute sense ; and all this is perfectly consistent, if it be granted that there are radically two orders of things, the one real, the other illusory. But the fundamental vice of Vedantism consists precisely in assuming the fact of these two orders ; for it implies a contradiction, since it is impossible to find in the pure and absolute essence of Brahma the ground of the asserted illusion.

4. The Vedanta system shows us also how pantheism must logically result in skepticism, the destruction of human knowledge. It must needs reject as illusive, and it does reject, all distinct notions, all notions grounded on distinction, and pretends to retain only the idea of absolute unity. But this idea is also distinct and supremely distinct, since it is opposed to all others. If, therefore, as conformably to the principle of pantheism must be the case, this distinction has only an apparent validity, a validity relative to our minds, all human ideas, without exception, vanish away. In a word, the act by which the mind affirms unity to the exclusion of multiplicity, the absolute to the exclusion of the relative, can take place only in virtue of a distinction which is itself but a phenomenon, and a phenomenon without a principle, the hypothesis of absolute identity.

5. Besides the leading points which have been indicated in this exposition, Vedantism embraces in its wide comprehension a multitude of other conceptions, which are common to it and to the other philosophies of India ; conceptions which it elaborates, modifies, and appropriates by impressing upon them the seal of its fundamental principle.

SECOND CLASS.

SYSTEMS IN PART CONFORMED, AND IN PART CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE VEDAS.

THESE systems are : 1. The Sankhya. 2. The Nyaya, with the Vaisechika.

1. THE SANKHYA.

KAPILA, who is regarded as the founder of this system, is represented in the Hindu legends sometimes as one of the seven great Richis or Sants that emanated from Brahma, sometimes as an incarnation of the god Vischnu, the preserver of forms, or of Agni, the god of fire. To him is attributed a collection of Soutras or aphorisms, distributed into six books. But the most complete exposition of the Sankhya doctrine is the Karika, a work of small extent, in a metrical form, and divided into seventy-two stanzas. It has been the text of a great number of commentaries.

By the name Sankhya is also designated the doctrine of the Yoga-Shastra, whose origin is carried back to a mythological personage named Patandjali, to whom many celebrated works are attributed.

We shall speak first of the Sankhya of Kapila.

*Exposition.**Sankhya of Kapila.*

As the word Sankhya signifies *number*, it has been thought to furnish ground for the conjecture that there was more or less of analogy between this system and the Pythagorean, in which numbers play so important a part. But what we know of the Sankhya doctrine does not confirm this conjecture. The root of the word signifies reasoning, deliberation; and it is more probable this denomination was applied either

by the founder or by his disciples, as to a system eminently founded upon the legitimate exercise of reason.

However this be, the object of this system, as of all the doctrines of India, is to lead by science to beatitude, either during life or after death. It contains two parts, the one metaphysical, the other logical.

Metaphysics of the Sankhya.

Science, as conceived in the Sankhya, comprehends the knowledge, 1. Of the first principles of all things ; 2. The combinations which result therefrom ; 3. The consummation of all things. Such, at least, are the three heads under which the several parts of this doctrine may be arranged.

Of the first principles of all things.

Of these there are twenty-five :

1. *Nature*, Prakriti, which is the root of all things, matter primordial and indeterminate, which may be perceived in itself, and which may be certainly inferred from its effects.

2. *Intelligence* or the *Great Principle*. It is the first product of Nature, and in its turn has produced other principles.

3. *Consciousness*, or the sentiment of self. This is the Intelligence individualizing itself.

4-8. *Five subtile particles* or atoms, derived from the individualized Intelligence : they are, as it were, the first form of individuality, its most delicate envelope, imperceptible to our senses.

9-19. *Eleven organs* of sense and activity. They are derived also from the Consciousness. Ten are internal, five of sensation and five of action. They unite in one internal organ, feeling, *manas*, which is at once the seat of sensation and the principle of action.

20-24. *Five elements* which proceed from the five subtile particles : the ethereal fluid, which is sonorous ; the air, which is sonorous and tangible ; fire, which adds to these two properties that of colour ; water, which possesses, in addition, savour ; and, lastly, the earth, which, besides the preceding properties, has also that of odour.

25. The *Soul*, Atma, which is eternal, immaterial, unchangeable, individual, multiple, sensitive.

Such are the twenty-five principles of things. The Soul implicated in the folds of Nature is the idea of the Universe, in which all these principles present a crowd of diversified combinations.

Of the combinations of the principles of things, or the Universe.

The various combinations from which result the universe constitute three sorts of creation : elementary creation, the gross creation, intellectual creation.

Creation elementary or personal. One of the principal objects of the philosophy of Kapila would properly be to explain how the soul becomes individual. Individuality, according to this system, may be apprehended under a form which envelops the soul, and to which the name of subtile or incorporeal person is given. This primordial form is independent of the gross elements which compose the body, and, consequently, it results only from the union of the intelligence, the consciousness, the five subtile particles, and the organs which are attached to them. This order of creation is called elementary, because, in the formation of the incorporeal person, the evolution of the principles does not extend beyond the elementary rudiments anterior to the formation of gross bodies.

Gross or corporeal creation. This creation, which

comprehends bodies formed of the five sensible elements, is divided into three worlds :

Above is the world of goodness, where virtue prevails : it is inhabited by beings superior to man.

Below is the world of obscurity or illusion : it is inhabited by beings inferior to man.

Between these is the human world, where passion predominates. It is the theatre of a misery from which the soul will never be delivered till it shall have attained to freedom from its union with the incorporeal person.

Intellectual creation. It comprehends the different states of the understanding, which may be clogged, or rendered incapable, or satisfied, or perfected. 1. The clogs of the understanding are error, presumptuous opinion, passion relative to objects of sense, envy, hatred, and fear. 2. The incapacity of the understanding comes from imperfection or injury of the organization, as blindness, deafness, etc. 3. The satisfaction of the understanding has its source in such opinions and convictions as afford tranquillity, but which, not being grounded upon the knowledge of the true principles of things, can never work out the final deliverance of the soul. 4. The perfection of the understanding is to be found in the various means by which it is prepared for and attains to science, which alone secures salvation from evil.

In order to comprehend the theory of the mind, it must be remarked farther that it possesses eight attributes, which are divided into two parallel but antipathic series.

Virtue, knowledge, calmness of sense or impassibility, power, which is the ability to work miracles : these are of the nature of goodness.

Sin, error, incontinence, infirmity, or weakness : these are of the nature of darkness.

This mixture of opposite qualities produces the state of passion and misery which is the condition of man.

Such are the ideas of Kapila respecting the three-fold creation. We have seen that three fundamental qualities, goodness, passion, darkness, play a great part, particularly in the corporeal and in the intellectual creation. These three qualities, which reside originally in Nature or the primordial matter (*Prakriti*), spread from its bosom through all the orders of creation, modifying various principles, and forming the source of multitudes of phenomena.

Goodness, or the essence of being, whose proper influence is to comfort, enlighten, elevate, when considered as in the corporeal world, predominates in fire, which for this reason tends, as we see in flame, to rise. Considered as in the spiritual world, it is the principle of virtue, by which likewise the soul is elevated.

Passion is tyrannical, impetuous, variable ; considered as in the corporeal world, it prevails in the air, which is in a natural state of agitation, and it is the cause of the transverse movements of the wind. In the world of spirits it is the cause of vice, which may be conceived in a transverse movement of the wind.

Darkness, heavy and resisting, considered in the corporeal world, prevails in the water and earth, which for this reason tend to fall or gravitate downward. In the world of spirits it is the cause of stupidity, which is the depression of the reason.

These three qualities, though opposite, concur to the same purpose, as the oil, the wick, and the flame, although contrary substances, concur in the production of the light which is diffused from a lamp.

Of the final end or consummation of all things.

Salvation is the being set free from the bonds in which nature has enveloped the soul.

The soul becomes free from these bonds by recognising that they are nothing but phenomena or appearances.

Thus, it begins by recognising that the gross elements are something purely phenomenal. This done, it is freed from the illusions of body; nevertheless, it is still enchained within the subtle (incorporeal) person through which its individuality is maintained.

But next it recognises successively that the principles which enter into the composition of the incorporeal person are likewise nothing but illusions :

In the first place, it perceives that the organs of sensation and of action, and the five subtle particles, that is to say, that which constitutes the organism of individuality, are nothing real.

But it is still implicated in self, in consciousness, which is the internal form of individuality. From this it is in like manner enfranchised.

There then remains no longer anything but the root of individuality, the intelligence, which, as a particular form of matter or Prakriti, is still something determinate. But yet, inasmuch as it is still a form, it is also to be conceived as something phenomenal.

Disengaged thus at last from all which produced the subtle person, the soul is set free from all the bonds of nature.

Thus, by the study of the principles of all things, science conducts to this definitive, incontrovertible sole truth : *neither do I exist, nor anything which pertains to myself*. All individual existence is a dream. Such is the enfranchising truth !

Logic.

Kapila admits three sources of human knowledge. "The knowledge of sensible objects," says the Kārikā, "is acquired by *perception*. *Induction* and *reasoning* conduct to the knowledge of things which escape the senses. But when a truth can neither be directly perceived nor inferred by reasoning, it is to be derived from revelation."

Does Kapila admit the revelation of the Vedas merely to avoid running counter to received opinions? Or, rather, does he resort to it as a means of filling up, by truths deemed incontestable, the chasms of his system, when the two other sources are at fault? Or, finally, is the human reason in his system really composed of two orders of knowledge of diverse origin? We do not undertake to answer these questions.

Perception corresponding only to sensible objects, and the theory of the principles of things comprising a multitude of assertions which the senses can never verify, the philosophy of Kapila rests almost entirely upon induction. By combining the different examples of induction cited by Colebrooke, we may reduce to the following formula the character of this philosophical process in the Sāṅkhya system: Induction consists in transforming that which passes in the sphere of human experience into general laws of the universe, that is to say, in making anthropology the measure of ontology.

It is by this process, in fact, that Kapila attempts to establish his theory of material nature and of the soul, *Prakṛiti* and *Ātma*, the two cardinal points of his whole philosophy.

In respect to the first point, he lays down the principle that the effect subsists anterior to the operation

of the cause, that is to say, what we call an effect, being only an emission of that which is contained in the cause, existed already before the emission itself took place. This principle is proved by examples taken from the circle of human experience. The oil is in the seed before it is expressed; the rice is in the husk before it is extracted, etc. Kapila concludes from this principle that everything which appears, everything which is distinct, is nothing but an emission, a manifestation of that which is contained in a general cause, in *Prakriti*.

He concludes also, by induction, that this general cause must be indistinct, indeterminate. We see that every determinate form is an effect proceeding from something which is indeterminate, at least relatively so. Thus a porcelain vase comes from something anterior, a mass of clay, which has in itself no determinate form. Every form, then, of the general cause, everything distinct, is an effect; the cause anterior to the effect is indistinct.

The foundation upon which Kapila builds in establishing the evolution of his original principles according to the order of succession above seen, appears to be induction or inference drawn from analogies of human experience. We know that observable effects preserve less analogy to their causes the farther they are removed from their source; from whence it results that their order of succession is represented by their different degrees of conformity to the cause itself. Now the great first cause, *Prakriti*, being indistinct, its first and most immediate effect should be one with the least definite representation of form, the least individuality. Such is the nature of Intelligence as compared with self-consciousness, in which latter the determination is more distinct. Self-consciousness, in its turn, is something

less definite than the subtile elements; and thus on to the gross elements, which have a form so distinct as to be perceptible by the senses.

With respect to the soul Kapila proceeds in a similar manner. His way of proving the existence of the soul is this: a bed is destined for some one to sleep upon, a chair for some one to sit upon. Generalizing such cases, he affirms that the whole collection of sensible objects is for the use of some different and foreign being: this being must be the soul. As every spectacle supposes a spectator, so the visible world supposes an observer of it, and this observer is the soul. So, again, it is matter of experience, that when a desire is common both to sages and to the mass of men, the satisfaction of that desire is possible. Now all men aspire after the termination of all vicissitude, the destruction of everything changeable; that is, all long for repose, for absolute abstraction. There must therefore exist a being capable of this absolute abstraction, and, of course, detached from all qualities. This being is the soul.

Kapila proves also, by various inductions, that souls are multiple and numerous. These inductions result in this general formula: birth, death, virtues, vices, happiness, misery, functions and actions, are not identical and simultaneous among all living beings, as they would be if one and the same soul animated all bodies.

Proceeding from previous conclusions, he proves the soul to be at once unproduced and unproductive. It is uncreated, since it is as different from Nature as the perceiver is from the visible object, and cannot therefore be an emanation from Nature: it is unproductive, uncreative, because it is destitute of qualities.

Observations.

Although the Sankhya enumerates twenty-five principles, it admits at bottom only two, Material Nature and the Soul, both real and substantial principles. Although the various principles which emanate from nature are purely phenomenal, yet nature itself is not represented in the system of Kapila as an appearance, but as the substance which supports the phenomena. Hence the doctrine of the Sankhya is a dualism.

But it presents a combination of ideas found in no other systems of dualism. In the latter the spiritual principle is the active, the creative principle, while the material principle is passive. In the Sankhya, on the contrary, the Soul is passive and unproductive; Nature alone is fruitful; it is the only principle of generation and of action. Other dualist philosophies conceive spirit under the notion of unity; matter under that of multiplicity, of division. With Kapila matter is the unity; real multiplicity does not exist except with respect to souls, which, eternal and imperishable, form a universe of spiritual atoms, where no original unity is found. Thus the consummation of all things is, on the one hand, nothing but the return of the phenomena into the material unity, and, on the other, the freedom, the complete development of spiritual multiplicity. Finally, dualism has almost always preserved, in the notion which it has formed of the uncreated spirit, some idea more or less modified of God. This idea disappears altogether in the doctrine of Kapila.

This system was a protest against religious ideas. Kapila puts one portion of the orthodox doctrine in contradiction with another portion. A special precept of the orthodox religion says, Slay the consecra-

ted victim ; but the general law says, Do harm to no living thing. He insists upon the insufficiency of religious practices compared with the supreme efficacy of science. Sacrifice, the most excellent of pious actions, procures, even according to the Vedas, only a finite reward, since the gods themselves perish, together with the universe, at the epochs of its periodical dissolutions. "Many thousands of Indras and other gods have vanished in successive periods, vanquished by time, for time is difficult to conquer." Science, on the contrary, by conducting the soul to the state of complete abstraction, frees it from the vicissitudes of time, and produces, not a transitory and relative, but an unchangeable and absolute happiness. And, since science is the only means which conduces to this definitive state, it follows, in the last result, that virtue is at the bottom nothing but the simple development of the intelligence, and that actions are indifferent.

Yoga Shastra, or the Sankhya of Patandjali.

The doctrine of Patandjali agrees in a great many points with that of Kapila ; it is sufficient to note the principal points of difference.

In the first place, Patandjali recognises a God who formed and governs the world. "God, Iswara, the supreme Ruler, is a soul distinct from all other souls, inaccessible to the evils which afflict them ; indifferent to actions good or bad and to their consequences, and to the ephemeral thoughts of man, which are but as dreams." Infinite and eternal, he possesses omniscience, and was the instructor of the first created beings, the divinities of mythology.

Kapila, on the contrary, expressly denies the existence of an infinite being who formed and governs the universe. "If detached from nature, and unaf-

fectured by consciousness and the other principles, he would have no motive to create anything ; if enchained in nature, he would not have the power." This is the first point on which the Sankhya of Kapila and the Yoga Shastra differ.

Secondly, although absolute abstraction is the common object of both systems, they still differ both in respect to the notion of this state and in respect to the means of attaining it. With Patandjali, complete abstraction is the absorption of the soul into God ; with Kapila it is simple liberation from the bonds of nature. The practices of devotion, which have for their object the subjugation of the mind and the body—the mind by withdrawing it from every particular thought, the body by preventing the senses from disturbing the self-collection of the mind—are in the doctrine of Patandjali the most effectual means of attaining to absorption into God ; while Kapila considers philosophical investigations as the best preparation for the supreme knowledge by which the soul obtains its entire deliverance.

2. THE NYAYA AND VAISESCHIKA SYSTEMS.

Historical Notices.

THE author of the Nyaya philosophy, or the philosophy of *reasoning*, is Gotama ; the author of the Vaisheschika, or philosophy of *individuality*, is Kanada.

The text of Gotama, which is a collection of aphorisms or *soutras*, divided into five books, and the *soutras* of Kanada, have given rise to a multitude of commentaries, in which the object has been either the explanation of these works entire, or of special portions of them, or to furnish matter accessory to the doctrine which they contain.

Although the Nyaya system is a system of logic,

and the Vaiseschika a physical philosophy, the latter is considered as the complement of the former in certain respects, and on this account they are commonly conjoined.

Exposition.

The Vedas prescribe the following method in the study of truth : the *enunciation* or *proposition*, which is the designation of a thing by its proper name, that is, a revealed term ; then the *definition*, which determines the characteristic qualities of the subject ; and, lastly, the *investigation*, which discusses the definition.

This method, however, is not perceivable, at least not clearly and precisely, in Colebrooke's exposition of the system of Gotama. Perhaps his exposition embraces only what relates to the third and most important part, namely, *investigation*.

However this may be, Gotama enumerates sixteen logical categories : 1. Proof ; 2. The Object or matter of Proof ; 3. Doubt ; 4. Motive ; 5. Example ; 6. The Truth demonstrated ; 7. The regular Argument ; 8. Reduction to the Absurd ; 9. Acquisition of Certainty ; 10. Debate ; 11. Conference or Interlocution ; 12. Controversy ; 13. Fallacious Assertion ; 14. Fraud and unfair Construction ; 15. Futile Reply ; 16. Defect in Argument.

This enumeration may, for easier recollection, be divided into three parts. The first treats of proof, that is, of the principles which constitute it ; the second comprehends everything relating to the objects of proof ; the third refers to what may be called the organization of proofs.

Principle of proof. (First category.) Proof, considered in its principles, may be divided into four kinds : 1. *Perception* ; 2. *Induction*, which is of three

sorts : consequent, when it ascends from effect to cause ; antecedent, when it descends from cause to effect ; analogous, when it is based upon analogies ; 3. *Comparison* ; 4. *Affirmation*, which embraces revelation and tradition.

Respecting the notion of cause, it should be remarked that Gotama admits three sorts of causes : the cause direct or intimate, as, for instance, the wool in relation to cloth, of which it is the material ; the cause mediate or indirect, as the carding of the wool, which concurs in the fabrication of cloth ; the cause instrumental and concomitant, which is neither direct nor indirect, as the craft which subserves the fabrication of the cloth.

Objects of proof. (Second category.) 1. The first and most important object of proof is the soul. The supreme soul is one ; it is the seat of eternal knowledge ; it is the creative, or, rather, disposing principle of all things. Individual souls are multiple. The proof of the existence of the individual soul of every man, as distinct from his body, results from his possessing particular attributes. Knowledge, desire, volition, etc., are characteristic attributes, and not, like number and quantity, common to all substances. The individual soul, present wherever the body transports itself, is for this reason infinite, and it is eternal also ; for that which is infinite is necessarily eternal.

2. The second object of proof is body. Without speaking of bodies which exist in other worlds, terrestrial bodies are either produced by the aggregation of atoms, determined by an unknown cause, or by generation, which comprehends four classes : viviparous ; oviparous ; worms and insects engendered by fermentation ; and, lastly, plants engendered by germination.

The human body is the seat of the soul, considered both as passive and as active ; under the first relation it is the seat of enjoyment ; under the second it is the seat of exertion.

3. The organs of sensation are the third object of proof. The external organs are not an emanation from consciousness, as in the Sankhya, but a material result of the following elements : the earth, which produces odour ; water, which produces taste ; light, which produces sight ; the air, which produces touch ; and, lastly, of the ethereal element, which produces hearing. This is the inverse of the doctrine of Kapila. Gotama explains the phenomenon of vision by supposing that a ray of light comes from the pupil of the eye, and directs itself towards the object perceived. Although this ray is not commonly visible, yet the light which comes from the eye of the cat, and other animals in the dark, is enough, according to Gotama, to prove its existence. He explains in a similar manner the phenomena of hearing, smell, etc.

The *manas*, or intellectual sense, effects, by means of the external senses, the knowledge of outward objects, and, by internal sensations, the perception of pleasure and pain.

4. The objects of the senses are the fourth object of proof. These are the elements enumerated above.

But here belong the categories of Kanada, which are particularly occupied with this subject. These categories are *six* in number. The first is *substance* ; there are nine substances : earth, water, light, air, ether, time, place, soul, and *manas*. Material substances are composed of atoms or substances simple, indivisible, and eternal. The existence of atoms is proved by this reason, that every composite must have components, and that the division *ad infinitum* of the components is absurd ; for it would

imply that an elephant and a grain of sand contain each an infinite number of parts, and must, consequently, be equal in extent. From whence it must be concluded that the mind necessarily decides for atoms or simple, and, therefore, unproduced parts; for production cannot be conceived, according to Kanada, except as an aggregation. Thus substances are eternal in the condition of atoms, although transient as aggregates. The five other categories of Kanada are quality and action, which reside in the substance; community, which makes many objects appear alike, and which includes genus and species; propriety or peculiarity, which is opposed to community; and, finally, intimate relation or aggregation. We now return to the categories of Gotama.

5-12. The other objects of proof are: the intelligence, which is divided into notions and recollections; the *manas*, considered now not as the organ of the senses and as a substance, but as the instrument of intelligence; activity or determination, which is the cause of virtue and vice; faults; transmigration, or the condition of the immortal soul when it passes from one body which dissolves into another which is reproduced; retribution; punishment; and, finally, salvation or deliverance, which the soul attains by distinguishing, in meditation on itself, its own essence from all the objects which surround it.

The organization of proofs. This part may be divided into three heads: the first relates to legitimate and conclusive proofs; the second to the discussion which brings proofs into play; the third to false proofs or sophisms.

Conditions of legitimate and conclusive proofs. (Third, fourth, and fifth categories of Gotama.) These are the doubt which is expressed by the position of the question; the motive or reason; then the

example, which is a point upon which, in a controversy, both parties are agreed.

(Sixth category.) The truth demonstrated: this is recognised either universally or individually, either hypothetically or by concession.

(Seventh category.) The regular or complete argument: this is a syllogism composed of five members: the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, the conclusion. The following is an example of the Hindu syllogism:

1. This mountain is burning;
2. For it smokes;
3. That which smokes burns, as the kitchen fire;
4. Accordingly the mountain smokes;
5. Therefore it burns.

(Eighth category.) *Reductio ad absurdum*. It consists in deducing from (false) premises conclusions manifestly inadmissible, which obliges us to renounce the premises.

(Ninth category.) The acquisition of certainty, which is the result of proof.

Discussion. (Tenth, eleventh, and twelfth categories.) *Debate* between two adversaries, where each endeavours to establish his own opinion and to subvert the opposite. *Interlocution* or conference takes place between two persons who confer together for the purpose of arriving at the truth. *Disputation*, which takes place when one of the controversialists seeks to overthrow the opinion of his adversary without meaning to advance his own proper opinion.

False proofs or sophisms. (Thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth categories.) These are fallacious assertions or the semblance of reason; the *non causa pro causâ*; fraud, or unfair construction, which consists either in altering the meaning of words, or in taking literally what is said metaphorically, or in

generalizing what is valid only in particular; the futile answer, or that which refutes itself; and, finally (sixteenth and last category), default of argument, or the ground of defeat, whereby discussions are brought to an end.

Observations.

1. The foregoing exposition, though somewhat dry, shows us, even in the centre of the Oriental world, in India, that old country of imagination and mystic illuminism, a logical system, extended, complicated, and elaborate, the existence of which had hitherto been unsuspected. The sole cradle of logic, it has been commonly thought, was Greece. To explain its origin we have gone back to the time of Aristotle, or, at the farthest, to Zeno of Elea. This explanation has become insufficient in face of the new questions which are now to be solved. Have the Hindu and the Greek logic a common origin? Was the one derived from the other at the period of the expedition of Alexander; or were fragments of the doctrine of the Brahmins carried into Greece, while, at the same time, some of the Greek systems succeeded in penetrating beyond the Indus? Is it the Hindu logic which became Greek, or the Greek logic which became Hindu? Or was it a parallel development, without any influence of one upon the other? These questions are not yet resolved. The last supposition appears the most reasonable.

2. Whatever may be the truth in regard to these questions, there are certainly many remarkable points of agreement between the logic of Aristotle, which has been the type of all European logic, and the logical labours of India. The science, as we have seen, was divided in the Hindu philosophy into three principal parts: the enunciation or proposition, the defi-

dition, and the investigation. This method corresponds, except in the difference of language, with the order followed by Aristotle, whose logic comprehends also three parts: the first treating of terms, which is the subject treated in India under the general head of enunciation; the second of propositions, which, by joining the attribute to the subject, determine the characteristics peculiar to the subject; and this, in Hindu logic, is the proper office of definition; and the third of the theory of reasoning and demonstration, which corresponds precisely to the investigation of the Indian logic.

3. The categories of Gotama, of which one part is a classification of the principal objects of philosophical investigation, and the other an exposition of the methods and processes of investigation itself, embrace also the two terms of human knowledge, the objective and the subjective; the realities which are the objects of cognition, and the laws of the mind itself as the cognitive subject. However imperfect the execution of the attempt may be, it denotes at once extended views, a spirit of analysis considerably developed. But these categories by no means correspond, as will be more particularly seen hereafter, to those of Aristotle. Those of Kanada are, however, analogous to the predicaments and predicables of the Greek philosopher.

4. The Hindu syllogism deserves attention in several respects. In the first place, philosophical investigation in its first development has scarcely any other process than the enthymeme; the syllogism, which necessarily implies general propositions, indicates a more advanced state when it is employed systematically as a complete form of human reasoning.

If we compare the European syllogism with that

of the Hindu logic, we see that the last three propositions correspond exactly to our syllogism, with only this difference, that the first or major term contains always an *example*. Under this name the dialecticians of India comprehend either a sensible object, or some particular point admitted or supposed to be admitted by those to whom the argument is addressed, and which in this relation becomes a fact. By means of the example as an integrant part of the syllogism, and inherent in the major premise, the general proposition is not presented except as realized in a positive fact, and thus abstraction takes a body and form. The philosophical idea which influenced such a combination is certainly not to be despised.

If we consider the five members of the Hindu syllogism, we shall perceive that it consists of two syllogisms resting on the same major proposition, or, rather, the same syllogism constructed in an inverse order. Setting out from the third, which is the major proposition, and which is placed in the centre, we find successively the minor and the conclusion, whether we go backward to the two anterior, or forward to the two posterior propositions. There exists a remarkable relation between this construction of the syllogism and the constitution of the human mind itself, which proceeds alternately by analysis and by synthesis. The first syllogism, which begins with particular propositions in order to arrive at a general proposition, corresponds to the process of analysis; the second, which begins with general in order to deduce particular propositions, corresponds to the synthetic procedure. But, however ingenious in theory may be a combination which makes a simple argument reflect the two fundamental methods of the human mind, it is not the less true that the Indian syllogism, which makes the mind travel twice

through the same route without learning anything, and to move heavily from drawing so much luggage, is very inferior as an instrument of discussion to the European syllogism, which is equally sure and more rapid. The one is like the heavy armour of the Macedonian phalanx, the other like the light and easy, but strong armour of the Roman soldiers.

As to the physical system of Kanada, the doctrine of atoms which is the basis of it differs in an essential respect from that developed by Epicurus. The latter supposes that atoms, diverse only as to their forms, are identical as to their essence; and, accordingly, he could not explain the universe except by laws purely mechanical, by the laws of motion, in virtue of which the diverse forms combine or separate. In the hypothesis of the Indian philosopher, there exist as many atoms, endowed with characteristic properties, and thereby essentially different, as there are general phenomena in nature. Sound proceeds from sonorous atoms, light from luminous, etc., so that the primitive formation of aggregates does not depend upon mechanical laws of motion, but upon intimate affinities, which tend to bring together atoms naturally analogous, and probably also to separate atoms that are essentially repugnant.

Kanada attaches to his atomistic theory a series of explanations of material phenomena, among which we note the three following points as having some relation to modern discoveries: 1. Gravitation is the cause of the descent of particular bodies; 2. That there exist seven primitive colours, although, indeed, Kanada places white and black among the number of them; 3. That sound is propagated by undulations, raying forth in all directions from a central point.

THIRD CLASS.

THE HETERODOX SYSTEMS OF THE DJAINAS AND
BUDDHISTS.*Historical Notices.*

THE Djainas and the Buddhists, who agree in formally rejecting the authority of the Vedas, are not simply philosophical schools, but religious sects, which attack orthodoxy in its source.

The Djainas are probably the Indian philosophers mentioned by the Greek writers under the name of Gymnosophists. In India, indeed, they are called Digambaras, which signifies *devoid of clothes*.

The Buddhists of whom Colebrooke speaks form a branch of that religious revolution which is connected with the name of Buddha, and which is entitled to a prominent place in the history of worship and sects. At a period which is not yet precisely determined, Buddhism, the character of which, in the present state of historical knowledge, is equally far from being perfectly understood, sprung up in opposition to the hierarchical constitution and doctrines of Brahminism, and maintained against it a long series of bloody struggles, which contributed at least to give a new impulse to philosophical activity.

The documents collected by Colebrooke respecting the philosophical opinions of the Djainas and Buddhists are incomplete compared with those he acquired concerning the doctrines of the other schools, and unfortunately, also, they are not entitled to the same degree of confidence. For, finding it impossible to procure original documents, he has formed his opinion from the testimony of their Brahmin oppo-

nents. In this deficiency of perfectly authentic sources, we must conclude this analytical exposition of the Hindu philosophy with some brief indications of the doctrine of these sects.

The memoir of Colebrooke on the Djainas and Buddhists contains also some glances at other less considerable schools. The Tcharvakas or Lokayatikas profess materialism, and regard thinking as the product of organization. Other sects, attached to the worship of Seeva, resemble in their doctrines the Yoga-Shastra of Patandjali; yet it appears they hold that primitive matter is the product of Seeva, the sole principle of the universe. A similar belief is found among the Pantcharatras or Bhagavatas, who, as religious sects, belong to the worship of Vishnu.

Exposition.

Opinions of the Djainas. Leaving out of view what concerns the worship of the Djainas, or the liturgical and ritual part of their doctrine, we notice the following opinions:

1. The Djainas explain the formation of the universe by identical or homogeneous atoms, the difference of existences being only the result of different combinations of these primitive elements.

2. Beings are divided into two great classes, animate and inanimate.

3. The soul is the subject of enjoyment, inanimate existences the objects of enjoyment.

4. Animated beings are eternal, yet still composed of parts, because they have bodies.

5. Animated beings are formed by the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, which are themselves aggregates of the primitive elements.

6. The soul exists in three states: it is either in *bondage* by its own activity, or *liberated* by the ful-

filment of precepts which are designed to destroy activity and the necessity of acting, or, finally, *perfect*, when all activity has ceased.

7. The doctrine of the Djainas, in respect to the causes which impede or secure liberation, contain maxims which for the most part enter into the common doctrine of most Hindu systems on this point, although they are modified by the peculiar principles of the Djainas.

Opinions of the Buddhists. It is much to be regretted that the philosophical opinions of the Buddhists are yet so imperfectly known. The little that is ascertained about them enables us to discover three schools very far advanced in the career of negative philosophy.

One school holds that everything is vacuum or non-being, and, as it distinguishes different degrees of vacuum or non-being, its doctrine has appeared to the first Orientalists who formed any notion of it, a mere tissue of extravagances. But more lately it has been perceived that by void, vacuum, or nonentity, it designated immaterial being. It admits no other existence than that of mind or spirit, an existence which is revealed in reflection. It is a system of spiritualism and idealism.

In the opposite extreme is another school. It professes sensualism and materialism. Its starting point is sensation, and it operates upon sensations by induction; but at this point the school divides. One section holds that the senses perceive external objects immediately, and that it is by induction we conclude the existence of the elements which compose these objects, that is, of the atoms, endowed with different qualities, which they communicate to the aggregates. The other section maintains that the senses do not perceive external objects immediately, but

by means of images and intermediate forms, from whence they conclude that the existence of the objects themselves, as well as their constituent atoms, is to be derived only by induction. Both sections agree, however, in holding that external objects have only a momentaneous existence; that they cease to exist as soon as they are not perceived, or, in other words, that the phenomena of external objects are perpetually changing; that their component atoms are perpetually separating to enter into new combinations, while the atoms themselves are the only invariable and substantial existences.

Finally, the third school, overpassing all the bounds of anterior philosophical negations, admits of no other real existence than that of *self*, which is eternal, and draws from its own depths all phenomena. This is individual pantheism, the opposite of other systems of pantheism, in which self (myself, I), as well as all individuality whatever, are held to be purely phenomenal.

The Buddhists conceive the series of phenomena which form both the physical and the moral or human world, as an infinite, necessary, and fatal chain of causes and effects, independent of all governing intelligence. For them the chief end, the salvation of the soul, consists in a state of complete apathy, where all thought is extinguished.

Observations.

The philosophical opinions of the Buddhist schools agree much more than most of the other Hindu doctrines which we have reviewed, with the systems professed in Europe in modern times. The spiritualism of the first school resembles that of Berkeley; the principles of the second coincide in many points with the materialism and sensualism of Cabanis;

the individual pantheism of the third has been reproduced in Germany by Fichte.

General Observations on the Hindu Philosophy.

I. We have thus far, with Colebrooke, classed the Hindu systems according to their external relations, that is, their conformity or opposition to the doctrine reputed orthodox. We must now, in recapitulating our survey of this great philosophical movement, consider these systems in respect to their intrinsic characteristics, by noticing the ideas which have predominated in them, and given them in some respects a sort of unity, and by referring to their fundamental grounds the differences which constitute their diversity.

II. The ideas common to most of these systems are the following :

1. Of one infinite, eternal substance, which is clothed with an innumerable multitude of forms, and manifests itself in that collective whole of phenomena which we call the universe ;

2. Of emanation, substituted for the notion of cause, properly so called, or of creation. The idea of creation implies giving reality to what did not before exist ; the idea of emanation merely implies either the manifestation of what before existed in a latent state, or the disengagement of a reality before existing, but confused with other realities, or the development of what before existed with all its constituent parts in a germe. These three senses of the word emanation express at bottom only one and the same idea ;

3. Of matter, considered as the means by which individual existences are formed. In most of the Hindu systems it has only an apparent existence ; in the others, matter, possessing a real existence, is the

invisible source of phenomena, of everything which has merely apparent existence ;

4. Of an infinite succession of periodical creations and destructions, giving to these words the meaning they have in the Hindu philosophy. When, by a gradual development, the series of emanations has reached its last term, the creation is complete. Then commences a destructive evolution. The emanations, falling back one into the other in the inverse order of their development, end by being absorbed into their substance. Then recommences the divine sleep of Brahma, the inaction of creative power, or, according to other conceptions, matter, the source of all production, returns to its state of indetermination. As an image of these alternations of production and absorption, the Hindus have taken the symbol of the tortoise, which by turns extends and draws in its feet ;

5. Of a state of abstraction by which the soul separates itself completely from nature, and even of a state of annihilation resulting from absorption into the substance : these are considered as states of perfect repose, supreme felicity, and the definitive object of science ;

6. Of a tendency to absolute indifference and apathy : a tendency which is conceived as the condition of human perfectionment even in man's earthly career. It does not radically exclude all activity ; for the very existence of Hindu philosophy is proof of great intellectual activity. But activity is admitted only as a temporary means ; that is to say, it should not be displayed except so far as its exercise is necessary to enable the soul to rise to that perfect repose where all activity entirely ceases.

To resume : the idea of unity, of that by which all things are one, *quà unum sunt*, not only predominates

in most of the Hindu systems over the idea of particular, distinct, and individual existences, but even effaces and destroys it. One of the two terms of creation is absorbed by the other, the finite by the infinite.

This characteristic tendency of the Hindu philosophy is perceptible even in the systems which have broken up the notion of the primitive unity by admitting two co-eternal principles. Thus, in the doctrine of Kapila, all the phenomena which compose the universe end by vanishing into the bosom of the eternal matter, and souls themselves, however great their multiplicity, arrive at an end common and identical to them all, of which it is hard to form a conception, but in which it is clear that all individuality disappears; for the general formula of this state is, *neither I myself, nor anything belonging to me, exists.*

III. Notwithstanding, however, the analogous tendency of most of these systems in many respects, yet this philosophy is divided by profound differences. Whenever and wherever human reason has attempted to solve the question of the origin of things, without taking for the basis of its efforts truths consecrated by universal tradition, three routes are open before it, three fundamental solutions present themselves: Pantheism, which beholds in finite beings only forms, modifications, of the infinite substance, the only really existing being; Dualism, which divides being or substance between two uncreated principles; Materialism or Atheism, which in place of the Infinite One substitutes a sort of indefinite multiplicity by the doctrine of atoms, a doctrine which is not explicitly brought out in all the systems of materialism, but which lies at the bottom of them all.

These three conceptions are developed in the philosophy of India. Pantheism has never been redu-

ced to formulas more strict, never been more boldly carried to its greatest height, than in the Vedanta school. In this pantheism particular beings are not even simple modifications of the Divine substance; the universe is nothing but the spectacle of his own thoughts, which God represents to himself by contemplating all the combinations which they would present if they were to be realized out of himself. The dualistic conception predominates in the Sankhya school; and Kanada pursues the materialistic solution of the great problem of the universe.

IV. If we possessed more complete information about Hindu views in regard to the origin of human knowledge, we should there also probably recognise solutions very different more or less explicitly adopted by the different schools.

The Vedantist school, which regards matter as a mere illusion, and with it all the sensible world, and which aspires to the contemplation of the absolute being, could not seek in sensation for the source of human reason. It comes, on the contrary, to a result the very opposite of sensualism, to illuminism, since it completely identifies the intelligence of man with the intelligence of God, making all the operations of human intelligence Divine acts.

Kapila and Kanada stand at the opposite extreme. They admit, philosophically, but one primitive element of reason, sensations upon which induction operates. There is, indeed, in this respect a want of harmony, and even a contradiction, between their psychology and their systems respecting the universality of things; for in the latter we see brought forward the ideas of eternity and of infinity, ideas which no operation of the mind can derive from sensations, because no sensation can contain the germe of them.

If the partisans of the Yoga-Shastra, or of the

Sankhya of Patandjali, had systematically occupied themselves with the question concerning the origin of knowledge, they would have been led to admit two primitive elements of the reason : sensations, by means of which material substance manifests itself to man, and conceptions of a higher kind, which reveal to him the Divine essence. Patandjali, in fact, seems to have combined the sensualist principles of Kapila with the illuminism of the Vedanta school, an illuminism which is particularly reflected in his theory concerning the transcendental contemplation whereby the soul is absorbed into God.

V. It would be interesting to know in what order of succession the philosophy of India has brought forth its different systems. While awaiting the historical investigations which may clear up this question, if indeed it can ever be done, we are reduced to conjectures. It is probable that the ancient Mīmāṃsā, the system most closely allied to the Vedas, was the first-born of this old philosophy. We should place next the Vedānta, because its spiritual pantheism, although it appears to us a corruption of the doctrine of the Vedas, harmonizes with it much more than any of the other systems. Possibly, this great idealism provoking, as all philosophical extremes, a reaction in the contrary direction, gave birth to the materialism represented by Kanada ; and the Sāṅkhya, with its doctrine of two principles, might then arise, if not as a reconciler, at least as a moderator for the human mind, tossed between two extremes. It may, however, be conjectured that philosophy would separate itself from the primitive doctrine only by degrees ; that it would not fall from spiritual pantheism into materialism and atheism without passing through an intermediate doctrine ; that, after having spiritualized everything into the absolute unity, it in-

vented dualism, which preserved still the spiritual principle, but combined it with a material principle, in order to avoid difficulties insolvable by pantheism; and that, at last, attaching itself exclusively to the second principle recognised in dualism, it sought in matter alone solutions which the other systems had not furnished. However this may be, yet as the necessity of logic, and particularly of dialectics, would not begin to be felt but in the sequel of a conflict of doctrines, we must not attribute to the logical system of Gotama an origin prior to that of the other systems. As to the rest, in venturing these conjectures respecting the order of their succession, we intend to speak relatively on the period when the leading and essential ideas of the several systems made their first appearance in the evolution of Hindu philosophy. For it is needless to observe that a system springing up previous to another system can nevertheless, only at a much later period, receive those developments which render its organization complete.

CHINA.

PRIMORDIAL CONCEPTIONS.

Historical Notices.

THE canonical books known by the name of King are the most ancient literary monuments of China. One of them, the Y-King, or Book of *Changes*, a sort of primitive encyclopedia, treats of a multitude of matters, which may be reduced to three heads: metaphysics, physics, and morals.

Fohi, founder of the empire of China, is the reputed author of the Y-King in its primitive form. The Chinese annals relate that writing was then not yet

invented, and that he composed this book with twenty-four characters or small lines, of which twelve were entire, and twelve cut in two or divided by a short space. The union of three lines formed a trigram. One of the first successors of Fohi perfected his work. He placed upon each of the eight primitive trigrams eight other trigrams, which produced sixty-four hexagrams. The founder of the dynasty of the Tscheous, King Ven-Vang, who lived twelve centuries before the Christian era, added to the hexagrams some very short marks, which his son Tscheou-Kong still farther improved. In spite of these successive additions, the Y-King would have become scarcely intelligible if, about five centuries before the Christian era, Confucius had not cleared up by his commentaries the table of Fohi, the notes of Ven-Vang, and the interpretations of Tscheou-Kong.

Exposition.

All things rest upon Taiki, *the great summit*, as rafters upon the ridge-beam of a house. The old Chinese philosophers gave to the great summit the name of Tao. Tao is identified with primitive reason, Li, from which it differs only as act differs from power. Taiki has produced two forms or two natures, Yang and Yn, the one perfect, the other imperfect. These are matter refined and matter gross, the celestial and terrestrial, clearness and obscurity, heat and cold, dryness and moisture, heaven and earth.

The two forms Yang and Yn have engendered four images, which appear to designate the two conditions of force or stability, of change or weakness, in which each of these two principles subsists. These two opposite states are expressed by the terms youth and age.

Yang and Yn, or heaven and earth, or the perfect

and imperfect matter, are considered as united in a marriage which, by means of the four images, produced the universe.

The four images, indeed, together with heaven and earth, produced the objects represented by the eight trigrams of Fohi, which correspond to all things.

Besides this twofold matter, the Y-King speaks also of spirits called sometimes Kuei-Chin, and sometimes simply Chin. They flow from the primitive reason into the twofold matter. Their power of action comes from numbers. Here is placed a mysterious theory very difficult to understand. We find a division of numbers into celestial and terrestrial, perfect and imperfect. Of the first ten numbers, the five unequal ones are celestial, the five equal terrestrial. The generation of the elements is represented by numerical combinations.

Man has two souls: the faculty of feeling resides in the grosser soul; the other soul, called Hang-Hoen, possesses the faculty of knowing. At death the former, sprung from earth, returns to it; the other ascends to heaven, from whence it came, and becomes *Chin*.

The morals of the Y-King rest upon this principle, that man ought to imitate the celestial reason, Tao, who, sublime in splendour and majesty, stoops down even to the earth. By humility likewise man will deserve to be raised up by Tao.

This in its principal bases is the philosophy of the Y-King, a very remarkable book, not only for the matter of its ideas, but also for its form; for the eight trigrams of Fohi, and the sixty-four hexagrams obtained by their multiplication, represent by their position, their combinations and qualities, the changes which take place in the physical and moral world.

Observations.

1. We find here, at the beginning of the Chinese philosophy, under an image proper to that philosophy, a conception which always appears at the head of all theological theories. It is this: that the human mind has always conceived the primitive ground or root of all things as in God; this is that incomprehensible something which can be conceived only as the support, the absolute basis of everything that exists, or, to speak after the Chinese fashion, *the great summit* which sustains the existence of all other beings. This figure of language is in some respects strikingly significant. The word substance, support, basis, expresses in itself something which lies *beneath*, but God is *above* all. It is needful, therefore, to indicate at once these two relations; and this is well expressed by the Chinese term which represents God as a sublime support.

2. But the great summit, inaccessible, impenetrable to human intelligence, is not a blind and formless principle. It is Li and Tao, reason and law; and, as such, reveals itself to our minds.

3. The conception of the universe in the Y-King contains an idea common also to nearly all philosophies. The creation which proceeds from the grand summit comprehends two subordinate principles, the one active, the other passive. The *Chin*, the genii, which are the forces of Nature, are eminently the active principle; matter is, compared with them, the passive principle, moved and directed by them. But by the distinction of two kinds of matter, the Yang, in virtue of its perfection, is considered as active relatively to the Yn or imperfect matter.

These two great principles of Nature enter also into the composition of Man, who is thus a lesser world, a microcosm of the universe.

4. Whatever may be the precise character or value of the theory of numbers, one cannot help remarking with interest, in one of the first attempts of ancient philosophy, the germe of the idea that the operations of Nature correspond in certain respects to mathematical laws. We meet with this idea in all periods of philosophy. It has been often a barren, unproductive idea; it has been often falsified, profaned by a mixture of visionary conceits and by extravagant applications; yet the movement was to go on till at length it received a great and legitimate application, on which depended the progress of the physical sciences. The sciences which have for their object the inorganic world, have three things to do: they must first state facts; then observe their constant relations of coexistence or succession, from whence their laws are inferred; and, lastly, reduce these laws to mathematical formulas, as Kepler and Newton have done in regard to the astronomical phenomena. By an admirable instinct, the author of the Y-King seems to have had a sort of confused presentiment of a truth which, thirty centuries later, was to organize the physical theory of the world.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT.

Although China, at least so far as our knowledge goes, has never been the theatre of a great philosophical development which can be compared with the Hindu philosophy, it has produced, nevertheless, about the sixth century before the Christian era, two remarkable schools.

The Y-King contained in the first place a metaphysical and cosmological doctrine; secondly, an ethical doctrine, which is the foundation of two other Kings, the Chon-King, where it is blended with

history, and the Che-King, where it is presented under the form of didactic poetry. Chinese philosophy is divided into two schools, corresponding to these two principal branches of the primitive science. The school of Lao-Tseu was metaphysical; ethical studies predominated in that of Confucius.

LAO-TSEU.

Historical Notices.

LAO-TSEU was born in China, in the province of Hou-Koang, about the beginning of the sixth century B.C. The legends say that he came into the world with white hair, a type of his precocious wisdom; hence the name of Lao-Tseu, which signifies the *old child*. In the memoir which Abel Remusat has devoted to this philosophy, may be seen the little that is known of the circumstances of his life. He appears to have taken a long journey to the regions of the West. Neither the place nor the date of his death is known. It is said that, seeing the empire ruined by great disorders and tottering to its base, he withdrew into a remote province, to live there in solitude. The mandarin of the place received him with kindness, and desired him to compose a book in which the principles of his doctrine should be clearly expounded. Lao-Tseu composed the *Tao-Te-King*, or *Book of Doctrine or Virtue*. This done, he sought another retreat and disappeared.

He is said to have had an interview with Confucius, which is thus related by Father Amyot in a narrative composed from the Chinese legends. Lao-Tseu, fixing his eyes on Koung-Tsee (Confucius), said: "I have heard of you, and I know your reputation. They say you do not speak except from the ancients, and that you retail only the maxims they

have taught. For what good do you take so much trouble to revive men of whom there exists no longer any vestige upon the earth? The sage should occupy himself only with the times in which he lives, and should have regard only to present circumstances. If the times and circumstances are favourable, he should profit by them; if, on the contrary, they do not favour, he should retire and keep himself tranquil without troubling himself about what others are doing. He who possesses a treasure does not care to show it to all the world; he preserves it to use in a time of need; you would do the same if you were a true sage. It seems by your conduct that you are ostentatious in this, and that you are carried away by pride. Correct this fault; purge yourself from all desire of pleasure: this will make you much more useful than all you are trying to learn about the ancients. You were desirous to know in what my doctrine consists; I have just given you the substance of it; profit by it. I have no more to say to you." Koung-Tsee was not offended at the harsh manner in which the old man spake to him, but, departing from him, contented himself with saying to his disciples: "I have seen Lao-Tseu; and, now that I have seen him, I know him as little as I know the dragon. The birds cut the air with their wings, the fishes swim in the waters, the quadrupeds press the earth with their feet in walking: how all this is done I know. But as to the dragon, I know not how he can descend from the clouds and reascend again. I know, moreover, how it is necessary to catch birds in snares, fish with hook and line, and to strike down beasts with the dart; but I know not how to go about to take the dragon: and so it is with Lao-Tseu."*

* Amyot, *Mémoire concernant les Chinois.*

Exposition.

Until the questions respecting the doctrine of Lao-Tseu are more completely settled, it must suffice to introduce here the comparison drawn by Abel Remusat of this doctrine with that of several Greek philosophers. We interpose in this brief analysis the Chinese passages which are used as points of comparison.

1. Lao-Tseu maintains, like the Platonic and Stoic philosophers, that the first principle of all things is reason; a sublime, indefinable being, of whom there is no type but himself. Like Plato, he gives to this being a name which signifies reason and speech or word. "The (primordial) reason can be subjected to reason (or expressed by words); but it is a supernatural reason. We may give it a name, but it is ineffable. Without a name it is the principle of heaven and earth; with a name it is the mother of the universe. It is necessary to be without passions in order to contemplate its excellence; with passions we contemplate only its less perfect state. There are but these two ways of designating a single unique source, which may be termed *impenetrable depth*: this abyss contains all the most perfect beings. Before chaos, which preceded the birth of heaven and earth, there existed but one sole being, infinite and silent, immutable, always acting, yet never changing. We may regard it as the mother of the universe. I know not its name, but I designate it by the word *reason*."

2. Like Pythagoras, he makes all beings to be linked to a monad. "Reason has produced one; one has produced two; three has produced all things. "Unity," says Hoai-Nan-Tseu, "is the root of all things; it is the reason which has nothing equal to

itself." According to Wei-Kiao, the One is the substance of reason, the purity of celestial virtue, the origin of bodies, the principle of numbers."

3. Like Plato, he regards the world and man as the copy of a divine archetype. "Obliged to give a name to the principle of things, I call it magnitude, progression, remoteness, opposition. [These last names seem to signify that the reason is of an essence contrary to the finite and imperfect nature of beings.] There are in the world four magnitudes, that of reason, of heaven, of earth, and of the king, which is one of the four. Man has his type and model in the earth, the earth in heaven, heaven in reason, reason in itself."

4. Like Pythagoras and most of the Greek philosophers, he believes souls to be emanations of the ether, which are going to return to it at death; and like Plato, he denies to the wicked the power of reuniting to the universal soul. Like Sallust, he imagines there is between the two principles matter and mind a bond of harmony, which is the air, the breath of life, the universal soul. "All things rest upon matter, and are enveloped by the ether. A subtile vapour, the breath of life, which keeps them in union, maintains harmony between them. Beings grow at the expense of the universal soul, which in its turn grows by their perishing. I teach in this only what I have been taught by others. But violent and evil men will not enjoy such a death [be united to the universal soul]: on this point it is I myself who am the father of doctrine."

In order not to misconceive the doctrine of many of the Greek philosophers, to whom the remark of Abel Remusat refers, and also, perhaps, the better to understand that of Lao-Tseu, we must keep in mind the distinction of two souls, the one gross and sensi-

tive, the other pure and intellectual: we have met with this distinction before, in the Y-King. It is probable that Lao-Tseu regarded the *breath of life* as the principle of the soul, and to which it was destined to be reunited.

5. Like the Platonic philosophers, he opposes the primitive state of the Divine intelligence before the creation of the world to its actual state since the unfolding of chaos, and since it has conceived and created the world. See the latter part of the passage cited in the first of the foregoing extracts.

6. With the Platonists, he also composes a mystic and supreme triad, either of three ages or periods of God, or of his principal attributes; and this ineffable triad he designates by a name taken from the sacred writings, and which has its root only in the Hebrew language. Compare the second of the previous quotations with the following: "That which you look at and do not see, is called I; that which you hearken after and do not hear, is called HI; that which your hand reaches after and cannot grasp, is called WEI. These are three beings which cannot be comprehended, and which together make but one. That which is above is no more brilliant; that which is beneath is no more obscure. It is a chain without break, which cannot be named, which returns into nonentity. It is that which may be called form without form, image without image, being indefinable. If you go to meet it, you see not this principle; if you follow it, you see nothing beyond. He who grasps the old state of reason (that is, the negation of beings before the creation) in order to estimate present existences or the universe, he may be said to have hold of the chain of reason."

CONFUCIUS.

Historical Notices.

CONFUCIUS, whose Chinese name is KOUNG-Tsee, was born in the province of Lou in the year 551 B.C. Having lost his mother when he was twenty-four years old, he passed three years in solitude and grief, during which his vocation for philosophy was developed. China presented at that period symptoms of a threefold decline, religious, moral, and political. To remedy so many disorders, he undertook to re-establish the ancient maxims, to found a school for propagating them, and to apply them with all his influence in the exercise of the public functions to which he should be called. These three spheres of exertion employed his whole life. He did honour to the dignities with which he was clothed by making them subservient to the reformation of abuses, and did still more honour to himself by the tranquil firmness with which he bore disgraces and persecutions. He had during his life more than three thousand disciples scattered throughout the Chinese empire, the principal provinces of which he had travelled over, preaching his doctrine. Some of his disciples, who continually lived with him, followed him about everywhere till his death. But neither the foundation of his school, nor his labours as a magistrate, were anything but means for the accomplishment of the great project to which he was devoted, and which was the soul of all his teachings and journeyings. This was to revive the ancient doctrine; and he employed many years in arranging the books of the Y-King, the venerable documents in which this doctrine was deposited. He completed the restoration of them in his old age. The Chinese historians contain an affecting recital of the religious act with which

he crowned his labours. "Having finished his literary career, he felt it his duty to return thanks to heaven for having given him life and strength to bring it to a conclusion. He assembled his most attached disciples, upon whom he most depended for the propagation of his doctrine after his death; and, having led them to the foot of one of those ancient hillocks near which a *ting* or pavilion had been built to preserve its memory, he directed them to prepare an altar. The altar being prepared, he laid thereon the six books of *King*; then, casting himself upon his knees, with his face to the north, he paid his adorations to heaven, and gave thanks, with expressions of the most sincere gratitude, for the distinguished favour which had been granted to him in prolonging his life long enough to accomplish the object for which alone he desired to live. He had prepared himself for this pious ceremony by purification and fasting, and he concluded it by the entire and unreserved offering up of the fruit of his labour."*

He composed, besides, several works upon morals, which have been commented upon and unfolded by his disciples, of whom the most celebrated was Meng-Tseu. Confucius died in the seventy-third year of his age, 479 B.C. A little while before his death he said to one of his disciples, "Kings have nowadays all degenerated from the virtue of their ancestors; none of them have liked the doctrine I have proclaimed; this is the true subject of my grief." He would have gone down to the grave without such a load of sorrow if he could have foreseen the influence which his doctrine was destined to exercise. Divine honours were paid to his memory, and China reveres him as the most exalted of sages.

* Mémoires concernant les Chinois, t. xii.

Exposition.

The following passage contains the substance of the moral precepts of Confucius.

"I teach you nothing," said he continually to his contemporaries, "which you might not learn of yourselves, if you would only make a proper use of the faculties of your mind. Nothing is more natural, nothing more simple, than the principles of the morality which I endeavour to inculcate in its salutary maxims. Everything I tell you has been practised by our ancient sages before you; and this practice, which in remote times was universally adopted, resolves itself into the observance of the three fundamental laws pertaining to the relations of sovereigns and subjects, of fathers and children, of husband and wife, and the exact practice of five chief virtues, which it is enough to name in order to give you the idea of their excellence and the necessity of practising them. They are, humanity, that is to say, universal charity between all of our race without distinction; justice, which gives to every individual what is his due without favouritism or partiality; conformity to established usages and ceremonies, in order that those who live together may have the same manner of living, and share alike the same advantages and inconveniences; uprightness, that is to say, that rectitude of mind and heart which leads one to seek and desire the truth in everything, without wishing to deceive himself or others; finally, sincerity or good faith, that frankness, that openness of heart, blended with confidingness, which excludes all feints, all disguise in conduct or action. These are the virtues which rendered our primitive teachers respectable during life, and which have immortalized their names after

their death. Let us take them for our models ; let us do our best to imitate them.”*

The peculiar character of the doctrine of Confucius is, that all the duties of man are presented as various forms of domestic duties. The law of the family is the universal law. It is the mother-idea of that philosophy which reduces all the virtues to the single one of filial piety. “Confucius, being seated with Theng-Tseu, said to him, ‘Do you know what was the supereminent virtue and essential doctrine which our ancient kings taught to all the empire in order to maintain harmony between their subjects, and to banish discontent between superiors and inferiors?’ ‘How should I know,’ answered Theng-Tseu, respectfully rising, ‘I, who am so little instructed?’ ‘Filial piety,’ replied Confucius, ‘is the root of all the virtues, and the first source of all instruction.’”

The spring of all evils is the strife that exists between superiors and inferiors. From this antagonism comes everything which disturbs harmony. The virtue which would make this antagonism disappear is therefore the radical virtue ; and this is the effect of filial piety. But, to conceive its universal efficacy, it is necessary to comprehend this virtue in all its extent. “It is divided into three vast spheres : the first is that of the care and respect due to parents ; the second embraces everything which relates to the service of prince and country ; the last and most elevated is that of the acquisition of the virtues, and of that which constitutes our perfection.”

The family, the state, the universe, are facts of the same type. The father, the sovereign, God, are the heads of this threefold family. The authority of the father is the authority of God ; the authority of the

* *Mémoires concernant les Chinois*, t. xii.

prince is that of the father. Children are to their father what subjects are to their prince, and what all men are to God.

First sphere of filial piety, respect and care for parents. This duty rests upon all, from the emperor to his lowest subject; it nowhere begins or ends. "The wisest emperors of antiquity served their fathers with true filial piety; hence you may see why they served *Tien* with so much intelligence. They served their mothers with true filial piety; this is the reason why they served *Li* with so much religion. They were full of condescension to old and young; this is the reason they governed so happily both superiors and inferiors. *Tien* and *Li* being served with understanding and heart, the intelligent spirit was displayed."

This general duty varies in its application according to different social conditions. The great, the men of letters, should manifest their filial piety by appropriate acts; so the filial piety of the emperor has its appropriate manifestation; and, in fine, in the lowest ranks of society, this virtue consists summarily for the multitude in putting to advantage all the seasons of the year, drawing sustenance from all the land, and prudently economizing it for the support of their fathers and mothers.

Second sphere of filial piety, the service of prince and of country. The relations of father and son give the first idea of prince and subject. "The prince is the father and mother of the people. . . . Have for your father the love which you have for your mother, and the respect with which you are penetrated towards your prince. You will serve the prince with filial piety, and you will be a faithful subject; you will be deferential to those who are above you, and you will be a submissive citizen. . . . He

who revolts against his sovereign cannot bear to have any one above him ; he sins in that he possesses in his heart no filial piety, the principle which inclines to obedience."

Third sphere of filial piety, the acquisition of the virtues, and of that which constitutes our perfection. However great the respect of the child for his father or of the subject for his prince, it should not degenerate into a blind submission to their mere will. "I make bold," said Theng-Tseu, "to ask if a son who obeys the wishes of his father fulfils thereby all the duties of filial piety?" "What is it you ask?" replied Confucius. "The emperor anciently had seven sages as censors, and, although he gave way to great excesses, he did not carry them so far as to lose his empire. A prince had five sages to reprove him, and, although he gave way to great excesses, he did not go so far as to lose his states. A noble of the empire had three sages to admonish him, and, although he gave way to great excesses, he did not go so far as to lose his mansion. A man of letters had one friend to admonish him, and he never went so astray as to disgrace his name. A father had his son to admonish him, and he never erred so far as to fall into dissoluteness. As soon as a thing is decided to be wrong, a son can no more be free of the duty of reproving his father than a subject his sovereign. Now, since a son ought to reprove his father when he does wrong, how can he fulfil the duties of filial piety if he limits himself to mere obedience to his father's will?"

Thus there exists a law superior to that of a father and of a prince. Just as the commands of a father are subordinate to the just orders of the emperor, so the will of both the father and prince are subordinate to an invariable and eternal rule, obe-

dience to which is the highest act, the supreme fulfilment of filial piety. This law is the law of *Tien* or of heaven, the Divine law. The service of *Tien* is the source of the intelligent spirit or of true wisdom, and it is necessary to ascend to him to find the origin of duties; "for the immutable relations of father and son flow from the very essence of *Tien*." Such are the three spheres of filial piety.

The duties of husband and wife, brother and sister, stand in relation to domestic paternity, from whence they are derived, as the duties of citizen to citizen are derived from political paternity personified in the prince, the image of *Tien*, whose law is the foundation of the relations which unite all mankind.

Filled with admiration at the doctrine of his master, Theng-Tseu exclaims: "O immensity of filial piety, how wonderful thou art! As is the regularity of the stars to the firmament, the fertility of the plains to the earth, such continually is filial piety for the people. The heaven and earth are never disordered: let the people imitate them, and the harmony of the world will likewise be as perpetual as the light of heaven and the productions of the earth. See here why it is that the doctrine of filial piety has no need of rebuking in order to amend, nor its politics of threats in order to govern."

Most of the foregoing quotations have been extracted from Father Cibot's paraphrase of the Hiao-King, or Book of Filial Piety, a work which is considered in China as expressing the doctrine of Confucius, and whose author appears to have been one of his disciples, the very Theng-Tseu, indeed, who figures in the work only as a simple interlocutor.

Observations.

However beautiful and however pure in many re-

spects the moral doctrine of Confucius is, it yet contained a profound defect, which has exercised a fatal influence upon the destinies of the vast empire of which he was the legislator. This vice is the radical confusion of political society, the state, with the family, where all the possessions are the possessions of the father, and where all wills should be nothing but his will. This confusion, which is the basis of the Chinese institutions and the pivot of the doctrine of Confucius, excludes from human society the element of individual liberty in order to give exclusive predominance to that of obedience. Hence the immobility of the Chinese nation, whose only strength has been that of stability without progress, just as the Grecian nations have displayed great activity without possessing the principle of stability or long life. Christianity has communicated to the nations whom she has enlightened both these elements, whose different combinations form the principal phases of modern societies, as their harmony constitutes the perfection to which they have attained.

Principal Disciples of Confucius.

Theng-Tseu, born about 505 B.C. He committed to writing the answers of Confucius, who had a great esteem for his knowledge and virtue. Besides the Hiao-King already mentioned, he composed the Tai-Hio, or Book of the *Great Science*, which treats of the different duties of man. The date of his death is unknown.

Tseu-Sse, grandson of Confucius. After the death of his grandfather, whose instructions he had attended till his thirty-seventh year, he still continued his studies under the direction of Theng-Tseu. He is probably the author of the Tcheoung-Young, or *Immutable Medium*, which has been attributed to

Confucius. In this treatise moral considerations are blended with metaphysical reflections. Tseu-Sse died about 353 B.C.

Meng-Tseu, born about the beginning of the fourth century B.C., was the disciple of Tseu-Sse. Next to Confucius, he is the most celebrated of the Chinese philosophers. The book which bears his name develops the doctrine of Confucius in forms less austere and more lively than those adopted by the grave patriarch of the Chinese philosophy. Abel Remusat remarks that the method of discussion in the Meng-Tseu resembles the Socratic. Although he insists, after the example of his master, upon the duty of political obedience, he opposes energetic demands in favour of the law of justice to the capricious or tyrannical will of power. He died about 314. The book of Meng-Tseu has been lately translated into Latin by Mr. Stanislaus Julien.

Chinese Philosophers in Modern Times.

The thirteenth century after the Christian era witnessed the formation, in the native land of Confucius, of a school which has deviated from the path he had prescribed. It has put in vogue a sort of material pantheism, which gives to morality no religious basis, and has produced a bad physics, founded upon abstractions, which, while pretending to explain everything, explains nothing.

P E R S I A.

PRIMORDIAL CONCEPTIONS.

Historical Notices.

THE most ancient records of the doctrines of Persia are contained in the collection known by the name of Zendavesta. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Anquetil du Perron, a French scholar, travelled into the East to collect them, and, after many years of fatigue and danger, succeeded at last in making this rich contribution to European knowledge. The translation which he has given of the work is accompanied by notes which prove the conscientious erudition of this learned Orientalist. The younger Burnouf has published a new translation, with explanations.

These writings, attributed to Zoroaster, belong to a very remote period, which has not yet been settled with exactness and certainty. It is probable that when they were composed, or, at least, when the doctrines of which they are the depository were promulgated, the traditional truths that constituted the primitive religion had been corrupted in Persia by a gross star-worship. The object of the doctrine of Zoroaster was to reform and purify the worship by recalling it to spiritualism; by representing, that is, the sensible world as the envelope and symbol of the spiritual world.

The Zendavesta comprises two sorts of documents :

The Vendidad, the Izeschnee, and the Vispered, written in the Zend language, are principally liturgical. But they contain, in the midst of a multitude

of prayers and ceremonial prescriptions, some doctrinal notions. These scattered conceptions are not exhibited in the form of a system, nor even of a didactic composition. By comparing and combining them, we can, however, to a certain degree, reconstruct them as a whole.

The Boudeshesch, or *that which has been created from the beginning*, written in the Pehlvi dialect, contains, as its title implies, a cosmogony which sheds great light upon many portions of the doctrine of the Zend documents. From this cosmogony proceeds, as so many branches, various series of notions relating both to the intercourse of men with God, or religion, and to the intercourse of men with each other. The ideas which it contains respecting the first of ancient sciences, astronomy, and the first of arts, agriculture, reflect, under this twofold celestial and terrestrial relation, the intellectual condition of the mysterious land of the Magi, a sacerdotal corporation which was to Media and Persia what the Brahmins have been to India.

Exposition.

1. In the beginning existed Time illimitable. Under this name the Zendavesta recognises the primitive unity, the source of being. Here appears already a difference between the Persian and Hindu doctrines. The former embrace God in his complete character, his character of infinitude; the latter, in order to define God, consider only one aspect of infinitude, eternity or infinity in duration. This abstraction, with which the Persian conceptions begin, would of itself be enough to lead to the conjecture that they would exhibit a body of ideas less extensive than that which has proceeded from the doctrine of the Vedas; and this is, in fact, the case.

2. The Eternal, or Time without bounds, first produced Ormuzd, the supremely pure and good being. He is the Light, and the Creative Word.

3. Time without bounds produced also Ahriman, the Evil Being, the principle of Darkness. He is the essence hidden in crime, the author of discord and anarchy, the chief of those who have no chief.

4. According to ancient Persian traditions, collected by Sharistani, Ormuzd should be regarded as properly the spiritual principle, and Ahriman as the genius of matter, which is the shadow of spirits.

5. Dependant originally upon these two principles, the creation contains in its bosom a radical hostility, a necessary strife, and the idea of conflict becomes the general formula of the universe. This conflict is represented in the physical world by the succession of day and night, which dispute the empire of Time, and alternately put each other to flight.

6. Ormuzd at first produced the Fervers, the living types of all things, then the Amschaspands and the Izeds, kings of good genii, who believe and adore. Ahriman, to resist these powers of light created by Ormuzd, produced the Dews, powers of darkness, evil and unbelieving genii, one of whose offices it is to utter the formula of skepticism, *perhaps*.

7. Thus the superhuman creation is twofold: it comprises two opposite worlds; and this hostility is introduced also into the inferior creation, the human or terrestrial world. Ormuzd had produced the germe of this inferior creation; a germe which contained the principles of human, and also of animal and vegetable life. This creation in the germe is represented by a bull, the symbol of organic force. Ahriman, after having urged his efforts against heaven, redescended to the earth, and wounded the mystic bull; but his fruitful death became the source of

life. From the left shoulder issued his soul, the vital and conservative principle of all animals, and from his right shoulder proceeded the first man. His blood produced the clean animals, and the wholesome plants sprang from his body. To maintain the conflict in this sphere of creation, Ahriman formed immediately the unclean animals and noxious plants.

It may be observed here that the mythus of the primitive bull envelops the philosophical conception of the unity of the vital principle in all organized beings.

8. To the world of genii created by Ormuzd, Ahriman had opposed the world of evil genii; to the animal and vegetable creation placed below man in the scale of being, he had opposed a creation of the same order, but corrupt and corrupting. Man, placed between these two extremes, had alone escaped this antagonism of the creation. Ahriman had not been able to find any means of creating a bad man. He had no other resource but to slay him; and the primitive man, Kaiomorts, who was at once man and woman, fell beneath his blows. From his blood sprang, by means of transformations, Meschia and Meschianee, ancestors of the human race, who were soon seduced by Ahriman, and became worshippers of the Dews, to whom they offered sacrifice.

9. From thenceforward a great conflict between Ormuzd and Ahriman has been maintained in the human race. Men pass their lives upon the earth under a twofold influence, from the good genii and from the Dews, which tends to sanctify or to defile their souls, and under a twofold contact, with pure and with impure material objects, which produces either purity or defilement of body. Hence the necessity of a double purification, spiritual and corpo-

real. This purification is wrought by prayers and rites taught by Ormuzd to Zoroaster.

10. The souls of men who follow Ahriman will go to dwell with the Dews in the abyss of darkness: those who hearken to Ormuzd will be united to him and to the good genii in light and blessedness. However, in the end, Ahriman himself shall be purified, evil shall be subdued, the antagonism of creation shall disappear.

Observations.

Traditional doctrines are so blended in the Zendavesta with philosophical conceptions, that it was impossible to sketch the principal points of this old philosophy without bringing into the exposition views which are evidently only fragments of an earlier tradition.

In a philosophical point of view, the Persian conceptions present a striking contrast to those of the Hindus. In the philosophy of the Vedas, the unity of the creation is the predominating idea, and in certain respects the exclusive idea. The presiding idea of the Zendavesta is not only the duplicity, but the antagonism of creation throughout every sphere of it.

This antagonism does not, however, constitute dualism in the sense in which it designates subsequent developments in the history of philosophy; dualism, that is, as maintaining two co-eternal, necessary, and uncreated principles. The principle of light and the principle of darkness in the Zendavesta both proceed from a primitive unity, Time without bounds. Unity appears at the origin of creation; it appears again at the final consummation, in the ultimate triumph of good.

It should be observed, also, that the unity of the creation, broken by the hostility of Ormuzd and Ahri-

man, nevertheless reappears and prolongs itself in each of its two immense fractions. On the one hand, moral purity and corporeal purity ; on the other, the defilement of the soul and the defilement of the body, are respectively identified so far that they are only two modes, two aspects of the corresponding good or evil principle : a conception which tends to bind closely the laws of what may be termed the organism of the universe to the superior laws of the intellectual or moral world.

The character of the dualism of the philosophy of the Zendavesta depends upon the determination of the question whether Ahriman is born evil by nature, or became so by the abuse of liberty. The latter supposition is the more probable. However, in the philosophical traditions of the Magi, to which we have before referred, and which probably contained a transformation of the doctrines of the Zendavesta, the principle of darkness, identified with matter, is represented as essentially evil ; but, in order not to attribute the origin of evil to God, the same traditions maintain that the production of this principle was not contained in the primary will of the Creator, but that it was solely an inevitable consequence of the creation of good beings, because darkness follows light as his shadow follows man. Under this figure was it intended to couch the profound meaning that, as every created being is necessarily imperfect, the creation necessarily contains two principles, the one limiting, the other limited, and that in this sense the Creator (the limiting being) is the principle or author of imperfection and evil ? It is very doubtful : yet the Persian conception under consideration bears some analogy to this idea.

Note.

History is silent with regard to any philosophical development in Persia. Perhaps the doctrines connected with the worship of Mithra, the explanation of which is still the subject of so much controversy, are themselves an index of such development. Be this as it may, we shall see hereafter, in treating of the period of gnosticism, that it is impossible to suppose a total extinction of philosophical speculations in Persia during the period immediately preceding the Christian era.

EGYPT.

Historical Notices.

THERE are reasons for believing that the germes of Egyptian civilization and science were brought from Ethiopia, which country itself, on this supposition, must have been peopled by one of the first migrations from the East. The Ethiopian city of Me-roë seems to have been, relative to Upper Egypt, the metropolis of a sacerdotal corporation, which gradually extended a theocratic government to the mouths of the Nile. It boasted the possession of a high and antique philosophy, and regarded itself as in some sort the eldest daughter of Intelligence. You are nothing but children, it said to the Greeks; there is among you no wisdom grown gray through time.

No work of Egyptian origin has been handed down to us embodying the philosophical conceptions, by means of which the sacerdotal colleges connected and organized the different branches of their knowledge. But the Greek historians Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, as well as Plutarch, and the Alexan-

drian philosophers Iamblicus and Porphyry, furnish materials for this part of the history of philosophy. Their representations, however, are broken by many a chasm, and the allegorical veil which covers most of the Egyptian doctrines is, moreover, not always transparent. We shall indicate only some leading points, without deciding whether they belong precisely to the class of conceptions which we have designated by the name of primordial philosophy.

Exposition.

1. The Egyptian philosophy places before all things the God without a name. It is the primitive obscurity, the incomprehensible being, the hidden principle of everything that exists, the invisible source of all light and all life, who is above all intelligence. He is designated by the title of Piromis, man supereminently, perhaps to signify that he is the most excellent of the gods, as man is the most excellent of terrestrial beings.

2. He becomes the producer, the generator. His first emanation is Kneph; this is the efficient reason of things, the creator, the demiurgus.

3. The second emanation is Phta. It is the organizer of the world, the god of fire, the vital principle.

4. After Phta and before Osiris many interpreters of the Egyptian symbols interpose two or three other emanations, which, however, can be nothing but particular modifications of the foregoing principles. The notion which they form of them seems to be neither very precise nor very constant.

5. The primitive as well as the later emanations proceed in a certain conjunction or *syzygy*. Each of them has a companion, which is, as it were, its diminutive, and sometimes possesses opposite attri-

butes. We shall inquire presently what is the philosophical idea of which the syzygy is the emblem. But as to what is the syzygy of Piromis, of Kneph, and of Phta, and what their characteristics, we are in both respects left in great uncertainty.

6. Another emanation makes a figure in this system, sometimes under the name of Buto, sometimes under that of Athyr: an emanation of darkness, which is identical with primitive matter, of which the first form was water.

7. What appears most clearly is, that all the primitive divine powers, in as far as they are incorporated in the universe, or, rather, radically constitute it, are represented by a double emanation, Osiris and Isis. Osiris is the luminous and active principle in nature; Isis is the passive, dark, material principle. Osiris is clothed with a robe of light without mixture of colours. The robe of Isis, or matter, is tinged with all the various shades which are displayed in the universe. Isis reflects in its variety the one light of Osiris, as matter, the subject of variety, receives all the forms which the active principle impresses upon it. Osiris is the father of beings; Isis is the mother, and she has all the attributes of maternity. Everything that exists, everything that breathes, is the product of the marriage of Osiris and Isis, of the union of spirit and matter. They are identified, Osiris with the sun, and Isis with the moon. The sun, the source of light, is also the principal agent in nature. The moon is opaque, and passive with respect to the sun, receiving from it light and heat. The harmonious influences of the sun and moon, which everywhere diffuse fertility and life, represent the eternally fruitful marriage of the active and the passive principles.

8. After Osiris and Isis come other subordinate

emanations, which correspond to the great phenomena of nature, resulting from the combination of the active and the passive principles. These emanations are nothing but the special causes of these phenomena.

9. Thus far we have seen only the development of the primitive principles of the creation, considered either as in the bosom of Piromis, the divine being, or as in the plastic force of nature. But in the creation there is a law of destruction ; there is disorder in order, evil in the good, death in life. The principle of Evil is Typhon. His origin is very obscure. His mother, it would seem, is Athyr, which probably represents the dark chaos, the primordial state of the elements. Typhon tears his mother's side at the moment she is giving him birth. He is clothed in the Egyptian symbolism with all the attributes of evil and disorderly force. He is united to Nephthys, *perfection, consummate beauty* ; hence the mixture of good and evil, which is, as it were, the essence of the world.

Observations,

1. The word emanation bears ordinarily, in philosophical language, a meaning exclusive of creation, properly speaking. Yet in explaining the Egyptian doctrine we have not used it strictly in that sense. We have made use of it because the idea of creation, in the proper sense of the word, does not appear in that doctrine. But from its not appearing, it should not be hastily concluded that it is formally excluded. It is probable that this old philosophy, in admitting a production of things, did not feel pressed by any of the questions which subsequently have been raised respecting the essential mode of that production. It neither denied nor affirmed anything upon this point,

at least it does not appear that it perceived any of those questions. This observation, if we mistake not, may be extended to the primitive philosophy of many other nations.

2. The doctrine of divine emanations or generations by *syzygies*, a doctrine which is equally met with in the mythi of India, may have had a double basis. It may have rested at first upon an induction of analogy drawn from terrestrial generations, which suppose the union of two beings. But it may, perhaps, have connected itself with a still higher philosophical idea. The active principle and the passive principle constitute the great distinction which appears in nature. It is easy to conceive that the active principle, or spirit, comes from God, since it is of an essence analogous to the divine, which is activity, life itself. But how is it conceivable that matter, the passive principle, should likewise come from him, since he exhibits attributes so opposite? They may have been led, in resolving this question, to suppose in God something corresponding in some way to the functions of matter in nature, as the divine energies in God correspond to the functions of mind or of the created active principle; and, accordingly, the divine emanations are represented under the double form of active and passive.

Note.

It is possible that some of the points expounded above, instead of forming a part of the primitive doctrines of Egypt, were, on the contrary, the last form which their doctrines received. But we know too little of their history to distinguish the phases of a philosophical development. The meditations of the priests of Thebes and Memphis lie buried beneath the ruins of their mysterious sanctuaries. Egypt,

so mighty in tombs, has been itself the tomb of its own science. The recent discoveries as to the manner of deciphering the *papyrus* which these tombs have preserved during the ravages of forty centuries, has given birth to the hope of recovering some precious relics of this fossil knowledge, and possibly, by combining the results of these discoveries with the records preserved by Greek writers, we may succeed in reconstructing at least the mummy of this old science.

CHALDEA.

Historical Notices.

THERE existed in Chaldea a sacerdotal corporation, the depositary of science, like the Magi of Persia. A conflict arose between these two rival corporations, and, when Babylonia passed under the yoke of Persian dominion, the Magi oppressed the college of Chaldean priests, and probably attempted to destroy it. It survived, however, or, at least, relics of it subsisted a long time afterward, since we meet with them at the period of the conquests of Alexander. But these persecutions must have compelled the learned order in Chaldea to cover their doctrines more and more with the veil of mystery, which explains the fact that such a feeble light respecting this philosophy has come down to us from antiquity. The little we know has come to us through the medium of foreign witnesses. If we except the fragment of Berosus, which contains features of an allegorical and mythical cosmogony, we are reduced to details of information very slight and few, scattered in the writings of Greek historians and philosophers.

Exposition.

God, the source of being ; a primitive chaos, which was nothing but darkness and water ; a humid matter containing monstrous animals ; nature in this original state personified under the emblem of a woman named Omorca ; God appearing in the bosom of chaos, dividing the body of the primordial woman, or nature, in order to form out of one half heaven, and out of the other half earth ; producing the light which destroys the monsters, children of chaos, then causing the disorder of the elements represented by these monsters to give place to order and regularity ; and, finally, from his own blood and that of inferior deities mixed with earth, creating the *souls* of men and animals, which are thus of divine origin, while the celestial and terrestrial *bodies* are formed from the substance of Omorca, or from the material substance ; this whole assemblage of ideas, the basis of which is evidently in primitive tradition, bears no token of philosophical reflection.

But in another relation the doctrines of the Chaldeans reveal, in the midst of the sacerdotal corporation, a scientific direction which was peculiar to it. The observation of astronomical facts was connected in their minds with a theoretical idea, according to which the events of the lower or human world depended upon the motions of the superior or celestial world.

Observations.

1. The astrological philosophy of the Chaldeans is in contrast with the doctrines both of India and Persia. Brahminism, preoccupied almost exclusively with the idea of the infinite, fell into idealism. Persian Magism divided its meditations between the

spiritual and the material world. The Chaldeans gave themselves up, above all, to the study of the material part of creation, and particularly to the phenomena of the heavens. In the two other philosophies spirit was conceived as predominant over matter; an inverse predominance is perceptible in the Chaldee philosophy, which in this respect contained the elements of fatalism and materialism.

The concurrence of human destiny with the sidereal revolutions was conceived from that period, as a passage in Plato seems to indicate, under the notion of the universal harmony of creation. The Hindu philosophy regarded the universe as an immense spectacle which God represents to himself; the ancient Persian philosophy conceived it under the notion of a grand conflict; Chaldean philosophy viewed it as an immutable harmony.

Note.

There were in Chaldea various sects and schools, of which Strabo and Pliny make mention. There was also a conflict of doctrines, and, consequently, to some extent, a philosophical movement. But history has not preserved the records which would determine its nature and direction. This loss is the more to be regretted, since a comparison of the physical philosophy of Chaldea with the metaphysics of India might enable us to pursue, at a very remote period and among two learned nations, parallel developments of idealism and empiricism.

P H Œ N I C I A .

THE cosmogony attributed by Philo to Sanchoniathon, a Phœnician writer, who flourished prior to the Trojan war, presents the draught of an explanation of the universe by material causes, in which, however, may be detected some traces of a coarse spiritualism.

If we rely upon some indications furnished by Greek writers, Phœnicia was not entirely a stranger to philosophical systems analogous to some of those which were subsequently developed in Greece. They speak of the Phœnician Moschus as the inventor of the doctrine which explains the formation of the universe by the combination of atoms. It is probably the first attempt at a material cosmology which was produced in Western Asia ; at least we know of none more ancient. This tendency was favoured by the peculiar genius of the Phœnicians, an industrious and commercial people, where mental activity was particularly confined within the circle of material things.

I

SECOND PERIOD.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

GREEK civilization had its origin in the East, from whence it spread into Greece by three different channels, at the north, the south, and the east. Three names appear prominent in the origin of this civilization: Orpheus, from Thrace, Pheroneus, from Egypt, and Cadmus, from Phœnicia. At that remote antiquity, religious doctrines, institutions, laws, and the arts were so closely united that it would be absurd to suppose the colonies that came to Greece from those different countries would bring with them each respectively only a single one of these elements of civilization. It may, however, with some reason, be thought that the dogmatic and moral element, united with the arts, was particularly developed under what has been termed the Orphic rule; that the political element, including prescriptions civil with respect to their object, but religious as to their forms, predominated in the Egyptian influence; and that the industrious element occupied the chief place among the influences derived from Phœnicia. The blending of these three elements contributed to form the peculiar character of the Greek genius, while its development depended in many respects, whether for good or for evil, upon the institutions which took the place of the Oriental *castes*.

Greek doctrines, in the point of view under which they are here to be considered, belong to two periods very distinct. The first is anterior to what may be properly called philosophical investigations, the second commences with those investigations. The first

of these two periods itself presents two successive and opposite phases. At first we see theological doctrines evidently Oriental both in their substance and form. They bear no mark of the Greek genius ; they are not yet wrought over by the Grecian mind ; they influence it without being in turn influenced by it. These doctrines are principally represented in history by the name of Orpheus. Then, after a struggle between the military and the sacerdotal power, in which the latter lost a great share of its influence, a civil system of morals distinct from theology became established. This new phasis is specially represented by the philosophical *heptad* commonly known by the name of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. Something analogous is seen in the history of other nations, particularly in China ; but in these cases the development of a system of ethics merely human and disconnected with theology, comes only in the sequel of philosophical controversies, by which men's minds are detached from their religious creeds. In Greece, however, there was no such intermediate stage ; the transition from the theological to the opposite state was by a violent and rapid reaction. Most of the seven sages, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Periander, were merely moralists or legislators ; they had nothing to do with scientific speculations. The first school was founded by Thales in Ionia, while about the same time the Italic school was founded by Pythagoras in Græcia Magna. Here begins the second period, the period of philosophical investigations.

The Greek colonies of Asia Minor and of Italy, connected by position, the former with Phœnicia and Chaldea, the latter with Egypt, were the double cradle of Hellenic philosophy. In this respect they were in advance of Greece proper. We might say

that, before throwing itself into the country which was destined to become the theatre of its great conflicts, philosophy took its position around it, and made, as it were, preparatory attempts at conquest. But the two tendencies remarked in the former period were reproduced in this. The Italic school continued under new forms the theological and metaphysical speculations of the East ; the Ionic school separated philosophy much more from the traditional science preserved in the sanctuaries.

Greek philosophy, taken as a whole, divides itself into two principal evolutions. The first extends from Thales to Socrates, the second from Socrates to Sextus Empiricus.

FIRST EVOLUTION.

THIS comprises : 1. The Ionic and Italic schools ; 2. The two Eleatic schools, with the systems of Heraclitus and Empedocles ; 3. The school of the Sophists.

IONIC SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

THALES of Miletus, whose family, according to ancient testimonies, was of Phœnician origin, was born about six centuries before the Christian era. He sojourned some time in Egypt, in the reign of Amasis, for the purpose of becoming initiated into the science of which the priests of Thebes and Memphis were the depositaries, and probably also visited Phœnicia, closely connected as it was with Chaldea, which was then another centre of sacerdotal science.

He became the founder of the Ionic school. The representatives of that school after him were successively, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Anaxago-

ras. We do not speak of Pherecydes of Syros, of whose views much less is known than of those of the other Ionians, though they seem to have been analogous on some points to those of Anaximenes his contemporary, on others to those of Thales.

Exposition.

The general character of this school consists in this, that in explaining the origin of things, it follows the method of induction, that is, attempts to conclude, from the observation of phenomena which fall within the circle of human observation, the principles and laws of the primitive formation of the universe. But this common method conducted the principal masters of this school to results in many respects different. As to the rest, in speaking of the method of the Ionians, we do not mean to say that they adopted it after having investigated and explained the grounds and validity of the method itself; for no trace of such an investigation is to be found. We mean only to say that the Ionic school made use of this method in a sort of instinctive way, and that its philosophical procedure may, in a general sense, be characterized as inductive.

Observation led Thales to suppose the existence of two principles. In the sphere of experience, no production takes place without a pre-existing matter. According to his manner of proceeding, the chief of the Ionic school, generalizing this observation, was led to infer that the formation of the universe presupposed a primary uncreated matter; for the proper notion of the creation of matter itself is not suggested to the human mind by pure experience. This primitive matter being destined to receive successively all the forms which constitute the different beings, is represented as originally destitute of any fixed or

constant form, and therefore in a state of fluidity. This seems to be the meaning of the maxim of Thales, that water is the elementary principle of things. This idea, to which his philosophical method very naturally led, may also have been furnished by the Phœnician cosmology, according to which the universe was primitively in the state of an aqueous substance.

But, on the other hand, an induction founded upon what passes in the sphere of human experience led him also to recognise, that wherever we perceive order, motion, life, there must be an intelligent and active principle, which is revealed by these phenomena. Thales consequently asserts, in addition to matter, a principle essentially different, an intelligence, a soul, which, operating upon matter or the primitive water, impressed upon it forms, gave it laws, from whence resulted the universe.

Cicero has given a summary of the doctrine of Thales in the following terms: "Thales of Miletus, the first who engaged in these inquiries, says that water is the original of things, and that God is that intelligence who from water formed all beings."

The dualism which forms the foundation of the cosmological philosophy of Thales differs from the Persian dualism, in which the two principles are represented in a state of hostility and conflict. In the system of Thales, far from being reciprocally repugnant, they are mutually dependant. Without the intelligent principle matter would forever have remained destitute of form, and without matter, intelligence, the principle of forms, must have necessarily remained inactive for want of an object upon which to exert its activity. If the philosophy of the Ionic school had been unfolded from the conception of Thales as from its germe, the labours of his disciples would

have been directed to a parallel development of the two elements of that conception, the notion of God and the notion of matter. But the case was otherwise; the germe was broken by his disciple *Anaximander*. He laid aside the notion of God, at least as needless for a philosophical explanation of the world, and thus entered upon the path of a purely material cosmology. He separated from his master also in another respect. Thales had admitted fluid matter, under the name of water, as the physical principle of things. But that conception still supposed in the principle some general form. Anaximander sought for a more abstract notion, and for the elementary water of Thales substituted something absolutely indeterminate, which he designated by the name of infinity, which, perhaps, was in his mind nothing but space without bounds. But, this indeterminate principle being admitted, how shall the production of form be accounted for? What reply he would make to this fundamental question, we do not know enough of the philosophy of Anaximander to enable us to decide.

It was probably with a view of escaping this difficulty that his successor *Anaximenes* had recourse again to the notion of a general form as the attribute of the physical principle of things, which principle he made to be air, a principle more physical, that is, less abstract, than that of Anaximander, and, at the same time, a fluid more subtile, more refined than that which Thales had adopted as the image under which he designated primitive matter. It was an intermediate conception between that of Thales and that of Anaximander. But it still ever remained to be explained how, from the abyss of this homogeneous mass, the forms which constitute particular beings could spring.

The material cosmology of Anaximander and of Anaximenes fell at the first step into great embarrassment, whether it attempted to conceive the first physical principle without any determinate form, or whether it attempted to attribute to it a form that should not be merely arbitrary. To get clear of these inextricable difficulties, *Anaxagoras*, the philosopher of Clazomene, brought back the primitive conception of Thales, matter as the subject of forms, and intelligence the active principle of forms. The union of these two principles was in his view the first principle of the universe.

Anaxagoras developed the idea of God. He distinguished, much more clearly than the founder of the Ionic school had done, the idea of matter from the idea of God, holding the latter to be a substance absolutely simple and pure. Denying to matter any internal energy, he conceived the spiritual substance as the necessary principle of all motion, all activity. His attempts to determine the proper characteristics of the divine essence, and to demonstrate the philosophical necessity of theology, have led most of the ancient writers to say that Anaxagoras was the first who rested philosophy upon this basis. By attending to the manner of their testimony, it may be reconciled with other passages, particularly of Cicero, which seem to allow this honour to Thales. The latter had indicated, though in a manner very confused, the idea which Anaxagoras developed, and of which he undertook a strict demonstration. In like manner, in modern times, the astronomical system which holds the revolution of the earth around the sun has received the name of Copernican, although this system had been already maintained, during the first half of the fifteenth century, by Cardinal Cusa, a Pythagorean philosopher.

Anaxagoras developed also the notion of the physical principle or the primitive matter. His predecessors had considered it as essentially extended, and, of course, divisible. Setting out with the idea that it was compounded, he inquired what were its components, and thus arrived at the notion of primitive elements, which he designated by the name of *homœomeriæ*, or similar parts. This term did not signify that those elements were similar to each other; on the contrary, he supposed them to possess different qualities, but similar to the qualities which our senses discover in the different sorts of bodies. We have already noticed this conception in the philosophy of Kanada. All phenomena, according to the system of Anaxagoras, result from the combination, in different degrees and in various proportions, of these elementary properties.

Observations.

In order to sum up these sketches of the Ionic school, we observe :

1. That this philosophy, regarded in its predominant character, was a physiology, a philosophy of nature; it was occupied with the universe in a physical and not in a moral point of view.

2. In comparing the doctrine of Anaxagoras with the ideas first sketched by Thales, we trace a philosophical progress in regard to the conception of God.

3. There was also progress in the conception of matter, since Anaxagoras explored this idea more profoundly than his predecessors, whatever, as to the rest, be the value of his hypothesis.

4. Although the explanations of the different physical phenomena which the Ionic philosophers imagined have been exploded, most of them, at least, by subsequent science, yet this school tended to consti-

tute the unity of science by seeking to connect the explanation of particular facts with some notion of the general laws of the universe.

ITALIC SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

WHILE the Ionian school was pursuing its labours, Pythagoras, born at Samos, in the last half of the sixth century before Christ, commenced, in that part of Southern Italy settled by Greek colonies, and known as Græcia Magna, a new philosophical movement. Antiquity speaks of his travels in Egypt and in Babylonia; and, according to the common opinion, he penetrated also as far as India.

He is represented in history in a threefold character: first, as a philosopher; secondly, as the founder of a philosophical institute or corporation, a typical society, after the pattern of which other societies ought to be formed; and, lastly, as a legislator. We have to do with him only in the first relation.

The greatest obscurity envelops the doctrines of Pythagoras. Its records are defective; many portions of his doctrine are presented only under the veil of symbols; and the mathematical language which he adopted as the general language of philosophy, requires very often for our comprehension a lexicon which he did not leave us. We shall abstain from entering into some parts of his doctrine, the interpretation of which is still a matter of controversy. Such, in particular, is his theory of numbers, which, to be made intelligible even to the extent of which it is susceptible, would require a special dissertation. All we shall say of his philosophy will be limited to some fundamental points, which will bring out the contrast between the Ionian and Italic philosophies in respect to their bases.

Exposition.

Pythagoras took a point of departure opposite to that of the school of Thales, and followed a method the inverse of the empirical process of the Ionians. The latter set out from facts, and endeavoured by generalization to arrive at their principles. Their logical process was that of induction. Pythagoras set out with the most general ideas, and proceeded by the method of deduction.

The principle of things with him is absolute unity, which comprehends everything. He designates this by the name of *Monad*, synonymous with the originating being or God.

The Monad includes spirit and matter, but without separation, without division. They are confounded together in it in absolute unity of substance.

From unity proceeds multiplicity, and this multiplicity is the universe, wherein that which exists in God in the state of unity is produced in the state of separation and multiplicity.

Matter, in becoming detached from God, becomes the *Dyad*, the principle of the indefinite, of darkness, of ignorance, of instability, motion, change, of inequality, of discord, and, in general, of all imperfection.

Spiritual beings having emanated from God, and becoming enveloped in the Dyad, fall thereby into a state of imperfection, instability, and division.

As the name Monad, although it expresses at once spirit and matter as held in absolute unity, is more particularly employed to designate the chief attribute of God, to wit, spirit; so the name Dyad, which belongs to the entire spiritual and corporeal world, considered as imperfect, is particularly employed to designate matter, as being the principle of imperfection,

and, therefore, the chief element in the very notion itself of anything imperfect.

The progress of creation has for its object the gradual enlargement of spirits from the bonds of the Dyad.

The intelligence and will should therefore strive against the empire which the Dyad exercises over them. The Intelligence is implicated in the Dyad, inasmuch as it receives the images of the multiple, the mutable, the transient. Everything which is transient, mutable, and multiple, is not, as such, a real being, but a false, an illusory existence; this is very much like the *Maia* of the Hindus; and, indeed, this name has been applied by Nicomedes, a Pythagorean.

The Intelligence can therefore be liberated from the bonds of the Dyad only by breaking away from the false science of the variable in order to attain the knowledge of the true, of being invariable.

In attaining this science there are different degrees. Mathematics—which includes arithmetic; music, as founded upon the harmony of numbers; plane and spherical geometry—is the first degree, because it is, in a sort, intermediate between the variable and the invariable, since it regards immutable relations under material forms. The mathematical language is therefore necessarily the language of initiation into science.

Advancing in science, the initiated learns more and more to consider things so far as they are one, to reduce multiplicity to unity.

The conception of this absolute unity is the highest summit of science. Arrived at this point, the mind is freed from the bonds of the Dyad.

The Will is involved in the Dyad by our love for particular and mutable good things, which, as particular and mutable, are only illusive good things.

The Will ought to strive to free itself from this false love, just as the Intelligence should strive to free itself from the false science of the multiple and mutable.

From hence the general necessity of fasting and abstinence, that is, of a regimen by which the soul mortifies the senses in order to restrict their dominion.

Upon these principles respecting the Intelligence and the Will rest all science and all morals.

True politics should propose as its object the realization of these principles in society. Hence, according to Pythagoras, a community of goods, under the administration of a chief who shall distribute to every one according to his needs, ought to be the basis of civil society, because it reduces to unity the possession of the multifarious goods which are the source of discord among men.

But souls are enslaved to the Dyad by bonds too strict, too strong, and too numerous for deliverance to be attained at one stroke. Consequently, the necessity of successive transformations or metempsychosis.

Souls, which by a bad use of their liberty have plunged into false science and false love, descend by transformation into bodies more gross than they at first inhabited. Enlightened and virtuous souls ascend and are clothed with bodies more pure, more free from the Dyad.

The complete salvation of the soul is its transformation into God. Delivered from the multiple and variable, it is absorbed into the absolute unity.

Such are the fundamental points of the Pythagorean philosophy. It is needless to remark its analogies with the Hindu systems.

The germes of pantheism which this philosophy

contains must needs have received development, and, in fact, were developed, if the writings which bear the name of Timæus of Locrum and of Ocellus Lucanus are really productions of the Pythagorean school.

Timæus, in the work on the *Soul of the World* which is attributed to him, regards the universe at bottom only as one single being, an immense intelligent animal, of which God is the soul, and matter the organism. Under this view his system adheres to dualism, but it is not a dualism which admits two hostile principles; it is not even the dualism of Thales and Anaxagoras, which supposes two reciprocally dependant principles; it is a dualism which considers mind and matter as the inseparable elements of one infinite individuality, and reduces them thus to unity, the grounding idea of the Pythagorean philosophy.

Pantheistic conceptions are produced with a character more strictly determined in the book which bears the name of Ocellus Lucanus. The universe is there represented as one sole being, uncreated, immutable, imperishable, under forms subject to change by death and by perpetual renovations.

Observations.

Notwithstanding the errors combined in the Pythagorean system, it was in other respects a real philosophical progress.

The Ionian school had constructed only a physical philosophy: the philosophy of the Italic school embraced the moral world.

It shed light upon the necessity of referring the origin of things to a principle of unity in order even to constitute any unity for science.

It began the distinction between sensations which

relate to the mutable order of things, and ideas which relate to immutable objects.

It established the subordination of the senses to the mind.

Observations on the Ionian and Italic schools.

A century had hardly passed away from the time Greece had begun to philosophize, and we have seen two, or, less expressly, three general systems of error already produced, dualism, atheism, and pantheism; erroneous systems which are the root of all other errors.

Dualism shows itself in the philosophy of Thales and Anaxagoras.

The germe of atheism was contained in that of Anaximander and Anaximenes.

Pantheism was born in the Pythagorean school.

Under another point of view: the method followed by the Ionian school, at least down to the time of Anaxagoras, the method of taking sensation as the starting point, must needs conduct, in proportion as this principle of sensualism should be developed, to the denial of the spiritual world. On the other hand, the Pythagorean philosophy, which considered sensations as illusive, laid the foundation of idealism, and must logically go on to the denial of the material world. We shall proceed to notice, in the period which followed, how this twofold development actually took place.

ELEATIC SCHOOLS.

THE city of Elea, situated in Græcia Magna, gave its name to two new schools. The one continued in certain respects the philosophical progress commenced by the Pythagoreans, and was called the metaphysical school. The other, which was of a later

date, and to which the name of physical school has been given, carried forward the philosophical movement of the Ionian school.

ELEATIC METAPHYSICAL SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

THIS school has three principal representatives: Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno.

Xenophanes, the founder of it, was born at Colophon. The date of his birth is uncertain. He seems to have flourished about the middle of the sixth century B.C. The city of Elea was the theatre of his teaching. He lived nearly a hundred years. According to Diogenes Laertius, he devoted himself in his youth to the study of the Pythagorean philosophy. His most celebrated work is one entitled, *On Nature*.

Parmenides, originally of Elea, was his disciple. He renounced the splendour in which his wealth would have enabled him to live, in order to give himself up in retirement and stillness to the study of philosophy. Like Xenophanes his master, he wrote of his doctrine in verse. The ancients have preserved some few fragments of these verses. Plato gave the name of Parmenides to the one of his own dialogues which contains the most metaphysical part of his philosophy.

Zeno, born also at Elea, was the disciple of Parmenides, who adopted him for his son. He acquired a great reputation by his writings, none of which have come down to us. Implicated in a political conspiracy, he was put to the torture, in the midst of which he showed a strength of mind seldom displayed.

Exposition.

The Pythagorean philosophy had maintained that everything is contained in the infinite unity, and that everything was produced by it. Xenophanes inquired if the production was possible, and denied the possibility. If anything has been made, said he, it has been made out of that which was, or out of that which was not. Out of that which was not is impossible; for out of nothing, nothing can come. Out of that which was, impossible still; for since it already was, it could not have been made. Setting out from the impossibility of any production whatever, he admits, in consequence, but one sole being, eternal, infinite, immutable.

Perhaps Xenophanes acknowledged still the reality of finite beings as simple modifications or forms of the infinite being. But Parmenides, strictly consistent with the principle of absolute unity laid down by his master, denied even the reality of these forms. He held that the one Being must be in everything like himself, and, consequently, could not exist under different modifications. Hence all real distinction vanishes into the sole notion of pure and absolute unity. Melissus, his disciple, commented upon these views.

Parmenides endeavoured also to connect his ontological with a psychological theory. Adopting the Pythagorean distinction respecting ideas which come by the senses and the ideas of pure reason, he maintained that the former, corresponding to something essentially variable, could not be the basis of an absolute affirmation; and that this basis could be found only in the conceptions of the reason, which, according to him, were reducible in the last analysis to the simple idea of unity.

Zeno presented the doctrine of this school under the critical and polemic form. He reviewed the ideas which are derived from the general idea of the finite, and set himself to prove that they are all contradictory, even to the notion itself which radically contains them. Led by the character of his mind, which inclined to argumentation, he investigated the laws which should govern this intellectual combat, and composed a logic.

Observations.

The labours of the Eleatic pantheists contributed to that progress of philosophy which results from the regular development even of error. For error cannot be developed except in virtue of certain logical laws, which are themselves truths. In proportion as the connexion which exists between the starting point and ultimate limit to which it conducts, between the principle and its last consequences, is made the more clearly manifest, the more decidedly is the destructive nature of error exposed; and it is of the essential character of false principles that every step of their progress turns against themselves, while their full development is their death.

The primitive doctrines of the Italic school, while they retained the notion of a creation or production of things, had held it vaguely, or, rather, they represented the production of things under the idea of an emanation from the Divine substance. The Eleatics proved very easily that, as in the system of emanation, what appeared to begin to exist already before existed, the production could be only apparent. They proved also, in the next place, that if there was no real production, all distinct individual existence is also nothing but a mere phenomenon. Thus the doctrine of emanation was conceived as containing,

and in fact did contain, the germe of the most complete pantheism.

Their labours also gave prominence to a truth, which has been confirmed by all subsequent philosophical experience, namely, that, as soon as the existence of finite realities is called in question, it is impossible to demonstrate it by starting from the notion of the infinite. From whence it follows that, under peril of regarding the universe as a pure illusion, its existence must be admitted as one of the first truths, which the human mind believes of necessity, without any previous demonstration.

ELEATIC PHYSICAL SCHOOL.

The philosophical doctrine propounded by Xenophanes and developed by his disciples, resulting as it did in the denial of the real existence of finite beings or of the universe, was a violent shock to convictions inherent in human nature. A reaction in a contrary direction was inevitable. It took place in the so-called Physical School. The two principal representatives of this school were Leucippus, and Democritus of Abdera.

Historical Notices.

Leucippus, who belongs to the beginning of the fifth century B.C., was born, according to some, at Elea; according to others, at Abdera. Zeno, whose doctrines he abandoned, was his master. He committed his own speculations to a work entitled *Treatise of Physics*, and to another *On the Soul*, both of which are lost.

Democritus of Abdera, born about 480 B.C., was the disciple of Leucippus. He visited Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, and was even in relations, it is said,

with the Gymnosophists of India. We have no authentic work of his, although he wrote much. He lived nearly a hundred years.

Exposition.

The metaphysical school of Elea came to deny the existence of the world only by repudiating the testimony of the senses as illusory. The reaction which arose against it started from the opposite extreme: the physical school took sensation for its starting-point, joining with it induction, as the Ionians had done; an induction, however, confined within the sphere of the sensible world. Thales and Anaxagoras had made use of induction to arrive at the existence of a Supreme Intelligence distinct from matter. But the Eleatic physicians employed the process only to arrive at the material principles of things.

While separating fundamentally from the metaphysical school, Leucippus and Democritus agreed with it in the principle that all production is only apparent; that it is nothing, and can be nothing but the manifestation of something which previously had existence.

From this principle applied to the material world, which, in the view of this sensual philosophy, embraced all reality, it evidently resulted that all the phenomena of generation and dissolution presented in the world are only transformations of matter, and hence that all philosophy ought to limit itself to investigating the principle of these transformations.

But here two roads were open to them, two hypotheses were possible.

They could suppose the existence of one sole principle, one indeterminate material substance, endowed with an internal energy, in virtue of which it

might produce all these transformations by perpetual self-modification. In this case they would arrive at a dynamic conception of the universe.

Or they could suppose a plurality of material principles, the various aggregations of which, determined by the laws of motion alone, would produce the various phenomena ; in other words, they might rest in a mechanical conception of the universe.

The Eleatic physicians rejected the first of these conceptions. In the first place, to admit a sole and single material principle would have been to refer the origin of things, like the metaphysicians, to an eternal unity, which would imply at bottom something distinct from matter, which does not present itself to the human mind except under the conditions of multiplicity. In the second, if they had represented this material principle as destitute of definite forms, it would have been difficult to account for the origin of forms. If, on the other hand, they had clothed it with a determinate form, it would have been equally difficult to explain why they should attribute to it one form rather than another. In a word, they would have fallen into the same difficulties that had already perplexed the physicians of the Ionian school.

Rejecting, therefore, the conception of absolute unity, Leucippus and Democritus maintained a plurality of material principles, a plurality even to an indefinite number, because, once set free from the idea of unity, there was no reason for stopping at any particular determinate number.

Hence the celebrated hypothesis of atoms as the constituent principles of the universe.

These atoms were supposed innumerable, with an infinite variety of forms. By this means they believed they could explain the prodigious and perpetual variety of secondary forms which resulted from their union or their separation.

The atoms were supposed to be endowed with the faculty of motion inherent in their essence, in virtue of which they united or separated: hereby they explained the formation and dissolution of bodies. Finally, they supposed the atoms to exist in a void abyss or space without bounds, whereby they explained the possibility of motion.

Leucippus and Democritus thus arrived at a conception of the universe the very opposite of that of Parmenides and Xenophanes. For infinite unity they substituted infinite plurality. We limit ourselves to remarking this result, without giving account of the slighter shades by which the fundamental hypothesis of atoms invented by Leucippus was modified by Democritus. We shall see hereafter how this hypothesis was developed by Epicurus.

Although Democritus added nothing considerable in this respect to the philosophy of his master, he endeavoured in other respects to strengthen and extend it. He made first an attempt at a sensual psychology, in accordance with his system of the universe. Sensations, according to him, are a sort of images, which, detaching themselves from bodies, enter into contact with the organization of man. Thus the mind is produced within from without; it is the result of the aggregate of images, just as the body is the result of an aggregate of atoms. The soul is a multiplex effect, and not a principle substantially one.

He commenced also the application of the material philosophy to morals. If there are nothing but sensations in man, and nothing but atoms in the universe, it is impossible to conceive the absolute idea of right and wrong. Morality can be nothing but a calculation of enjoyments, just as the soul is a combination of sensations, just as the universe is a combination of atoms. This consequence appears to have been formally admitted by Democritus.

Metrodorus of Chios, a disciple of Democritus, professed skepticism, of which he presented the following formula: I do not even know that I know nothing.

Observations.

The speculations of the Eleatic physical philosophers had the effect of evolving one great truth, namely, that it is impossible, if we confine ourselves to the material world, to find a principle of unity, and that induction can never produce the notion of pure infinity. And this itself is a philosophical progress; for the characteristics, as well as the intimate essence of the materialist philosophy, became more manifest; and, we repeat, truth gains in proportion as the grounds of error are unfolded.

As to the rest, by directing attention to the observation of phenomena, they represented one half of human reason, and supplied a counterbalance to idealism.

Observations on the two Eleatic schools, metaphysical and physical.

The labours of these schools terminated in two results, the one positive, the other negative.

In the first place, they exhibit a triple parallel development. Xenophanes and Leucippus devoted their attention to things in themselves, the one from the spiritualist point of view, the other from the materialist. Parmenides and Democritus added to this philosophy of things (ontology) a theory respecting the ideas which represent things in the human mind (psychology), which was a theory of pure idealism on the part of Parmenides, of pure sensualism on the part of Democritus. Finally, Zeno, and probably Metrodorus of Chios, studied the laws according to

which ideas are combined (logic). Ontology, psychology, and logic go together to constitute the systematic whole of philosophy.

This progress was necessary. For philosophy, which is the universal science, aims continually, like all the special sciences, to organize itself under all its forms and to unite all its forces. It was natural, also, that the progress should proceed in the order in which it is represented. Eager to solve the great problem of the universe, the mind of man must needs first soar away into the regions of ontology, before falling back into itself to examine the instruments of knowledge, the cognitive faculties; and psychology, in its turn, naturally preceded logic, which is in some respects only the legislation of the intelligence.

To this positive result there was added a negative result.

Each of these schools sought for the solution of a problem which was insolvable in the shape in which it was propounded. The metaphysical school demanded of its adversaries that, in setting out from rational conceptions alone, they should demonstrate the existence of the finite, or of the variable order of things. Now rational conceptions correspond to something invariable and absolute, and, of course, all the consequences that can be deduced from them partake of the same character, and can never result in the term sought for, which, as it is variable and relative, has precisely the opposite character.

On the other hand, the physical school proposed the same difficulty, only in the inverse sense; they required that, taking as the starting-point sensations alone, which relate to the contingent and variable, we should bring out a demonstration of the absolute and invariable order of things. It was on this condition only that it consented to recognise the exist-

ence of anything absolute and invariable, and they safely defied their opponents to fulfil this condition.

The insolvable objections which these two schools, between whom the empire of philosophy was divided, mutually threw back upon each other, had necessarily the effect of impairing the authority of the speculative intellect. For the blows which each of them directed against one half of the human mind, fell upon the other half. In fact, both ideas and sensations have for their common support, in the last analysis, natural convictions, which rest upon no previous demonstration. If all ideas must be demonstrated, there must be an infinite series of demonstrations, and so no demonstration is possible. If, on the contrary, all demonstrations have for their basis an order of ideas indemonstrable, the human mind adheres to those primary ideas only by a simple and invincible belief. By requiring that the physical school should base its belief in sensations upon demonstration, and by rejecting on this point the convictions inherent in human nature, the metaphysicians thereby assaulted the very foundations of their own philosophy, since they themselves were obliged for their own systems to rest upon primary indemonstrable ideas, which they could no otherwise have than by falling back ultimately upon pure belief. The physical philosophers, who admitted simple faith or necessary conviction as the ultimate ground of sensations, but rejected it in regard to pure ideas, fell into the same inconsistency ; and thus both schools, intent only on combating the doctrines peculiar to their adversaries, undermined the common foundation of all philosophy.

INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

WHILE the two Eleatic schools were forming, another philosophical tendency began to show itself, represented at first by Heraclitus, and afterward by Empedocles. The former, born at Ephesus, had been connected with the physical school of Ionia; subsequently he attended the lectures of the founder of the metaphysical school of Elea, about the end of the fifth century B.C. Empedocles flourished at a later period, about 430 B.C. This philosopher, originally of Agrigentum, appears, like Heraclitus, to have studied philosophy under different masters, both physical and metaphysical.

Exposition.

The ideas of Heraclitus and Empedocles, so far as they were in common, belong to a philosophy which is neither idealist, like that of Xenophanes and Parmenides, nor sensualist, like that of Leucippus.

On the one hand, they attempted to construct a system of physics, and maintained fire to be the principle of all material phenomena. This principle acted in the production of phenomena according to two fundamental laws, the laws of love and hatred, concord and discord, or, to use the language of modern science, attraction and repulsion. Each of these philosophers combined, with these general ideas, conceptions peculiar to themselves. But both of them, in the respect that they attempted a physical explanation of things, agreed with the physical schools of Ionia and of Elea.

But they separated from them, particularly from the Eleatic, in another point of view; for above the

physical world they acknowledged a spiritual and intellectual world; they distinguished ideas from sensations; they recognised God. In this part of their doctrine they fall in with the doctrine of Pythagoras, and with the spiritualism of the metaphysical school of Elea, without, however, adopting the idealism of the latter.

The philosophy of Heraclitus is entitled to a particular remark. The inconsistency and opposition of the philosophical theories maintained by his predecessors and by his contemporaries, had thrown his mind into a state of skepticism. He appears to have got free of it by establishing the basis of philosophy in common reason. This seems to be the purport of the fragments of his writings preserved by Sextus Empiricus. "Universal and divine reason, according to him, is the *criterion* of truth. That which is universally believed is certain; for it is borrowed from that common reason which is universal and divine; and, on the contrary, every individual opinion is destitute of certainty. . . . Such being the character of reason, man remains in ignorance so long as he is deprived of the commerce of language; it is by means of this alone that he begins to know. Common reason, therefore, rightly claims deference. Now this common reason being nothing but the picture of the order of the universe, whenever we derive anything from it, we possess the truth; and when we interrogate only our own individual understanding, we fall into error." (Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Logic.*, l. 8.)

We possess, also, some fragments of a philosophical poem by Empedocles, too imperfect, however, to enable us to form a complete view of his system. The death of this philosopher was still more illustrious than his doctrine. He fell a martyr to his zeal

for science, having met his death in exploring the crater of Mount Etna.

Whatever were the exertions of Heraclitus and Empedocles to found a school that should avoid the excesses of idealist pantheism and of materialist atheism, it would appear, nevertheless, that the two schools of Elea exercised at this period a preponderating influence over Greek philosophy. This influence resulted, as we have already said, in shaking the foundations of human reason, and leading to skepticism, which was actually brought out, though under a peculiar form, in what may be called the epoch of the sophists.

THE SOPHISTS.

Historical Notices.

HISTORY informs us that a host of sophists spread over Greece. Among the names which have escaped oblivion are enumerated Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Polus, Thrasymachus, Callicles, Hippias.

The sophists may be divided into two classes. The first consisted of mere rhetoricians: they were absorbed in the science of words, and strangers to every philosophical idea. The other class, with whom alone we have anything to do, were dialecticians, who occupied themselves with human reason for no other end than to arm it against itself. We take, as types of this intellectual degradation, Gorgias of Leontium and Protagoras of Abdera.

Exposition.

Skepticism was evidently the ground of their common doctrine. They maintained that there existed and could exist for man no absolute truths, but only relative truths. *Gorgias* supported his skepti-

cal conclusions, particularly by the principles of the metaphysical school of Elea, by attacking the existence of the finite; but he maintained, at the same time, that all notion of the infinite is utterly unattainable by human intelligence. He wrote a book entitled, *Of that which is not, or of Nature*.—*Protagoras* connected his skeptical argumentation with the principles of the physical Eleatics. He maintained that the phenomena of nature, as well as the modifications of the human mind, are in a state of perpetual variation, which excludes all possibility of certain knowledge.

But among the sophists skepticism took a special form. It was not, with them, the gloomy despair of reason, which suicidally destroys itself; it was a frivolous levity and contempt. The sophists were skeptics who used reason only for sport. To amuse the youth of Greece, eager for all spectacles and games, they gave them the spectacle of an intellectual gymnastics, and, maintaining by turns both sides of a question, exhibited before them feats of argumentative skill and force. They were repaid with great applause, and to many of these philosophical mountebanks this sad trade became a source of wealth.

Observations.

If the state of mind, characterized by the infatuation which the sophists excited, had long continued in Greece, philosophy would have perished; but it had strength enough to triumph at this critical period, and the reaction which followed produced the most brilliant development of Greek philosophy. At the opening of this new epoch appears the great name of Socrates.

SECOND EVOLUTION.

SOCRATES.

Historical Notices.

SOCRATES was born at Athens 470, and died 400 B.C. He was the son of a sculptor named Sophroniscus. He exercised at first his father's profession, but afterward gave himself up to the study of philosophy. This study did not prevent him from fulfilling his duties as a citizen. He bore arms several times in defence of his country; he discharged also with firmness the public functions intrusted to him. But he devoted his life above all things to diffusing among his fellow-citizens the love of wisdom. The testimony of the ancients is not uniform as to the question whether he committed his doctrine to writing. However this may have been, yet his oral teaching, free from all scientific ostentation, contrasted strongly with the pompous lectures of most of the philosophers, and, above all, with the charlatanism of the sophists, who honoured him by their hatred. The history of his virtues and his persecutions is too well known to make it needful to go into details in this place. The *Phædo* of Plato is the epopee of his heroic death.

Character of the Philosophical Reformation attempted by Socrates.

Historical Notices.

Philosophy, in the degraded state to which the sophists had reduced it, was no longer a grave and serious thing. The first step to its reformation was to restore its true character by recalling it to an aim at once elevated and practical. This was the vocation of Socrates, who particularly devoted himself to

the ethical branch of science. He acted in a certain sense the part of a physician for Greek philosophy, about to perish from inanition. His influence was felt even in schools which differed the most decidedly from his ethical doctrines: for Epicureanism, while totally corrupting philosophy, directed scientific speculations, in conformity with the recommendation of Socrates, to an order of ideas applicable to the conduct of life.

The doctrine of Socrates is substantially a theory of virtue. The type of virtue is God, the author of everything that is good and beautiful, who governs the world by his providence. The seat of virtue is the soul, like God in its nature, and immortal as he is. The essence of virtue comprehends wisdom, which relates to the duties of man towards himself; justice, which determines his duties to others; and piety, which includes his duties towards God. The means of cultivating virtue, so far as they depend upon man, are self-knowledge and moderation of the desires; so far as they proceed from God, Divine influence or inspiration. The ultimate consequence of virtue is felicity. God is the guaranty for their final harmony.

The method adopted by Socrates in expounding his ideas resulted from the notions he had formed respecting the object of philosophy and the nature of the soul. Philosophy relates essentially to a practical end, and the true method of teaching, he held, should have the same character. Instead, therefore, of commencing with lofty speculations, often unintelligible for most of those whom one wishes to instruct, we should, in the opinion of Socrates, take hold of men's minds as they are, with their ideas, and even their prejudices, in order gradually to raise them to the knowledge of the truth. This process, besides, in

his view, agreed best with the nature of the soul. He was persuaded that the soul contained the germes of the truth, but enveloped and even smothered by vain opinions engendered by the passions. We should begin, therefore, by setting the soul free from this envelope, in order to give scope for the development of these innate germes. We should go in among these false notions, put them in opposition to each other, and make them destroy each other. Hence the subtile disputations to which Socrates did not disdain to descend. His method was the critical; it was negative in its processes, but positive as to its object.

The philosophical evolution which commenced with Socrates presents a phasis of increase and a phasis of decline.

The *increasing* phasis will bring before us, first, some schools which attempted the organization of philosophy; then the great schools in which this organization was accomplished, meaning thereby that a predominating view became the centre and vital principle of a vast body of ideas. These great schools are Platonism, Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism.

The *declining* phasis will show us the gradual dissolution of these philosophical organizations, down to the moment when, their theories being exhausted, skepticism undertook to present itself as a formal theory.

INCREASING PHASIS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

1. MINOR SCHOOLS: ESSAYS TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY.

IN the interval of time which separates Socrates from Epicurus, various conceptions made their appearance, which may be termed fragmentary, because

they contain only some few of the elements which were afterward combined in the other schools with a more extended system of ideas.

These conceptions may be divided into two classes. The first, detaching from the fundamental doctrine of Socrates some portions and adulterating them, prepared the way for subsequent systems much more celebrated. The others were the continuation, somewhat restricted, of systems anterior to Socrates, but modified by the influence of the Socratic philosophy. To the first class belong the views of Antisthenes and of Aristippus; to the second those of Pyrrho and of Euclid of Megara.

FIRST CLASS.

Antisthenes, or the Cynic School.

ANTISTHENES, who taught about the year 380 B.C., was the founder of the Cynic school, of which Diogenes was the most perfect type. This school, in some respects, prepared the way for Stoicism.

Antisthenes borrowed at first from the Socratic school the principle so well developed by Plato, that the chief good consists in virtue, or resemblance to God. Then starting from the idea that God is supremely independent, he made virtue consist of a proud independence of all external things. Everything that interfered with this independence was to be disregarded, contemned, and rejected by the wise man; hence his contempt not only for pleasures and honours, but even for social civilities, the most respectable customs, and for scientific theories, which he rejected as a mass of barren subtleties. Thus, while Plato, equally with himself, making virtue the sovereign good, sought to unite it harmoniously with all the elements of human nature, Antisthenes sacri-

ficed human nature to an idea of virtue which was, in reality, only the savage exaltation of egotism.

Aristippus, or the Cyrenaic School.

The school of Cyrene, founded by Aristippus, who also flourished about 380 B.C., was a preparation for Epicureanism, as the Cynic school was for Stoicism. The principal representatives of this school next to Aristippus were his grandson Aristippus, surnamed Metrodidactus, Hegesias, Anniceris, and Theodorus.

The Cyrenaic school borrowed from the Socratic doctrine the principle that all philosophy ought to have a practical object, and that this should be the happiness of mankind. But, instead of leading man to happiness by the fulfilment of duty, it repudiated the very notion of duty, or confounded it with that of pleasure. If it thus paved the way for Epicureanism, it nevertheless differed from it in that the Cyrenaics, with the exception of Anniceris, had nothing in view but immediate actual enjoyment, and chiefly the gratifications of sense, while Epicureanism rested on a calculation of enjoyments which comprehended the whole course of life, and in which intellectual pleasures had their place.

Although the school of Cyrene paid very little attention to speculative questions, its moral principle led it to admit no other source of knowledge than sensation. Some philosophers of this school, still more consistent, rejected the testimony of sensation itself as an organ of objective truth, and held only to its subjective character, that is, to the impression, agreeable or painful, which accompanies it. They forbade all inquiry after truth in itself, in order to limit all human activity to the pursuit of pleasure. Skepticism and sensual gratification were the natural conditions of man: this was the monstrous doc-

trine of which Theodorus, surnamed the atheist, was the father.

SECOND CLASS.

Pyrrho, or the Skeptical School.

THE doctrine of Pyrrho of Elea, as developed by his disciple Timon, presents a singular mixture. All philosophy should relate to virtue; this was the element that Pyrrho received from the Socratic doctrine. But he deduced from it the inutility of science, and, to prove this inutility, he undertook to demonstrate the impossibility of science by borrowing the arguments of the sophists which Socrates had refuted—their arguments against human certainty. Pyrrhonism was thus, in its origin, a continuation of the sophistic philosophy, combined with a moral principle. Speculative philosophy being excluded, practical philosophy consisted in following the impulses of nature.

Euclid, or the School of Megara.

The school of Megara, founded by Euclid about the year 400 B.C., to which may be joined the schools of Elis and Eretria, was, at least in the doctrine of its founder, a partial continuation of the doctrines of the metaphysical school of Elea, modified by the Socratic influence. Euclid maintains, with that school, the primitive unity as the sole reality; but, instead of regarding it, as Xenophanes and Parmenides had done, specially under the ontological point of view, he considered it chiefly under a moral point of view, conformably to the tendency communicated by Socrates. The absolute being was contemplated by him as the absolute good. The other philosophers of the Megaric school present nothing noticeable ex-

cept a subtle dialectics, directed specially against cognitions founded upon the testimony of the senses.

2. GREAT SCHOOLS: ORGANIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE philosophical development promoted by Socrates produced four great schools.

The school founded by Plato, inasmuch as it deduces science from a sphere superior to the sensible world, takes its place at the point of view furnished by Pythagoras and the metaphysical Eleatics.

The school of Epicurus takes its position at the point of view peculiar to the physical Eleatics, and, previously, to the Ionian materialists.

The Aristotelian philosophy attempted to accomplish what had never before been attempted, except very imperfectly by the school of Heraclitus and Empedocles. It sought for a middle way between idealism and sensualism. Although the school of Aristotle appeared before that of Epicurus in the order of time, yet we shall speak of the school of Epicurus first, because, in pointing out, in the doctrines of Aristotle, something intermediate between Platonism and Epicureanism, we shall be able more easily to seize its peculiar character after having considered the two extremes between which it vibrated.

Finally, Stoicism, founded by Zeno, undertook to combine a speculative philosophy, of which the principle could be found in the sensualism of Epicurus, with a moral philosophy which had the most of its roots in Platonism.

PLATO.

Historical Notices.

PLATO, born in the island of Egina in the year 430 B.C., was descended on his father's side from

the family of Cadmus, and on his mother's from that of Solon. He gave himself early to the study of the arts, painting, music, poetry, and to geometry. Mathematical knowledge and skill were united in his vast and noble genius with enthusiasm for the beautiful. The lectures of Socrates developed his philosophical vocation. After the death of his master he made several voyages for the purpose of gaining instruction. He visited the philosophers of Greece and the priests of Egypt. He was also in relations with Dionysius the elder, afterward with Dionysius the younger, kings of Sicily. His love of justice, with which he strove to imbue them, drew upon him, on their part, the most odious persecutions. The school which he founded in the gardens of the Academy became the centre of a wide-spread light. He died in 348 B.C. He published his philosophy in the form of dialogues, which have been classified in various ways.

Exposition.

We shall first exhibit the theory of Plato respecting ideas, which is the basis of his philosophy, and then sketch his theory of things.

Theory of Ideas.

Skepticism would be the condition of the human mind if it were not possible to find some foundation for absolute affirmation, affirmation reposing upon something necessary and invariable; for without it everything would be fluctuating in our conceptions. Now what do we find in our intellectual constitution?

We find there, in the first place, *sensations*: but sensations present nothing necessary neither in themselves, nor in the objects to which they relate. In themselves sensations are purely relative to the in-

dividual who experiences them, more or less strong, more or less vivid, varying with individuals and with different successive states of each individual. The objects to which they relate are contingent ; they may exist or cease to exist ; they are susceptible of more or less ; they vary perpetually.

Besides sensations what do we find ? By generalizing the impressions furnished by experience, we come to form in our minds *notions* which represent not the individual object of each sensation, but a general object, which is, as it were, the summary of a whole class of sensations. But these notions, for the very reason that they are generalizations of sensations, partake fundamentally of the character of variableness essential to the sensations in which they have their root.

If, then, there is nothing else in the human intelligence than sensations and notions, there is no way of finding the basis for an absolute affirmation. But is there nothing else ? Suppose all the triangles which are realized in nature were destroyed : everything pertaining to them which falls within the sphere of sensation would then disappear ; but something still remains ; the properties of the triangle subsist immutably. Suppose that, believing I am exercising an act of beneficence, I render to a distressed person what proves to be a useless service : vary the supposition in any way you please ; not only change all the circumstances, but the fact itself. Suppose that, wishing to give the man a remedy which shall save his life, I give him a poison which kills him. My action preserves a character which does not change with the variation of circumstances, and this character is derived from its relation to a conception superior to anything which passes within the sphere of the contingent and variable, to the conception which is call-

ed justice or holiness. Go now through all space and time, and everywhere and always the conception of the essential properties of the triangle, the conception of justice and holiness, are respectively one and the same. There is, then, in the human intelligence, something universal, because it is independent of space and time; something necessary in itself, since no variation affects it. This is *ideas*.

Thus there are three things in the human intelligence: sensations, notions, ideas. Sensations correspond to the variable and individual; notions correspond to the variable abstracted from the individual object of each sensation; ideas correspond to the invariable and universal.

From hence it follows that ideas are the only possible basis of absolute affirmation, and constitute, strictly speaking, science. Sensations, destitute of any character of universality and necessity, are intelligible only in their relation to realities of which they are the shadows, to ideas. Notions, as far as they are distinct from sensations, are possible only through generalization, and generalization is possible only in virtue of a want which the reason feels of arriving at a term universal in itself. Everything in the human mind which is subordinate to ideas, is rendered clear only by a reflected light: ideas alone possess that light, or, rather, they are that light itself.

Theory of Things.

God.

That which is mutable, that which is limited or dependant upon time and space, has less of being than that which is universal and immutable. That which is manifested by ideas is therefore the supreme reality, the being pre-eminently, or, in other

terms, there exists a substance of which ideas form the essence : that substance is God.

On the other hand, the variable order of things, as it can be known only relatively to a superior order, must have been formed on the model of ideas. The being, therefore, of whom ideas are the essence, must have acted upon the variable in order to impress upon it the form of ideas.

Thus God is conceived under two different relations in the philosophy of Plato. He is conceived as substance and as cause ; as the substance of ideas, as the cause of forms, which are, in the variable order, the external imprint of ideas. In this connexion we see why, in the philosophy of Plato, God is particularly represented under the notion of the *Logos* or Word, which contains the eternal ideas, the types of all things. It is by ideas, and only by ideas, in the double relation which has been indicated, that Plato arrives at the conception of God ; or, which comes to the same thing, God cannot be known, does not reveal himself to the mind, except by his Word.

Creation.

Unity, universality, immutability ; these are the characteristics of God. Multiplicity, locality, variability ; these are the characteristics of the world. God could not be the author of the world, since it has properties so diametrically opposite to his own. There exists, therefore, out of God a principle of the variable, the imperfect, the finite, which, as it could not be derived from God, must be self-existent. This principle is *matter*, passive, blind, indefinite, without forms.

But does not the notion of these two substantial principles lead to the recognition of a third substance as necessary to the explanation of the world ?

The world would not exist if God had not acted upon matter; for then, matter remaining in its state of passivity and indetermination, no form, no action, no order could have been produced. But, on the other hand, matter being in all these respects the antithesis of God, does not the action of God upon matter imply a reality, which is neither pure activity, like God, nor pure passivity, like matter? This intermediate principle, partaking of the nature of matter and of the nature of God, Plato designates by the name of *soul of the world*. The Platonic cosmology, considered in its root, may therefore be expressed by the following formula: God is to the soul of the world as the soul of the world is to matter; the universe is a great law of proportion.

If the notion of the soul of the world be clearly the key to the cosmology of Plato, it is not less true that the notion itself is very obscure for us. The soul of the world, is it created or uncreated?

If uncreated, there exists, then, between God and matter a third eternal principle, in which the variable and the invariable, the finite and the infinite, co-exist. But, if this be taken for granted, why could they not be supposed to coexist in God? and in this case, instead of the primitive dualism maintained by Plato, we arrive at the Pythagorean idea, according to which everything, even matter itself, proceeds from the substantial unity, the infinite Monad.

But if the soul of the world, as some passages in Plato seem to imply, was created by God, who formed a compound of divine and of material qualities, then God was able to act primarily, without any intermediate principle, upon the primitive material; and in this case, is it not difficult to conceive on what grounds Plato concluded the necessity of this intermediate substance?

To avoid in part these difficulties, it may be said that Plato has not maintained the soul of the world as an essence necessary to render the action of God upon matter possible, but only as a necessary result of that action; that is, by the action of God on matter, the indivisible and the divisible, the invariable and the variable, the archetypal ideas and the formless matter, were to a certain degree blended together, and from thence has resulted this intermediate substance, partaking the nature of both.

However this may be, the two primitive principles maintained by Plato have served him not only to explain the formation of the universe, but also to explain the origin of evil, the highest philosophical question next to that of the creation. In the system of Plato, evil, taken in general, exists necessarily; for it is nothing else than the resistance itself of matter: it exists independently of God, since matter is self-existent. In thus placing the principle of evil out of God, Plato wished to avoid the immoral consequences of pantheism, which, referring this principle to God, destroys the purity of the divine essence. But evil exists necessarily in the material principle only so far as it is not informed by the divine ideas. In acting upon it, God tends to destroy evil by bringing matter into subjection to the proper laws of ideas, and the creation, throughout its whole duration, is nothing but the development of this divine conflict.

Cosmology.

The cosmology of Plato has two parts, the one relative to the spiritual principle, the soul of the world; the other relative to the material world, which is the body of that soul; and the two parts of this cosmology, or general science of the universe, unite together in the same way as psychology and physiology

unite to constitute the special science (anthropology) which has man for its object.

1. The soul of the world, individualizing itself, dividing itself into different souls, forms the gods, the demons, and men, in as far as they are intelligent beings.

As there exists in nature a multitude of different centres of action, there are also as many particular emanations of the soul of the world, as many different souls, which are relatively to each part of nature what the soul of man is relatively to the organism which his soul animates and directs. But all these different souls, these different intelligences, have the soul of the world for their common centre, nearly in the same way as the different faculties of the human soul unite in a central point, which constitutes individual personality.

2. In the physical part of his cosmology Plato holds two principles of the material universe, the terrestrial element, without which nothing is solid; the igneous element, without which there is no light. The one is the principle of the tangibility of the world, the other of its visibility. But, as these two elements have no analogy, God, in order to unite them, has produced two intermediate elements, air and water, which, on the one hand, are analogous to each other by their common property of fluidity, and, on the other hand, are analogous to the two extremes, air to fire, water to earth.

In the *Timæus*, Plato has entered into extended speculations concerning the physical laws of the world, the exposition of which cannot be brought within the limits of this historical sketch.

3. The psychology and physiology of the universe form at the bottom but two branches of a science which is one in its object, since the universe is nothing but one immense animal.

This animal acts in time and by motion : time is the mutable and fluid image of eternity, immutable in its unity ; motion is the activity of the soul of the world and of the souls derived from it.

The world will endure forever, because it is good ; but this immortal life of the world is divided into periods, at the end of each of which things return to their primitive state. This constitutes what Plato calls the great year.

Anthropology, or Science of Man.

Anthropology comprises two parts, the one psychological, which treats of the soul ; the other physiological, which treats of the body.

The soul may be considered under two relations, as a being capable of intelligence, and as a being capable of love.

Under the first relation we have already seen that Plato distinguishes three spheres of the human soul, that of sensations, of notions, and of ideas.

He maintains three corresponding spheres in the affective part of the soul, in the soul as capable of love : the love of the absolutely good corresponds to ideas ; sensual or animal love, which corresponds to sensations ; and between these two, intermediate affections, passions, which, on the one hand, are not immediately directed to animal objects, and, on the other, do not relate to the absolutely good, and thus correspond to notions, which are a sort of middle term between sensations and ideas. These intermediate affections are designated by him by the name of θυμός, the *irascible* principle. Ambition, love of glory, anger, etc., belong to this category.

Plato connected physiology with psychology in the following way : the superior part of the soul, that which lives in ideas and the affections or desires

which correspond to them, has its organ in the head. The seat of the passions is in the heart; that of the inferior part of the soul is in the intestines. The harmony of these three organic centres, according to the laws of subordination which hold them together, constitutes the foundation of organic life.

Logic and Morals.

Logic expresses the rules which the soul, as intelligence, ought to follow; morals is the expression of the rules which the soul, as affective, ought to follow.

Logic.

There are three sorts of logic. The first is *apodictical* or *absolute*, and corresponds to the necessary, the invariable, or, in a word, to ideas. *Probable*, or *epicheirematic* logic, is a middle term between absolute logic, which produces certainty, and the third kind of logic, the imperfect, which is soon to be explained. Notions are the element of probable logic. Inferior to the first kind, because mere notions can never constitute certainty, which belongs only to ideas, it is yet superior to the third kind, because it embraces elements freed from all individuality. The third kind is *imperfect*, or *enthymematic* logic, which is limited to individual objects. Major or general propositions cannot be furnished by sensations which relate only to individual objects. This logic, unable to employ the syllogism, is obliged to restrict itself to the enthymeme, and as the enthymeme is a mutilated syllogism, enthymematic logic is imperfect or mutilated logic.

We find the fundamental precepts of the logic of Plato in the theories of Aristotle, notwithstanding the essential differences necessitated by their differ-

ent starting points. We observe in passing, that if, in his own meditations, in the internal processes of his own mind, Plato evidently followed the *a priori* method, which descends from generals to particulars, he preferred ordinarily in the exposition of his theories the inverse method, which concerns itself first with particulars, in order to bring out from them the universal and absolute.

Morals.

Morals expresses the laws of the soul as loving, and, consequently, as acting, in virtue of the affections which govern it.

Just as in logic, taken in a comprehensive sense, the soul imitates the Logos, the divine Word, so in morals the soul imitates God as loving and acting.

God, who loves ideas with an infinite love, acts without himself only in order to realize these archetypes of all things. Man ought, therefore, in like manner, to subordinate inferior loves, the love of sensible and mutable good, to the love of ideas, of the absolute good; and to act only for the sake of realizing within the sphere of his activity, and according to the measure of his power, the divine ideas.

The general principle of morality is therefore imitation of God. The good is the realization of the true, of which the beautiful is the brightness or splendour. This notion of the beautiful is the foundation of Plato's esthetics.

Politics.

Politics is the application of morals to social institutions. The object of the latter should be the gradual elevation of men to the worship of ideas, to the love of good properly called, and thereby to reduce multiplicity to unity, by destroying the influence

of causes of division among men. Abusing these sound principles, Plato deduced from them two anti-social consequences, the abolition of marriage and the abolition of property. Both of these being in opposition, according to him, to social unity, individualize and divide men.* In this respect he misconceived the true notion of social unity, which needs not be destructive of individualities and personal possessions, but, on the contrary, tends to maintain, complete, and develop them, and thus to bring them into harmonious union.

As to the rest, his political theories are closely connected in other respects with his whole previous philosophy.

If Politics be only an application of Morals, and if Morals correspond to the different faculties of man, society or collective man should be constituted as an individual. Hence the reason why every perfect society should rest upon the distinction of three ranks or castes. The first, the learned or philosophical class, should be devoted to the contemplation of ideas; this class is the social intelligence; it should make the laws. The second class is the depositary of the public force; it is the θυμος, the *irascible* element of society. Like that, it corresponds to notions, because it exerts itself in a sphere inferior to science and superior to manual labour. The third class is composed of labourers and artisans; it is related to the physical wants; it holds in society the same rank as sensations in the soul of man, and plays the same part. From hence it follows that so-

* [These views are to be found in the *Republic*. Entirely opposite ground is taken in the *Laws*, the genuineness of which has been called in question. If Plato be the author of the *Laws* as well as of the *Republic*, the contradiction is to be explained as a change of opinion. The *Laws* express his maturer views at a more advanced period of life.—Ed.]

cial perfection consists in uniting these three classes to the laws, by which sensations and physical love, notions and irascibility (*θυμος*), are subordinated to ideas, the supreme rule of all love.

The Future Life.

Plato formed a twofold demonstration of the immortality of the soul, conformable to his double theory of God. He regarded God, as has been noticed, as both substance and cause; as the infinite *substratum*, in which ideas have their eternal reality; and as the author of the forms which constitute the order of the universe. Now souls, as far as they are united to ideas, partake of the divine substance, and thus are in their nature imperishable. In this point of view God is the immanent root of their existence. But, besides this, as the creator or author of forms, God is good and just, and these two attributes require that souls who have imitated the divine activity should be rewarded, and that souls who have formed themselves upon the evil principle, or matter, should be punished. Thus the views of Plato respecting the last end of things correspond to his views respecting their origin.

Such are the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Plato. The immense variety of consequences in which the unity of this system displays itself, surpasses the limits set to this work, otherwise a greater service could scarcely be done for the instruction of students than to exhibit, as completely as possible, the riches contained in this sanctuary of Greek philosophy.

Observations.

1. Plato, with respect to his starting-point, separates himself fundamentally from the two great Eleat-

ic schools. They had demanded, the one, a demonstration of the existence of the absolute or infinite, the other, a demonstration of the existence of the finite. Plato admits this twofold existence as a primordial conception; he takes it as the very condition and basis of all science, as containing a truth without which to philosophize is impossible. He thus avoided the rocks on which most of his predecessors had split.

2. The philosophy of Plato united two characteristics rarely combined, the most extended variety with the most perfect unity. To present within a narrow circle ideas well connected is not a difficult thing; nor is it difficult for a philosophical mind to make a collection of thoughts extending to a host of objects, but without mutual connexion, dispersed and floating. The difficult thing, the grand and beautiful thing, is to penetrate through diversified orders of ideas, seizing and reducing them all to unity by means of fundamental conceptions which govern them all.

In respect of *extent* and *variety*, the philosophy of Plato surpasses that of all the anterior Greek philosophers. He borrowed from them, it is true, a certain number of elements, but he made them his own by enlarging, unfolding, and combining them with his own ideas. The school which had advanced the farthest in the field of speculation, had traversed, so to say, only some particular regions of the human mind. Plato surveyed them all. In him philosophy displayed its proper character and authority; it appeared as the science which constitutes the unity of the different sciences.

The logical *unity* of Platonism is radically found in his theory of ideas, which contains at the same time an objective unity, because ideas are being itself.

The subordination of sensations to notions, and of notions to ideas, is reproduced in different forms throughout every branch of the philosophy of Plato, and determines an analogous order, as we have seen, in each particular circle of reality. This may be easily seen in casting the eye over the following table :

Theory of Knowledge.

Ideas.	Notions, intermediate between ideas and sensations.	Sensations.
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Theory of the Universe.

God, absolute, necessary, immutable, etc.	The Soul of the World, partakes of the nature of God and of that of matter.	Matter, principle of the variable, the relative.
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The Human Soul.

Region of the Intelligence and of the Love corresponding to ideas.	Region of the Intelligence and of the Love corresponding to notions.	Region of the Intelligence and of the Love corresponding to sensations.
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Human Organism.

The Head, organ of the superior part of the soul.	The Heart, organ of the <i>θυμος</i> .	The Intestines, organ of the intimate affections of the soul.
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Logic.

Apodictic Logic.	Epicheirematic Logic, which is intermediate between the two others.	Enthymematic Logic.
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Morals.

Love of the Absolute (Platonic Love).	Complex Love.	Sensual Love.
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Politics.

Learned class, devoted to the contemplation of truth.	Intermediate class between the philosophers and labourers.	Labouring or industrious class, devoted to agriculture, handicrafts, etc.
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In respect to form, the philosophy of Plato, clothing its most lofty conceptions with the drapery of poetry, full of life, beauty, and splendour, surpasses all the philosophies which sprang from the fruitful soil of Greek genius.

EPICURUS.

Historical Notices.

EPICURUS was born at Samos in the year 341 B.C. He gave himself to the study of philosophy from his earliest youth. He attended successively the lectures of the disciples of Plato and of Democritus. He gave the preference to the doctrines of the latter ; but he wished to improve it, to extend it to a larger system. The founder of a new school, like Plato, he taught in a garden at Athens. But his lectures were never public : his disciples formed a sort of secret society. Epicurus died at the age of seventy-two years. Some of his writings have been recovered from the ruins of Herculaneum.

Exposition.

The sole object of the philosophy of Epicurus is to lead man to happiness or complete enjoyment. This object clearly characterizes his system. Truth, absolute good, order, are no longer, as with Plato, the highest term of philosophy. Moral good, which unites and subordinates each individual to the whole, disappears, and enjoyment, directly relative to the individual, takes its place.

Man can attain happiness only by the right use of reason ; for thereby alone can he learn to secure himself against, or to triumph over, the causes of suffering which surround him.

Consequently, he puts at the head of his philoso-

phy what he called his canonical doctrine, because it contained the legislation of reason.

He distinguished two things in the human intelligence, sensations and anticipations.

Sensations are the impressions which external objects make upon man. To explain their nature and formation, Epicurus adopted the hypothesis of Democritus. Emanations, flowing from objects and combining with the human organization, produce the phenomenon of sensation.

Anticipations (conceptions) are sensations generalized. If man possessed nothing but pure sensations, he would not differ from the brutes; he could not reason, because reasoning implies general notions, and sensations correspond only to individual objects. There is, therefore, in man a faculty whereby he forms general notions, and these general notions have the name of anticipations (presumptions), because they are the starting-point of all reasoning.

Human reason is, then, the result of two principles, an external principle, which is the action of external objects, and an internal principle, which is the reaction of the understanding. But the understanding neither acting nor being able to act upon anything but sensations, these two principles reduce human knowledge to one primary source, to a single germe, namely, sensation, which, according as it is crude or elaborated, exists in different states of development.

This established, it is manifest that error, which springs from a wrong use of reason, cannot be found in simple sensations, which are nothing but the work of nature, and not the product of man's activity. It is only the general notions, the anticipations, which are the product of man, that can be vitiated by error. From whence it follows that the fundamental rule of

reason is to try our anticipations by sensations, to analyze them and reduce them to their primitive elements, and to verify them by this reduction. Such is the substance of the philosophical *canon* of Epicurus.

Provided with the rules which should direct the exercise of his reason, man should apply himself to know the truth, in order that he may avoid all causes of suffering. These causes are internal and external; they exist within himself and without him; and the external causes are divided into two great classes, for man is connected with two worlds, the world of nature, and the social world. Philosophy should therefore teach him to know himself, to know nature, or the principles of things, and, finally, to know the true laws of society.

1. *Self-knowledge.* Setting out from the principle that nothing exists in the mind but sensations, man comes to the conclusion that all his faculties should be applied to a single object, the avoidance of pain and the securing of pleasure: his sole duty is to make himself happy. The simple knowledge of this fundamental principle will set man free from one of the chief causes of unhappiness. The bulk of mankind, strangers to the lights of philosophy, are subject to perpetual torment, because they fancy that there exists a moral motive distinct from pleasure. The law of pleasure being found frequently in opposition to this chimerical law of duty, conflict is stirred up in the soul, disquietude, and remorse.

But after having recognised that pleasure and duty are identical, man ought to calculate his enjoyments so as to avoid all injurious excesses, whether as respects his physical wellbeing or as respects tranquillity, which is the health of the soul.

2. *Knowledge of nature, or the principle of things.*

Here Epicurus renewed the theory of Democritus. Admitting nothing in mind but sensations, and nothing in nature but bodies, he inquired after the components of these compounds, and came thus to the idea of indivisible, eternal, and indestructible atoms, which are the principles of all things. Democritus had supposed that atoms were put in motion in a right line in the infinite void. Epicurus observed that this hypothesis was not sufficient to explain the universe even in a purely mechanical way; for it could not be conceived how the atoms could meet so as to form bodies. He endowed them, consequently, with a second motion in an oblique line, by which, carried in every direction, they would come, by their successive contacts and separations, to produce the different phenomena which compose the universe. Among these phenomena he included the soul, which is of a more refined matter than the body, but so united to it that the dissolution of the one involves the dissolution of the other.

Epicurus did not contrive this atomistic cosmology from any love of philosophical speculations, but in order to deduce from it, conformably with the scope of his system, practical results favourable to the happiness of man, such as he conceived it. These results were of two sorts. In the first place, the knowledge of nature furnished man with means of augmenting the sum of his pleasures, by applying this knowledge to his wants. In the second place, physical science freed man from innumerable evils born of superstition, by which name Epicurus designated religion, the fear of the gods and of another life. Atheism, the basis of his system, is represented by him as the essential condition of happiness.

He speaks, it is true, of the gods, of beings superior to man, endowed with bodies resembling human

bodies in their form, but composed in a more perfect manner, and living in the enjoyment of unchangeable felicity. Now, without inquiring if Epicurus did not make this concession to the popular faith merely for the sake of securing his private tranquillity from the denunciation which he would have drawn upon himself by a strictly formal profession of atheism, it is enough to say that this part of his doctrine is an appendage to his system perfectly compatible with the atheism which lies at the foundation of it. It is merely an admission that man is not the only being endowed with intelligence and the capacity of happiness. But between the notion of such beings more perfect than man, and the true notion of God, there is an infinite distance ; and, on the other hand, Epicurus declares these gods to be indifferent to this world, which is not their creation, and unconcerned with the destiny of man. His system, which denies all idea of Providence, after having denied the divine substance itself, presents the two characteristics which have always distinguished complete atheism.

3., *Knowledge of the true laws of society.* These are nothing but different ramifications of the one sole fundamental law, self-interest. Men, originally dispersed and roving, like wild animals, began by little and little to associate, because they found that society was a means of augmenting their pleasures and diminishing their pains. The social compact rests for every one upon a calculation of advantage ; the advantage ceasing, the compact is dissolved. Consistent with his principles, Epicurus excluded from his theory of society all idea of justice, and, still more, all idea of a divine law originally revealed. He maintains that man invented language.

Observations.

1. Compared with the material systems whether of the Ionian or the physical Eleatic school, the doctrine of Epicurus, in its psychology, logic, cosmology, morals, and politics, presents a vast development of germes antecedently sown. If, on the other hand, it is compared with the material systems which appeared in subsequent periods down to the last moments of Greek philosophy, we shall equally perceive that these later systems are all included within the circle traced by Epicurus. Greek and Roman antiquity never carried materialism any farther than this philosopher left it, just as the real progress of spiritualism never overpassed the limits marked out by Plato; and, accordingly, these two names have remained as representatives of these two philosophies.

2. We have already remarked that the doctrine of Epicurus, though diametrically opposed in its very foundations to the doctrine of Socrates, felt, nevertheless, the impulse given to philosophy by the master of Plato, and in recalling it from barren speculations to a practical object, Epicurus formed no theory purely theoretical; his logic, his cosmology, his psychology, and his politics all terminated in a practical morality, but radically vitiated by the absorption of the idea of duty into that of pleasure.

3. Platonism had shown itself, by its spiritual theories, eminently favourable to the inspirations of art, which lives in the element of sentiment and imagination. These faculties aspire after something superior to the world which our eyes see and our hands touch. The materialism of Epicurus, concentrated in sensation, showed itself, as it consistently should do, hostile to those faculties which rise higher than the senses, and attacked the arts, which are their language.

ARISTOTLE.

Historical Notices.

ARISTOTLE, born at Stagira, in Macedonia, in the year 384 B.C., began at first to study medicine. He afterward came to Athens, where he attended the lectures of Plato. He soon attained great success in the career of philosophy and the other sciences. His reputation induced Philip of Macedon to invite him to his court, and to confide to him the education of his son Alexander. The conqueror of Asia did not forget in the midst of his triumphs the master who had developed his genius. He was careful to send him the historical and scientific documents which his victories put at his disposal. Aristotle taught at Athens in the gymnasium called the Lyceum. Besides his public lectures, which were the exposition of his doctrine for the mass, he gave to a small number of chosen disciples lectures of a higher order. After the death of Alexander he was the object of divers persecutions. Dreading the fate of Socrates, he withdrew to Chalcis, in the island of Eubœa, where he died at the age of sixty-three.

Exposition.

In speaking of the philosophy of Plato and of Epicurus, we began by expounding their ideas concerning the primary sources of human knowledge; we follow a similar order in regard to Aristotle.

Aristotle, who combated on this point the theory of Plato, attacked also that of Epicurus, not, indeed, as taught by Epicurus, who lectured at a later period, but the sensualism professed by the physical school of Elea. He however advanced principles, some of which seem to belong to the idealism of Plato, others to the sensualism of Epicurus.

Thus, on the one hand, his celebrated maxim that there is nothing in the intelligence which was not first in sensation, *nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, seems to refer all ideas to sensation as their source. But, on the other hand, Aristotle insists upon the distinction between the contingent and the necessary, the relative and the absolute; and as the contingent and the relative are derived in the intelligence from sensations, the notions which correspond to the necessary and the absolute have a radical analogy with what Plato called ideas.

One thing is clear: that Aristotle sought a middle way between idealism and sensualism; but in what that middle way precisely consisted is far from being equally clear. Perhaps the fundamental points of the doctrine of Aristotle may be represented in the following manner:

The human mind has two constituent parts, logical forms, and the elements furnished by sensation.

In virtue of the forms by which it is essentially constituted, reason produces affirmations that stamp upon the variable and individual the character of logical necessity and universality, resolvable into the *principle of contradiction*, so called, namely, that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time.

But these forms of the reason, and the affirmations which proceed from them, require a subject-matter to which they may be applied; this matter is furnished by sensation, by experience.

This being supposed, we see how the doctrine of Aristotle concerning human knowledge in certain respects agrees with that of Plato and with that of Epicurus, while in other respects it differs from them both.

It maintains, with Plato, that knowledge contains an element radically distinct from sensation. It

maintains, with Epicurus, that without sensation there could be no knowledge.

It differs from Plato, because in the doctrine of the latter, ideas, the source of absolute affirmations, which are not resolvable into purely logical truths, are eternal realities, independent of human reason, external to it, and merely manifested in it. It differs from Epicurus, because the *anticipations* (conceptions) of his system are nothing but the generalizations of sensations themselves, while in the system of Aristotle, the forms of the reason, although they cannot, indeed, be applied to anything but sensations, yet *add* to them, in constituting knowledge, an element independent of experience.

If these be in fact the fundamental positions of Aristotle, it is easy to see why he himself always represented his system as radically distinct both from Platonism and from sensualism. If, on the contrary, the view we have taken be incorrect and false, his doctrine must appear as nothing but an amalgamation of principles manifestly incompatible, and which run, of necessity, into Platonism and Epicurism. Now, although it is assuredly possible that his system contains a radical inconsistency, yet it is not to be presumed that so superior a mind as his would lay down evident contradictions for the foundation of his philosophy; and we think he can be acquitted only by supposing that he took his position, or, at least, endeavoured to take it, at a point of view analogous, or partially so, to that which Kant took in modern times.

From thence it would follow that philosophy ought to begin by determining the internal laws of the reason, or, in other terms, that it depends principally upon logic. His logic is, in fact, the master work of Aristotle, the key to all his speculations, the bond

which unites all the portions of his immense labours. Amid all changes of philosophy, logic has remained substantially what he made it. He has ceased to rule by his metaphysics, but his logic still maintains its dominion.

Logic, comprising the laws of demonstration, and thereby of science, supposes, as Aristotle remarks, indemonstrable notions, which serve as its basis. He refutes on this point two classes of philosophers: the one maintains that everything should be demonstrated, and that everything is actually demonstrated; the other, that everything should be demonstrated, but that this universal demonstration has not yet been found. The first represents the collective whole of truth as a circle, and each particular truth as a point in the circle, in such way that each truth is at once principle and consequence; principle relatively to that which immediately follows, and consequence relatively to that which immediately precedes it. Aristotle had no difficulty in showing that this universal circular demonstration was nothing but the sophism of the vicious circle which nobody would take for the basis of a partial demonstration. As respects the other philosophers, who, without possessing universal demonstration, limit themselves to maintaining the necessity of it in order to constitute science, Aristotle replies to them, that man, from his very nature, must believe something, while, on the contrary, their doctrine would render him unable to believe anything, since it implies an impossible condition, to wit, an infinite series of demonstrations.

These foundations of logic being established, Aristotle divides the science into three parts. The first treats of terms, the expression of ideas; the second of propositions, the expression of judgments; the third of argumentation. As argumentation, which is

the instrument of scientific demonstration, is the proper object of logic, it is essential to know its elements. It is composed of propositions; propositions must first, therefore, be examined. But propositions are themselves composed of terms; we must, therefore, commence with terms, which are the primary elements of argumentation.

In this first part of logic Aristotle reduces terms, and thereby human ideas, to ten primitive categories, which are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, position, habit.

But, in order to operate upon these categories, or *predicaments* as they were also called, the mind must combine them with categoremata called *predicables*, which are five in number: genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

The distinction between the predicaments and predicables consists in this, that the former express what is inherent in beings, while the latter, expressing the mind's own points of view, are for the most part nothing but formulas, by means of which we combine the predicaments.

In this first part of logic Aristotle propounds a multitude of views, which would have their proper place in universal grammar.

In the second part he classifies and analyzes propositions, making them fall into a scheme determined by the predicaments and predicables. His views concerning the division of propositions into simple, complex, affirmative, negative, universal, particular, indefinite, singular, moral; the opposition of propositions, which is either contradictory or contrary; their identity, and their conversion, have been brought together in most modern treatises of logic.

The same is true of his theory of argumentation, all the processes of which he reduces to some sim-

ple rules, and all the forms to a single form, the syllogism.

Such are the foundations of demonstrative logic. But besides this logic, which sets out from that which is certain and arrives at certain conclusions, there is another logic, which is nothing but the art of conjecture ; it is applied to probabilities, and takes the name of dialectics. Its laws are fundamentally the same as those of demonstrative logic, its validity only is different.

After having spoken of logic, the instrument of science, let us pass to science itself. Science is the product of the activity of reason. This activity has two principal directions, the speculative and practical. Hence the classification of the sciences.

The SPECULATIVE, or THEORETICAL SCIENCES, are divided into three classes.

I. Sciences purely rational : these are metaphysics and mathematics.

1. *Metaphysics*, or, as Aristotle calls it, the *first philosophy*, treats of being in general, abstracted from everything which constitutes the different species of beings.

Aristotle attaches his whole metaphysics to a logical principle expressed in these words : the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Guided by this principle, he draws out from the general notion of being a series, as it were, of logical emanations. The first of these logical emanations is *substance*, which is being considered as implying a unity, the support of its modifications. If we abstract the substance from the modifications, we arrive at the idea of the *primary matter* of being. But matter cannot be indeterminate ; that which determines it is *form*, the third logical emanation. Finally, being, composed of matter and form, contains the notion of

power, active or passive. Passive power is the susceptibility of being modified by the action of another being. Active power is the modifying principle. Power manifests itself by motion. It is by the idea of motion that Aristotle is led to the idea of God, considered as the immutable mover of the universe.

The metaphysics of Aristotle may be considered is the antipode of the great systems of emanation brought out by Oriental philosophy. In those, every emanation, every development of the primitive being, is personified; in Aristotle, all the developments of being appear only under the form of abstract notions. Abstractions beget abstractions, as persons engender persons. It is in order to indicate at once these relations and differences that we have used the term *logical emanations*.

2. *The Mathematics*. There are only two treatises of Aristotle upon this subject extant. They require here only a simple mention.

II. The second class of theoretical sciences comprehends the experimental sciences; namely,

1. *Natural History*, for which Aristotle collected numerous materials, which he put together with superior sagacity. To this part of his works belong: the *History of Animals*, treatises concerning their *motions, organization, generation*; *Of Respiration, Of Plants, Of Physiognomy, Of the Duration of Life, Marvellous Narratives, Problems*.

2. *Psychology*. The soul is an entelechy, energy, or activity, the principle of organic, sensitive, and intellectual life. The acts of the organic life are generation and nutrition. It is common to all beings. The sensitive life is peculiar to animals. But every external sense perceiving only that which characterizes the object to which it is applied, the comparison of sensations could not take place if there were not a

common internal sense, receiving the impressions transmitted by all the others. Here we are reminded of the *manas* of the Hindu philosophy. Sensations are accompanied by an appetite corresponding to them, which, joined with the images perceived by the senses, completes the sensitive life. The intellectual life, which is peculiar to man, exists in two modes; for the intellect is passive as far as it invests things with forms, active as far as by its own power it reacts upon those forms. The intellect has also a corresponding appetite, the rational appetite, the desire for truth, which completes the intellectual life. The intellect is not merely theoretical, or concerned with conceiving of that which exists; it is also practical, indicating what should be done or avoided. From the practical intellect, combined with appetite, proceeds the activity of intellectual beings, by which they seek what is good, or turn from what is injurious.

Of the psychological works of Aristotle are his treatises *On the Soul*, *On the Memory*, *On the Senses and Sensible Things*, *On Sounds*, *On Colours*, *On Dreams*, *On Waking*, *On Youth and Age*.

III. The third class of theoretical sciences comprehends the mixed sciences, which are only different branches of general physics, which itself is only the application of metaphysical notions to the general phenomena of the universe.

Aristotle's physical explanation of the world involves the concurrence of three orders of conceptions, principles, causes, and the elements.

1. *Principles*. Some anterior philosophers had maintained that the universe resulted from similar principles; others, that it resulted from opposite principles, as cold and heat, the bases of the physics of Empedocles. According to Aristotle, opposite prin-

ciples reciprocally subvert each other, while similar principles could never produce the diversified phenomena of nature. He therefore maintained two opposite principles, form and privation, combined with a third principle, namely, matter, which lies at the ground of the two others.

2. *Causes.* These are of four sorts : the material cause, *ex quâ aliquid fit* ; the formal cause, *per quam* ; the efficient cause, *à quâ* ; the final cause, *propter quam*.

3. *The Elements.* There are two primordial elements : earth, which is dense ; fire, which is elastic. They are united by two other elements, water and air, which are analogous to each other, and partake, at the same time, of the nature of the others, the one of that of earth, the other of that of fire. This idea occurs in the philosophy of Kanada and in that of Plato.

The three principles, the four causes, and the four elements, combined with the laws of motion : these are the sources of general physics.

To this department of his philosophy belong his treatises, *Of Things physical, Of Generation and Decay, Of the World, Of Heaven.*

The PRACTICAL SCIENCES comprehend : 1. Morals or Ethics ; 2. Politics ; 3. Economics.

1. The principle of the morals of Aristotle is the moderation of the desires according to the decisions of reason. In place of the positive principle of duty maintained by Plato, and of the positive principle of pleasure maintained by Epicurus, he substitutes, conformably with the general character of his philosophy, an abstract rule. Virtue, by this rule, consists in a medium between opposite passions. The object of morals is the satisfaction which results from this moderation of the desires.

We ought to notice, in respect to what Aristotle says of justice, a distinction which has since been generally adopted by theological casuists and by jurists, to wit, the distinction between commutative justice, which regulates the transactions and relations between individual and individual according to a sort of arithmetical proportion, and distributive justice, which in a state proportions rewards and punishments in a sort of geometrical progression.

2. Politics, like morals, is concerned with the mutual relations of men, but it has to do with those relations which are regulated by external laws. From whence it follows that good politics consists, like morals, in a moderation between contraries, in a medium between tyranny and anarchy, that is, in a constitution where monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are combined.

Aristotle, by making utility the political criterion, as he had made the happiness of moderation the moral criterion, deduced from this principle the legitimacy of slavery as a condition of society. Thus, instead of looking at the common happiness of the human family, his common utility means at the bottom only the conditions requisite for the existence of an egotistical state, founded upon the distinction of victors and vanquished, that is to say, not upon the equality of nature, but upon the preponderance of force.

STOICISM.

Historical Notices.

ZENO, founder of the Stoic school, was born at Citium, in the island of Cyprus, in the year 362 B.C. Commercial affairs brought him to Athens, and philosophy retained him there. Having acquired a

knowledge of the doctrines professed by the different schools, he undertook to establish a new school, which took its name from the portico (στοα) in which he gave his lectures. He died in 262, at the age of ninety-eight. The Athenians paid distinguished honours to his tomb and his memory.

Chrysippus, who held the second rank in the old Stoic school, was born in the year B.C. 280, at Soles, in Cilicia. He was the disciple of Cleanthes, who himself had been the disciple of Zeno. He died in the year 207.

Exposition.

Stoicism is distinct both from the partial systems of which we took notice in the preceding pages, and from the great systems of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. It cannot be ranked with the partial systems; for, on the contrary, it is completely organized into a comprehensive philosophy, containing a logic, which comprises at once the rules of reason and those of language; a physics, that is, a theory of the world; and, finally, a morals, the chief part of Stoicism, for which the two others serve as a preparation. But, on the other hand, there is not the real unity of principle and tendency which characterizes, though in different ways, the Epicurean, Aristotelian, and Platonic systems. For it was a combination of two contradictory elements; of an element of sensualism and materialism, which sinks man to the animal, and of an element which elevates and ennobles him, which cannot be conceived except on the principles of spiritualism. Yet this union, or, rather, attempt at union, was the predominant idea in Stoicism.

In order to form a just idea of this system, we must recognise its double nature, which touches upon Epicureanism on the one hand, and upon Platonism on the other.

Stoicism, as it was established by Zeno and developed by Chrysippus, derives all human knowledge from sensations, elaborated and generalized by the understanding.

Conformably to this principle of sensualism, the Stoics maintained :

1. That there exists no other beings than bodies.
2. That the corporeal beings which compose the universe may be divided into two classes, the one active, the other passive, the universe presenting here two great characteristics of activity and passivity.
3. That the passive principle, designated by the name of matter, has been informed, ensouled, by the active principle, which is designated by the name of God ; a principle corporeal and intellectual, which is the pure ether and the primordial fire.
4. That the universe is thus a great animal.
5. That the souls of the gods, of genii, and of men, are emanations from the primitive fluid.
6. That everything is subject to the laws of Fate ; for God, or the primitive intelligent fluid, can act only according to his nature, and the nature of the passive principle which he ensouls ; and souls emanated from the universal soul are, for the same reason, subject to fatal laws in their sphere of action.
7. That souls, perishable in their nature, will one day vanish away by returning to the great soul.
8. That the world itself, formed by fire, will be dissolved by fire, and undergo a palingenesia or regeneration.

To resume : the intelligence enclosed within the circle of sensations, the universe an assemblage of corporeal principles, with fatality for its law—these are the elements of sensualism and materialism inherent in the Stoic doctrine at the first stages of its development.

But it comprised also other elements, which, having an opposite tendency, belong to another order of doctrines.

1. It is the just, the honourable, the holy, and not pleasure, which should be the motive of human actions.

2. The wise man should endeavour to repress in himself all excitements of the soul, which carry away the will in spite of judgment and reason, that he may attain to that perfect tranquillity in which the soul, free from every unreasonable affection, inclines entirely to the honesty and justice which reason reveals.

3. The right is the only good, wrong the only evil: everything that is neither right nor wrong is neither good nor evil, as, for example, privations, pain, death; none of these will shake the tranquillity of the wise man.

4. The sole effort of the wise man should be to resemble God: man, a part of the universal whole, should live according to the laws of the whole or of nature; and these laws have their most excellent manifestation in the divine essence, and in the action of God upon the world.

5. For God is in his essence order, justice, holiness.

All this moral teaching implies two fundamental principles incompatible with the other part of Stoicism. On the one hand, the notion of the just, the holy, cannot be derived from sensation; and, on the other hand, the idea of duty, of obligation, cannot be allied with the idea of fatality.

This radical incompatibility of the two constituent elements of Stoicism explains the contradictions which its doctrines exhibit in the diverse series of its consequences. Of these, however, we must omit the detail.

Observations.

1. In order to characterize Stoicism in a single word, we may say that in respect of morals it was the intermediate between Platonism and Epicureanism, just as Aristotelianism was the intermediate between them in respect of logic.

2. Platonism tended to elevate the human mind; Epicureanism to abase it; Aristotelianism sought to regulate it: Stoicism exerted less influence upon the intellect than upon the character of man.

3. The noble and elevated part of Stoicism gained gradually the upper hand, in many respects at least, of the consequences of the sensual and material principles combined with it, and the great and noble souls who subsequently embraced the doctrine of Chrysippus and Zeno were chiefly attracted to it by the severe majesty of its morality.

4. Nevertheless, in relation to morality, it contained radically the vice which we have already remarked in the Cynic school, and which became effectually grounded in Stoicism. This vice was the exaltation of human pride. The consistent Stoic believed himself morally equal with God, because, like Him, he depended upon nothing but the laws of nature; because he was just, as well as God, by the sole energy of his own will; and because he expected to attain to a tranquillity of soul as absolute as the calmness which God enjoys. Stoicism was, in this point of view, a deification of man, wrought by the powers of man alone.

DECLINING PHASIS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

THE increasing phasis, which we have surveyed, has presented four great systems, around which revolve the particular conceptions produced in that pe-

riod of time. We now go on to observe, in the succeeding period, the continuation of philosophical labours in these same four directions; continuations which will exhibit symptoms of a gradual dissolution.

We shall follow to the end of its career the movement of Greek philosophy, properly so called, reserving to another place what we have to say of Greek philosophy as modified by Orientalism. Although in this declining period the philosophical genius of Greece lost the vigour and grandeur that characterized the labours of Plato, of Aristotle, of Epicurus, and of the founders of Stoicism, it nevertheless displayed a great force of expansion and propagation. Two new centres of intellectual activity were established, the one at Alexandria, under the Ptolemies, the other at Rome. But the Romans were in reality nothing but organs of the Greek philosophy speaking Latin, and on this account we comprehend them in its last period.

I. CONTINUATION OF THE PLATONIC SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

THE school founded by Plato received, as we have already said, the name of the Academy. The epoch during which the disciples of Plato adhered to the principles laid down by their master has been designated by the name of the Old Academy, while the name of New Academy has been given to the epoch in which fundamental alterations were made in the Platonic school as originally instituted.

This second epoch of Platonism may itself be divided into two periods. The first commences with the reformation attempted by Arcesilaus of Pitane, born about the year 316 B.C.; a reformation to which many historians of philosophy give the name

of the Second or Middle Academy. The second period dates from Carneades, born at Cyrene about the year 215 B.C., who is considered, according to the threefold designation now indicated, as the founder of the New Academy.

Exposition.

Of all the Greek schools, Platonism had the most elevated pretensions. Its theory of ideas involved the complete and absolute knowledge of things in themselves. Platonism, in this point of view, represented, so to say, the high aristocracy of the intellect, and must needs have been, accordingly, the particular object of attack by the other schools, whom a common jealousy united against it. But the more attractive this science was, which was to dissipate all the darkness of the human mind, the more difficult it was to hold firmly to it, in the midst of the incessant objections opposed to it on all hands by its adversaries. As the Platonists held in contempt all the theories of knowledge maintained in the other schools, they would naturally, when once they admitted a doubt as to their own theory, begin to despair of the human intelligence itself. This explains the apparently singular phenomenon, namely, that Platonism, which exalted the human mind to the greatest height, was the first to descend towards the opposite extreme, the first to establish a mitigated skepticism. In the period which we are surveying, it no longer attributed to the human intelligence the power of knowing things in themselves and with certainty; it allowed to the reason no other *criterion* than probable appearances.

It was, besides, led to this doctrine in another way. The schools which believed in the possibility of arriving at the knowledge of things, but not that supe-

rior and absolute knowledge which Platonism had promised, firmly maintained, for that very reason, their confidence in their own theories much longer, and, animated by that confidence, attacked their principal enemy, Platonism, with a much bolder tone. In order to lower the pretensions and disconcert the polemic pride of their adversaries, the Platonists, in their turn, attacked the dogmatism which all their adversaries displayed, even while denying to the human mind the power of attaining, in any certain way, to the reality of things.

In a word, in the impossibility of knowing what is, man can know only what appears to be; he must therefore renounce certainty, and limit himself to probability: such is the fundamental principle which constitutes the unity of the speculations of the Middle and of the New Academy; a principle which characterizes their common tendency.

Arcesilaus devoted his efforts particularly to the development of the purely negative part of this principle; he insisted upon the impossibility of knowing things in themselves, and upon the necessity of abstaining from all dogmatical judgments. In the sphere of practical life, he maintained opinion to be the rule of our judgments, that is, appearances more or less probable.

This doctrine of probability was chiefly developed by Carneades. Between the cognitive intellect and the objects of reputed cognition he placed *phantasy*, the representative appearance, which is relative to both. As it is impossible to compare the appearance with the object, since that would presuppose the previous knowledge of the object, so there is no means of attaining a certain knowledge of things. But as the phantasy, the appearance or impression, may be true, we should not absolutely refuse all re-

liance upon it, but should endeavour to distinguish what is probable from what is not. This probability evidently cannot be derived from the object, which as yet is unknown; it must therefore be sought for in the subject, the mind, which thinks it knows. It may have three sources or three degrees: 1. The liveliness of the impression produced in the mind; 2. The agreement of one appearance with other appearances, which, far from contradicting, confirm it; 3. The examination of the appearance itself under its different aspects. If, under whatever aspect it be regarded, it still remains always alike, we ought to place a greater reliance upon it. The combination of these conditions constitutes the highest degree of probability, or the most complete criterion to which man can pretend.

The principles of the New Academy were propagated in the Roman world. Their most illustrious representative was Cicero, born B.C. 108, celebrated for his eloquence, his political influence, and his philosophical labours. Cicero asserted nothing as certain in regard to the most important objects which can occupy the mind of man, God, religion, and a future life, except when he could support himself upon the common consent of mankind, which he considered as the voice of nature. But when he reasoned in a purely philosophical way, conformably to the doctrines of the New Academy, he admitted nothing but probabilities, as may be seen particularly in his treatise *On the Nature of the Gods*, which begins and ends with a "perhaps." In morals, however, he inclines in many respects to Stoicism.

Cicero has played an important part in the philosophical world, far less on account of any original contributions of his own, than because he filled the office of factor for philosophy between Greece and

Rome; of Latin secretary to the Greek schools, whose numerous systems he made known to his countrymen in clear and elegant forms. His writings contain a multitude of details of information of the greatest value in the history of philosophy.

II. CONTINUATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SCHOOL.

THE labours of the continuators of the Peripatetic school present no new order of ideas of any great importance in the history of philosophy; and we shall confine ourselves to noticing, among the principal Aristotelians whose speculations have come down, at least partially, to us, those who modified in any noticeable degree the primitive doctrine of the Lyceum, indicating, as far as possible, with respect to each one, the characteristic traits of their philosophy.

1. Theophrastus, who attended the lectures of Aristotle. He is particularly known by his *Characteristics*, a work imitated in modern times by La Bruyère, who has risen far above his model. Theophrastus seems to have endeavoured to reduce the various phenomena of the physical world, as well as the faculties and operations of the soul, to the laws of motion, by referring these laws themselves to the predicaments of Aristotle. The importance thus given to the theory of motion, as the universal principle of explanation both in the physical and moral world, agrees very well with the theology of Aristotle, which recognised God only as the prime mover of the universe.

2. Dicæarchus of Messina, who lived about the year 320 B.C. He denied the existence of spiritual forces, and held the principle of life to be a purely material energy, which at the ground is a reduction of everything to the laws of motion.

3. Strato of Lampsacus, who lived about the year

270 B.C. In metaphysics he denied the reality of the general notion of being, and considered it as nothing but an abstraction, which represented simply the idea of the permanence of particular beings. In psychology he seems to have identified thinking with sensation. In logic he maintained that all truth for man was merely verbal. In cosmology he rejected the existence of a divine power, and recognised only the blind force of nature. All phenomena, according to him, were derived from two principles: motion, which is inherent in all bodies, and gravity, which is likewise essential to bodies, and in virtue of which they all tend to their centre.

To these Peripatetic philosophers may be added the names of several who flourished from the epoch of Aristotle down to about the year 100 B.C. Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenes of Tarentum, Heraclitus of Pontus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Lycon, Critolaus of Phaselis, Diodorus of Tyre. Of these, some offer nothing noteworthy; others were distinguished by the extent of their knowledge, but their writings are lost.

Andronicus of Rhodes carried to Rome the philosophy of Aristotle, whose works he expounded in the capital of the world about the year 80 B.C. Alexander of Aphrodisia, in the close of the second and beginning of the third century of the Christian era, founded a Peripatetic school at Alexandria. No recollection of any importance attaches to the names of the other disciples of Aristotle who spread his doctrine in the Roman empire.

III. CONTINUATION OF THE SCHOOL OF EPICURUS.

THIS school continued for a very long time without producing any remarkable work. From Epicurus down to the age of Augustus we reckon ten successive

chiefs of this school who have left no traces of any importance in the history of philosophy.

The doctrine of Epicurus gained a footing at Rome in the last years of the Republic, and the corruption of manners which characterized that period was at once the cause and effect of its rapid spread. A singular spectacle was then presented. Platonism, which looked upon the creation as a divine epopee; Stoicism, with its dramatic ideas about the struggle of human Free-will and Fate, were naturally allied to poetry, yet neither of them had a poet for their interpreter. Nothing can be less poetical in itself than the mechanical philosophy of Epicurus: yet poetry lent it its forms. Lucretius sang of nature, of matter, of pleasure, and of non-existence; for poetry is never anything but the expression of ideas that live in men's minds, and, at that period of struggle after religious convictions, materialism was the expression of what remained of pensive enthusiasm in the human mind. But, apart from the brilliancy shed upon it by the poem of Lucretius, Epicureanism continued its work of corruption in obscurity, and no longer figured upon the theatre of philosophical theories.

IV. CONTINUATION OF THE STOIC SCHOOL.

STOICISM, as we have seen, contained two parts, the one scientific, the other moral, and incompatible with each other in certain fundamental points. This incompatibility must needs show itself in the history of Stoicism. It had already manifested itself even in the time of Zeno. Two of his disciples, Aristo of Chios and Herillus of Carthage, endeavoured, in two opposite directions, to render one of the elements of Stoicism predominant over the other. The first rejected physics and logic, and reduced all philoso-

phy to morals. The second, on the other hand, derived morals from science.

As the distinctive character of the Stoic philosophy was chiefly determined by its moral doctrines, as its principal power of propagation lay in its ethics, which struck and attracted the mind with far more force than the speculative ideas of Zeno and Chrysippus, the moral branch of the system would, it was to be expected, gain in the long run an exclusive predominance. It is true that Sphærus, Athenodorus, Cleanthes, Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, maintained almost inviolate the deposit of original Stoicism. But the time arrived when its speculative part was decomposed, while its moral part subsisted in its integrity. Two celebrated Stoics, Antiochus of Ascalon and Panætius of Rhodes, at a period near to the Christian era, endeavoured to blend the theories of Zeno with those of Plato and Aristotle. From that moment the speculative part of Stoicism proper began to fall into dissolution.

Seneca, however, the preceptor of Nero, did for Stoicism what Lucretius had done for Epicureanism. He commented upon it, developed, and adorned it; and, though without resorting to poetry, clothed the doctrines of the Portico in forms not wanting in beauty and attraction. But the last representatives of Stoicism that have commanded the attention of posterity, Epictetus the slave and Antoninus the emperor, cultivated chiefly its morals.

Cynicism, which was nothing but a sort of brutal Stoicism, produced some names little renowned, down to the time when it ascended the funeral pyre of Perigrinus, who is said to have burned himself at Olympia in the second century of the Christian era.

General Observations.

We have now followed in their development, or, rather, in their degeneracy, the four great schools of Greek philosophy. Stoicism, as a scientific doctrine, was gradually dissolved away. Epicureanism, which buried the notion of truth in the sentiment of pleasure, had, in crowning itself with flowers, celebrated the funeral obsequies of the intellect. Peripateticism had become exhausted ; its dialectics, the instrument of disputation, alone survived of all its vast assemblage of doctrines. For a long time, too, the New Academy had cast doubt upon the corner stone of the human mind. It is true that, in the first and second centuries of the Christian era, some philosophers endeavoured to revive the Platonic speculations, among whom may be named Plutarch of Cheronea, more remarkable, however, for his learning and good sense than for his theoretical ideas. About the same period the attempt was also made to resuscitate Pythagoreanism. But these exceptions do not destroy the general fact of the dissolution of philosophical doctrines.

Such a state of philosophy must naturally produce a startling resurrection of skepticism. Philosophy was in a situation analogous to that which, in the first phasis of the development of Greek genius, had immediately preceded the skepticism of the Sophists. But the philosophical spirit had undergone too prolonged labours ; it was too much worn out during these long and laborious experiments ; it was become too old to fall back again, as the Sophists had done, and seize upon the mind as a child's play-game. The new skepticism was, therefore, to exhibit a character eminently serious ; it was to offer to wearied reason an asylum and a place of repose. Such, in

fact, was its character as it was sketched by Ænesidemus, who seems, however, not to have established skepticism except in the sphere of science; such also was its character as constituted by Sextus Empiricus, who represented it as the normal or proper state of the human mind, taken in its universal relations.

SKEPTICAL SCHOOL.

Historical Notices.

IN proportion as doubt gained entrance into the schools of philosophy, under different forms and in different degrees, the proper physiognomy of the skeptical school founded by Pyrrho must needs be gradually effaced. Skepticism grew weak as a sect in proportion as its influence gained in extent. Nevertheless, in most of the schools, which felt this influence deeply, it was a vague discouragement of the reason, and not an avowed doctrine. There was a tendency to doubt, a sort of passive and mitigated skepticism, which was not produced as a system, and still less as a complete and thorough-going system. But this disposition of mind must needs none the less terminate in a resuscitation of the old skeptical Pyrrhonic school, which, in systematizing doubt anew, in raising it to an active, polemic, and predominant doctrine, constituted it the centre of all philosophical tendencies, as the general formula of everything which preceding philosophical investigations had revealed concerning the nature and laws of the human mind.

The New Skeptical School extends from Ænesidemus, contemporary with Cicero, to Sextus Empiricus, who lived in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Between these two philosophers, of whom the first was

the prime mover, and the second the legislator of the new skepticism, occur names much less known. Zeuxippus, Antiochus of Laodicea, Menodotus, Theodas, Herodotus of Tarsus, respectively mark periods in the genealogy of the doctrine.

Ænesidemus, originally of Crete, composed a work on Pyrrhonism, divided into eight books, of which Photius has given us a summary. But the great documents of the school are the works of Sextus Empiricus, his *Institutes of Pyrrhonism*, and his eleven books *Against the Mathematicians*, that is to say, against all dogmatic philosophers. The native country of Sextus is unknown: he appears to have lived for some time at Alexandria, where also Ænesidemus had resided. He received the name of *Empiricus*, because he belonged to a school of medical men who limited themselves to experiment, and rejected every medical theory.

Exposition.

As Ænesidemus is commonly placed at the head of the skeptical movement which terminated with Sextus Empiricus, it might be concluded that the doctrines of the former were identical with those of the latter. This, however, is not certain. There is room for doubting whether Ænesidemus professed skepticism in the strict sense of the word. We know, from the testimony of Sextus, that Ænesidemus, who was attached to the doctrine of Heraclitus, borrowed from that philosopher the principle that the notions common to all minds are the rule for the thinking of each one. If he considered these as a practical rule, the only one to which recourse can be had in the absolute uncertainty of all positive faith, of all dogmatic judgment, his doctrine was not essentially different from that of Sextus, who likewise ad-

mitted a practical rule, though he conceived it in a different way. But if these common notions were for him, as they seem to have been for Heraclitus, a real criterion of truth, then he did not profess skepticism, since he admitted one kind of certainty; he professed skepticism only with respect to philosophy and science, since in his view all the results of intellectual activity, everything superadded to the primary universal notions inherent in human nature, was completely uncertain. In denying scientific cognition, he destroyed, it is true, one of the necessary modes of the human mind, and left only bare belief: he attacked fundamentally, also, his very principle of common reason, for the possibility of science is one of its convictions. But this merely scientific skepticism was still different from that of Sextus, which embraced the human mind in its whole extent and in all its modes. Whatever be the truth on this point, yet, as the arguments of Ænesidemus are to be found in the system of Sextus, it will be enough to expound the latter, which is, in fact, the most complete expression and the most powerful apology for skepticism. It sums up all anterior Pyrrhonic ideas, and succeeding skeptics have added nothing fundamental.

Skepticism sets out with a distinction which has for its object the reconciliation of speculation with practice. It distinguishes in man nature and reason. There exist in the nature of man indefinable instincts, which lead him to acquiesce in appearances. It is in virtue of these instincts that he provides for his wants, that he conforms himself to laws and customs: the whole of practical life rests upon this basis, and in this sense skepticism admits a *practical criterion*. But when, instead of confining himself to the instincts of nature, man calls for the intervention of reason; when he imagines that he can know with it and by

it not merely phenomena, but things absolutely, in themselves ; when, in a word, he admits a *speculative criterion*, he attempts what is impossible, he would seize what is not to be grasped.

Hence there are but two great philosophical sects, dogmatism and skepticism. Their radical difference turns not upon the necessity of a practical criterion, the necessity of yielding to appearances, but upon the possibility or the existence of a speculative criterion, which may establish a relation between the phenomenal and the real. Dogmatism maintains a speculative criterion, and all the polemics of skepticism is directed to overthrow this pretension of the dogmatists.

The supposition of a speculative criterion contains in the first place, according to the skeptics, a radical contradiction. If we do not demonstrate the criterion, we must choose it at hazard ; if we undertake to demonstrate it, the demonstration will still contain a principle adopted at hazard, or which, in its turn, requires to be demonstrated, and thus on in an infinite series.

But the impossibility of such a criterion results from a multitude of other considerations, which may be referred to three principal heads : 1. The mind, or subject of cognition ; 2. The object of cognition ; 3. The relation of the subject to the object. The innumerable arguments brought forward by Sextus Empiricus may all be comprised within these three categories, although he himself has followed a more complicated classification.

1. The subject of knowledge, the mind, is affected by sensations and by conceptions, by phenomena and noumena.

Now, in the first place, sensations and conceptions conduct to opposite results. On this point Sextus

reproduced the logical antagonism which the controversy between the idealists and sensualists had brought out.

Secondly, conceptions are in themselves opposed to each other: this he proves by the history of philosophy.

Thirdly, sensations are equally opposed to each other, because they vary and must vary according to differences of organization, distance of objects, and changes which take place in man, according as he is in a waking or sleeping state, in infancy or old age, in motion or at rest, preoccupied with joy or sorrow, love or hate: changes which modify not only the sensations, but the conceptions likewise.

This threefold antithesis, which lies at the ground of the human mind, is reflected in an infinite diversity of laws, customs, mythologies, and creeds.

2. In regard to the objects of knowledge: each object being in relation to another, it is necessary to comprehend the whole in order to know really any part. Besides, no object presenting itself immediately to us, but only through a sign or medium, how are we to distinguish the one from the other? In fine, objects appear to us not in their simplicity, but as composed of divers elements, and these compositions undergo perpetual variations.

3. If we consider the relation of the cognitive subject to the object of cognition, new difficulties arise. The process of the mind is intuitive or discursive, that is to say, it proceeds sometimes by spontaneous rules anterior to any artificial combination of ideas, and sometimes by those combinations of ideas of which logic traces the laws.

In order to arrive at a legitimate affirmation in virtue of simple perceptions, it is requisite to be able to distinguish in them what pertains to the subject

and what to the object. This discrimination is impossible, since the question in regard to the notions from which we are to set out will always recur for solution.

Logic, the art of combining perceptions, an art which necessarily partakes of their uncertainty, treats of definitions, categories, and argumentation.

Definitions are useless, since he who makes a definition is supposed already to comprehend the thing itself. If nothing is to be conceived without definition, it will be necessary to define everything: in this way we shall be forced into an infinite circle of definitions. If, on the contrary, we can form conceptions without their assistance, then definitions are of no value in the pursuit of truth.

The categories, for instance those of genus and species, are either vain or false. They are vain if they are mere creations of the mind; for what could we in that case conclude from them in relation to the reality of things? They are false if they subsist, if they have their proper reality out of the soul. In fact, as soon as we suppose that the species exists independently of the genus, we can no longer conceive that the former is included in the latter.

Argumentation combines universal propositions with particular propositions; but, on the one hand, it is necessary to set out from individual objects in order to be able to conclude the truth of universal propositions; and, on the other hand, we rest upon universal when we wish to prove the existence of individual objects. Reasoning in general, and logic along with it, rests, then, for its basis upon particular reasonings admitted to be false, the vicious circle, and it can so much the less lead to truth, because, in requiring an examination of the individual objects, without exception, included in the universal

proposition, it implies an operation manifestly impossible for man.

Skepticism cannot be invalidated by objecting that it renounces its character by the very fact of employing reasoning itself, by laying down principles and deducing consequences from them. The skeptics take a stand in relation to dogmatism in general, much like that of the controversialist who attacks a particular system by hypothetical arguments, or arguments *ad hominem*. Just as the controversialist, in such a case, concedes for the moment the truth of the system, and concerns himself solely to show that it cannot be supposed true without being made to appear contradictory or false, so the skeptics admit the notions maintained by the dogmatists only for the sake of proving that they mutually destroy each other. The essence of skepticism is in the pretension that the intelligence finds its death in knowledge itself, that it fades and perishes away in contemplating itself.

To general arguments against the grounding principles of dogmatism, Sextus added some special arguments against various theories of the dogmatists.

Observations.

1. Perfect skepticism, taken by itself, is invincibly repudiated by human nature ; but, at the same time, it cannot be refuted in an absolute way by human logic. For every refutation of this kind implies a certain principle on which it rests, and skepticism admits no certain principle. But nature, says Pascal, upholds feeble reason, and prevents it from wandering to such a degree of extravagance. Man naturally believes in truth from the very fact that he is an intelligent being. The mind repels skepticism, as life repels death, as being excludes non-being ; for

absolute skepticism would be the very extinction of reason.

2. The vice of skepticism does not consist in maintaining that it is impossible to *demonstrate* radically that man can have certain knowledge of truth, but precisely in requiring that demonstration. In maintaining the first point, it follows reason; in asserting the second, it abjures human nature, which believes in certainty in virtue of a vital, indestructible faith, which no objection can succeed in shaking.

3. In reality, complete skepticism is impossible: that of Sextus himself is incomplete. He denies the relations of human intelligence to things objectively considered, but, in fact, he believes at least in the existence of the human intelligence, and he can admit that only in virtue of that invincible belief which he on all other points attacks. He yields to it in the very act of denying it.

4. The polemics of skepticism, summed up or constructed by Sextus, have thrown great light upon the native condition of human reason. In sounding the depth of skeptical theories, we are led to recognise the fact that reason unfolds itself under a double law, a law of obscurity and a law of light, in a state which might be represented under the image of luminous shadows. It is shadowy, because it begins by believing, without explaining that belief; and thus belief, and thereby certainty, is at its origin a mystery. But these shadows are luminous, since this faith cannot subsist without attaching itself to notions, and every notion, every distinction in thought, is of the nature of light. We need not, therefore, be surprised that we find, in all stages of the development of the human mind, this mixture of darkness and light. It is nothing but the prolongation of that primitive dualism which exists at the very source of reason, and

which is itself derived from a still higher source, from the essence of every created intelligence. As intelligence, it is in the light, for it lives in God, the infinite reason; as a limited intelligence, it is in darkness, being by its very limitations separated from the infinite reason. In this point of view, these shadows become wonderfully luminous. For, if our intelligence cannot penetrate beyond its limits, and comprehend *in itself* the darkness which surrounds it (which would be in contradiction with its finite capacity), it can yet comprehend it as necessary, and, seeing the cause why it can see no more, it penetrates to the impenetrable; and it is a magnificent proof of its feebleness and its grandeur, that, all enveloped as it is in these shadows, which fall upon it from the heights of creation, it knows how to subject them in turn, and to look down upon them.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

THE observations already made upon each of the principal Greek systems render extended developments here unnecessary. Some general views will be sufficient.

1. Taking collectively the schools which it produced, Greek philosophy was much more occupied with the diversity of things than with their radical unity, with the finite element rather than with the infinite. In this respect it is the inverse of Oriental philosophy.

2. Theology was much less developed in it than cosmology, and cosmology than anthropology. The human element, or the science which has man for its object, predominates in it. Greek philosophy raised and discussed a multitude of questions respecting the theory of human knowledge, morals, and politics, which the Hindu philosophy appears to have disdain-

fully neglected, or which, from the heights of its pantheism, it did not perceive.

3. Logical processes predominated also in Greek philosophy, as intuition predominated in the Oriental philosophy.

4. In respect of form, philosophy in most of the Greek schools is devoid of poetic images; but, in seeking a language rigorously exact, it has substituted too often a vocabulary of subtle and barren abstractions in place of the antique symbolism. It fell in this respect into an extreme the opposite to the luxuriousness of imagination which is displayed in the Oriental philosophy. Perfect philosophical language ought to reflect the union of images and ideas which is exhibited in the real world. Plato so conceived it.

5. In respect to the question on which depends every explanation of things, the question concerning the original principle, dualism predominates in the Greek schools. Idealistic pantheism and atheistic materialism occupy by the side of dualism scarcely so great a space in Greek philosophy as the dualistic and material systems occupied by the side of predominant pantheism in the Hindu philosophy.

6. In the progress of these systems Greek philosophy encountered skepticism at the end of both its principal epochs.

7. While Greek philosophy in its decline was crawling, discouraged and without faith, among the fragments of its old schools, a new school sprang up from the union of Oriental doctrines with the most elevated portion of the Greek speculations: a school which, far from yielding to doubt, carried its faith even to illuminism. This school, which does not belong to the purely Greek philosophical movement, will find its place in the following period.

THIRD PERIOD.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE FIRST CENTURIES OF THE
CHRISTIAN ERA.

It does not fall within the scope of this work to exhibit the proofs of the Divine origin of Christianity; regarded merely in a philosophical point of view, it presents the greatest fact in history. The regenerator of the Old World, the creator of the New, it evidently possesses within itself the principle of perpetual progress. The nations that have embraced it have risen superior to all the rest of the human race, and have progressively advanced to such a degree of intellectual development, moral ascendancy, and political power, that it is now evident Christian civilization will go on step by step to accomplish the education of all the nations of the earth. Christianity is not, like this or the other doctrine of antiquity, a source of culture and progress for a particular people or epoch, exhausting itself upon that people or that epoch: it is the immanent source of the culture and perfectionment of humanity. It must therefore possess in its mysterious depths a power, a light, a life superior to all philosophies ever known; and as its primitive documents prove that it did not spring up after the manner of any of the speculative and scientific theories, we are naturally led to the conclusion that it is not simply a sublime product of human reason, but that it had a higher origin.

Setting out from the Christian era, philosophical speculations may be divided into two great classes: speculations opposed to the Christian creed, and speculations harmonizing with that creed.

FIRST CLASS.

PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OPPOSED TO THE CHRISTIAN CREED.

THESE embrace two principal series of doctrines, which were developed nearly at the same time.

1. The Oriental doctrines, represented by Gnosticism, which, by modifying and corrupting Christianity, endeavoured to combine it with itself.

2. The Græco-Oriental speculations, represented by the Alexandrian Eclecticism.

The Oriental doctrines were also reproduced in the Cabala of the Jews, a notice of which will come in as an appendix to this class.

FIRST SECTION.

ORIENTAL DOCTRINES.

GNOSTICISM.

Historical Notices.

IT is not to be supposed that the intellectual activity was slumbering, during the five centuries which preceded the Christian era, in the bosom of those sacerdotal corporations which extended from Persia to Egypt. If antiquity has not preserved to us a body of testimonies and records which directly establish the philosophical progress of that period, it is nevertheless reflected in an undeniable way by a general fact, which was, so to say, its living monument. The powerful appearance of Oriental doctrines in the Greek and Roman world would be inexplicable if there were not some preparation for it. The mind does not pass suddenly from a state of lethargy to

so highly excited a state of intellectual interest ; and Gnosticism cannot be conceived except as we consider it the manifestation of previous exertions of the philosophical spirit which at length issued from the depth of the Oriental sanctuary to perform a brilliant part upon the scene of the Occidental world.

Gnosticism, taken as a whole, presents a combination of Persian, Chaldean, and Egyptian doctrines, united to conceptions of which India was the ancient source, and to ideas similar to those which among the Jews formed the basis of the so-called Cabalistic science. This mixture, this syncretism of doctrines, was gradually prepared by the multiplied and continually-increasing communications established between those nations by the conquests and policy of Alexander. The same cause likewise served to bring the Oriental and Greek world into contact. Thus a double fusion took place. When the Oriental speculations, between which very close mutual analogies existed, were brought together, and had formed by this connexion a stronger and more extended whole, they aspired to invade the Western world, at the period when the decline of Greek philosophy, all exhausted by doubt, had stirred in men's minds a vague feeling of want, of desire for satisfactory speculations. The Gnostics flattered themselves that they could meet this want.

But the immediate cause of this philosophical movement was the shock produced by Christianity, then springing up. Orientalism beheld great numbers of its partisans attach themselves to Christianity, to which they were the more strongly attracted, in that, besides the peculiar proofs of its Divine origin, they thought they recognised in its leading truths the development of the old doctrines of the East. Governed by this persuasion, their enthusiasm for

those doctrines was increased by all the power with which Christianity seized upon their minds, and they were inspired with a great ardour for proselyting. But in embracing Christianity many of them fundamentally misconceived its essence and its spirit. Instead of subordinating philosophy to faith, they subordinated faith to philosophy.

The word (*γνῶσις*, *gnosis*) from which the name Gnostics was derived had been previously employed in many schools to denote a science superior to the belief of the vulgar. In the mouth of the Gnostics the word expressed the threefold superiority of their doctrine: over the pagan rites and symbols, which it professed to explain; over the Hebrew doctrines, the imperfection and errors of which it pretended to unfold; and, finally, over the common belief of the Christian Church, which in their view was nothing but the weak or corrupted envelope of the transcendent Christianity of which they averred themselves to be the depositaries. Some of them openly contemned the doctrine and writings of the apostles; others pretended that the true apostolic teaching, distinct from the forms under which it had been presented to the common people incapable of comprehending it, had come down to them by means of secret tradition; and there were also some among them who limited themselves to interpreting, in a sense opposed to the faith of the Church, those of the canonical books which they in other respects received with veneration.

Gnosticism is a very singular phenomenon, which has commonly occupied far too little space, whether in the history of the Church or in the history of philosophy. It was something intermediate between the heretics, in the restricted sense of the word—that is, those who rejected only this or that point of the

Catholic faith—and the pagan Orientalists, of whom we shall have occasion soon to speak. It had affinities and antipathies with respect to both. It agreed with the simple heretics in recognising the revelation of Christ. But the aim of the heretics, which was confined to effacing from the Catholic creed some doctrines which they disliked, was far below the pretensions of Gnosticism, which subordinated Christianity entirely to anterior doctrines, and cast them in some sort into its mould, to make them come out in a state of complete transformation. On one hand, like the philosophical school of Alexandria, it went back to Oriental sources; but it was profoundly distinct from that school, because it connected Christianity with the doctrines of the East, while the Alexandrians connected the Oriental doctrines with Greek philosophy, which the Gnostics despised. Although some individuals borrowed numerous ideas from Greek philosophy, the forms of which they admired, yet, generally speaking, this contempt of Greek philosophy formed one of the distinctive traits of Gnosticism. The Alexandrian philosopher Plotinus complains in bitter terms of the audacity of those who mocked at Plato, as well as the other divine geniuses of Greece, and by their sacrilegious criticisms obtained the applause of the people. These last words are a picture of the state of mind at that time: opposition to Greek philosophy had become a means of popular favour.

Gnosticism produced divers systems, which, if considered in a purely historical view, may be referred to two centres; for their principal local seats were Syria and Egypt. Logically considered, they give ground for another distinction, according as the pantheistic or dualistic element prevailed in them. This logical classification does not strictly agree

with the historical; Basilides, for instance, one of the most brilliant interpreters of the Egyptian school, professed the dualism predominant in the Syriac school, which derived its doctrines more particularly from Persian sources.

The principle of pure pantheism is revealed in the systems of Apelles, of Valentinus, of Carpocrates, of Epiphanes, and of a sect which claimed exclusively the title of Gnostic. The speculations of Saturninus, of Bardesanes, of Basilides, set out with the principle of dualism modified by pantheistic conceptions. The Gnostic ideas which were developed from these two principles, concurred in the production of Manicheism, which was the highest combination of Persian dualism with everything compatible with it in Hindu pantheism.

To these different systems there were numerous corresponding heresies less comprehensive, which were in some sort the transformation of them.

We shall speak, 1. Of the ideas common to most of the Gnostic systems; 2. Of the Gnostic systems specially pantheistic or dualistic; 3. Of the continuation of Gnostic conceptions in Manicheism; 4. Of the transformation of these prototypical errors into more limited heresies.

Exposition.

Ideas common to most of the Gnostic systems.

I. The distinction of two worlds, the superior world, the region of light, purity, bliss, immortality; and the inferior world, a prey to darkness, vice, misery, death. What was the ground of this distinction? What were the philosophical questions connected with it? The ideas which in this connexion form the basis of Gnosticism, may be expressed in the following formula: the infinite being, the pri-

mordial substance, could not remain inactive ; it has rayed forth in emanations.

The primary emanations, so closely united to their source, must have shared largely the attributes of the divine essence, and, consequently, the superior world is necessarily in contrast with the human world such as we know it. But in what way could the transition from one to the other have been originally effected? They conceived it by supposing that the divine emanations formed a series which went on diminishing in perfection in proportion as the distance from their origin increased. Thus we come to an emanation where perfection and imperfection are in a sort of equilibrium, and which was then capable of producing or of organizing the inferior world, with all its defects and all its disorders. Here a new question arises : In what way this latter emanation, this being placed at the lowest degree of the superior world, formed the inferior world? In replying to this question there is a division among the Gnostics, as we shall presently explain ; but, in spite of the diversity of their replies, their common doctrine respecting the distinction of the two worlds is none the less maintained. If the being who formed the inferior world did not really create or produce it, if he merely exercised his power upon a matter eternal, existing out of the superior world, the distinction between the two worlds would then begin at the point where the intervention of matter began. If, on the contrary, he really produced or brought it out from himself, this inferior world would then, it is true, be nothing but the last link in the chain of emanations, the most concrete, the most gross link, but, nevertheless, the universe would still comprehend two worlds, two parts, subject to opposite laws, since perfection and imperfection would exist in in-

verse proportions. Suppose a series of torches, the light from which follows a law of decrease to the point of becoming imperceptible and confounded with total darkness: in one portion of the series the light prevails over the darkness; in the other, the darkness prevails over the light.

II. The infinite being, the source of all emanations, is in all the Gnostic systems something invisible, withdrawn into profound immense night, the Unknown Father, the *Abyss*, *Βυθος*. It is the *Brahm* indeterminate of the Hindu metaphysics, the *Piromis* of the Egyptian theology; it is, in the language of modern philosophy, the ground of being, the substance, incomprehensible in itself, and which is conceived as that which is concealed under that which appears.

III. The emanations which compose the superior world are not the creation of that which did not exist, but only the emission and manifestation of that which was contained in the bosom of the *Abyss*. They are nothing but the display of the substance, his attributes, his forms, his names. Taken together with him, they constitute the *Pleroma*, the plenitude of intelligences. They are generally called *Eons*, *ἄιῶνες*. Their number varies in different systems: in one of them it is carried as high as three hundred and sixty-five. They are commonly classified in subordinate series, which correspond to heptads, octeads, decads, and dodecads. The Gnostics do not determine arbitrarily the number of the *Eons*, nor the number of their series; all this is referred to antique theories of numbers, which would seem to have some foundation, in appearance at least, in the conceptions of the human mind, since they are to be found in almost all theogonies and cosmogonies.

IV. The emanations proceed almost always two by two in syzygy. This idea, which belongs also to most of the ancient theogonies, may have had for its basis a double induction, as has already been remarked.

V. The Demiurgus, who is the last emanation of the Pleroma, and the first power of the inferior world, which he produces or which he organizes, plays an important part in the Gnostic theories, since he is the bond between the two worlds. By this conception the creation is kept originally from the intervention of God, the Unknown Father: it is unworthy of him. The Demiurgus being a mixture of light and ignorance, of force and feebleness, the plan of creation, although it contains some good things, is radically vicious, and ought to be destroyed. Gnosticism, saving a few exceptions, is a sort of grand anathema hurled by man against the creation.

VI. In all the Gnostic systems the idea reigns of a degradation, a Fall, which is one not only of the human race, but of the entire inferior world, and which, according to some of the systems, began in the very bosom of the Pleroma. It is known in two ways: sometimes as the descent, the imprisonment of souls in the corporeal world, an imprisonment brought about either by the will of the creator, the Demiurgus, or by an invasion, usurpation of matter, which he could not resist; sometimes as a primitive crime, which appeared either in the form of pride, jealous of all superiority, or in the form of pleasure, which attracts the souls of men, and even the genii themselves, to sensual good.

VII. The idea of the Fall led to that of the Regeneration. As the latter consisted precisely in reforming the work of the Demiurgus, it could not be wrought by him. It was requisite, therefore, that

one of the high powers of the Pleroma, that the first divine thought, intelligence, mind, should descend personally to the lower ranks of the creation, or, at least, communicate his gifts to a human being, to enlighten man, and to teach him the way of return to the bosom of the Pleroma. This redeeming virtue is Christ. Christ is the antagonist of the Demiurgus, the reformer of his plan, the destroyer of his creation. He is, so to say, the head of an immense Protestantism, which must go on working to the dissolution of the universe, corrupted at its very source.

VIII. In the Gnostic theology concerning redemption, two features, essentially connected with their philosophical principles, should be noticed. In most of their theories, the divine emanation, which was manifested under the form of Christ, was not clothed with a real body ; it took only the appearance of one. This notion flowed as a consequence from their ideas of the evil nature of matter. In the second place, the law promulgated by our Saviour is not the development of the primitive law, nor, above all, of the Mosaic law. These two laws have Jehovah, who is nothing but the Demiurgus, for their author ; they express only his mind, whereas the Christian law is the expression of the divine mind, the intelligence of the Unknown Father.

IX. From hence were derived other consequences, which might have served as the basis of a singular philosophy of history, if the Gnostics had thought of constructing one.

1. The human race, considered with regard to its total duration, is divided into two categories, corresponding to two epochs : in the first epoch, from the creation to the redemption, men had the religion of the Demiurgus ; in the second, they are the worshippers of God.

2. Men may, besides, be divided into three classes, according to the principle of life which reigns in them. Those who suffer themselves to be captivated by the inferior world live only a *hylic* (material) life, of which matter (*'υλη*) is the principle. Those who seek to return into the Pleroma partake of a higher life, which has its principle in itself, the *pneumatic*, or spiritual principle. Finally, the *psychical* principle constitutes the life of those who content themselves with merely rising to the Demiurgus: the soul, *ψυχη*, *anima*, which is neither matter nor spirit, corresponds to the creator, whose essence is a combination of the pneumatic with the hylic principle. This theory was particularly developed by Valentinus, but it follows naturally from doctrines common to all the Gnostics.

3. The Jews, subject to the Demiurgus, Jehovah, were psychical; the pagans, plunged in the inferior world, were hylic; the pneumatic are true Christians. In forming this classification of the human race, Valentinus acknowledges that it admits of exceptions more or less numerous. Christianity itself contains two classes of persons: the one consisting of those who stop at the letter of its precepts, at creeds, at the rind of the fruit of life; the other of those who rise to the intuition of truth, and are nourished by the divine spirit.

X. From all the foregoing, it follows that the progress of the human race ought to consist in rising from the hylic and psychical to the spiritual or divine life. The hylic principle is subject to death, and, according to many Gnostics, those who remain under its control throughout their lives will then be completely annihilated. The psychical will obtain only the imperfect rewards which the Demiurgus can bestow: the pneumatic or spiritual will return to the bosom of the eternal Pleroma.

Pantheistic or Dualistic Systems of Gnosticism.

We should be forced into too many details if we attempted to follow, through all the different Gnostic systems, and under all the mythical forms in which they are clothed, the particular ideas by which their common doctrine is infinitely shaded. We shall confine ourselves to noticing the principal points of difference radically determined by the predominance of Pantheism or of Dualism.

Dualism.—Saturninus, Bardesanes, Basilides.

Saturninus was a Syrian by birth, and lived during the reign of the Emperor Hadrian. From what remains to us of his doctrines, it does not appear that he considered the principle of Evil to be an emanation from God, originally pure and subsequently corrupted. It is more probable that he conceived it as eternal. In his view the Evil principle, Satan, was at once spirit and matter. He was not a simple, but a compound being. It was natural to inquire which of these two elements was the primitive element, the generator of the other. This was done by *Bardesanes*, originally a Syrian, who lived in the time of Marcus Aurelius. He represented matter as the primitive element of Evil, and Satan as a spiritual manifestation of matter. In the same way as the Abyss of Goodness, the *Bythos*, was the father, and produced intelligence, his son or daughter, and thereby a succession of emanations, all manifesting himself under different aspects, so the Abyss of Evil, matter indeterminate, was the mother, and brought forth her own expression, her son Satan, and, through him, a series of analogous emanations. There was thus between the good and the evil creation, considered in their source and their development, a paral-

lelism, which reduced this dualistic system to a sort of hostile harmony, the unity of a grand and eternal antinomy. The manifestation of a double *Unknown*: such was the universe. It may be remarked, also, that Bardesanes, in as far as he conceived matter as producing its own manifestation, fell in with the Hindu idea of Kapila, according to which matter, *Prakriti*, engendered the intelligence, and thereby began to reveal itself. We know, besides, that Bardesanes made India a subject of critical inquiry. From information furnished by some ambassadors sent to that country about the time of the Emperor Verus, he published a work entitled *Commentaries upon India*, of which, however, only two fragments are extant.

Basilides, born in Syria, went to Egypt, and taught his doctrine at Alexandria. Although his ideas concerning the eternity of the two principles have nothing peculiar, his mode of conceiving the mixture of good and evil, when compared with the conceptions of most other Gnostics, throws light upon the foundation of these doctrines. According to Basilides, the beings that emanated from the principle of Darkness, smitten with love for the light, rise and rush towards the bosom of the Pleroma. According to other Gnostics, the Pleroma, on the contrary, overflows, and descends to the kingdom of Darkness. In the first hypothesis, the mixture of good and evil is the product of the attractive power of the good; in the second, it results from its expansive force. However opposite these conceptions, and the images in which they are clothed, they tend towards a more elevated idea, which the human mind has always pursued whenever it has attempted to solve the great problem which has forever tormented the speculative intellect. It is constantly com-

pelled to conceive the mysterious combination of good and evil as connected originally, by a relation of some kind, with the efficiency of the principle of goodness itself.

For the rest, all these dualist systems—dualist in what may be called their first act—resolve themselves in an instant into pantheistic conceptions, since all beings are nothing but forms, either of the good being or of the evil being, phenomena of a double substance.

Pantheism.—System of Valentinus.

This system represents the grounds of all the Gnostic theories in which pantheistic ideas predominate. The origin of matter and of evil is the primary point of separation between pure Pantheism and Dualism. If matter is conceived as an emanation more gross, a form of spirit, or even as an illusion, Pantheism prevails: if it is eternal and uncreated, like spirit, Dualism is constituted.

The first of these points of view appears to be that taken by Valentinus, who belonged to the Egyptian school, and who was the most celebrated of the Gnostics for the extent of his conceptions. He put out his doctrines in the first half or towards the middle of the second century. He probably held matter in the pantheistic sense. In its generality it was in his view the shadow of that which really is; but, considered in the different states in which it is actually presented, it proceeds from the mind. Valentinus propounds this idea in mythical language. Created wisdom, the universal symbol of souls, feels joy and pain. Its joy or its smile produces luminous matter; its pain produces aqueous and terrestrial matter. Matter, therefore, in its principal states, is at bottom nothing but a form of the soul, dilated by joy, or condensed and obscured by grief.

Evil has not its primary source in a principle substantially existing out of the divine emanations; for evil commenced in the interior even of the Pleroma. It was produced by the opposition existing between the desire which urged the Eons to unite themselves to Bythus (*Βυθος*), the Abyss, that is, to comprehend it, and the limitations of their nature, which rendered their desire impossible to be satisfied. In following this idea of Valentinus, we are led to conceive of evil as being simply a false direction of the good. For the desire to become united with the Unknown Father, the source of everything that is, is in itself good: it becomes evil when it breaks the bounds which circumscribe everything that is not the Universal Father. Evil is good gone astray.

Valentinus was also led, by his predilection for pure pantheism, to mark in a less decisive way the distinction between the superior and the inferior world, between which he supposed a third, which floated with a vague essence between the two: an idea extremely vague in itself, but which Valentinus made use of, conformably with the object of pantheism, in order to explain with more ease how the primitive substance was able, by successive transformations, to produce itself at last under a material form. The ancient pantheism, particularly that of India, has constantly reached forward to the idea of something which, without being spiritual, was still not material.

Observations.

Although many of the Gnostic leaders have deduced from their doctrine maxims which tend in certain respects to the moral improvement of man, it is not the less true that a great number of Gnostics have drawn from them consequences subversive of all virtue: which explains the reproaches cast upon

them of being profoundly immoral. They arrive systematically at these consequences in different ways.

1. Their pantheism and dualism lead directly to them. In the first of these systems, God is the only agent; and how is it possible to conceive a real distinction between virtue and vice? In the second, man, an emanation from a double principle, is subject to forces which draw him irresistibly towards good or evil. Freedom is radically destroyed, and with it the very notion of virtue.

2. The Gnostic doctrines, which attribute the creation to an imperfect being subject to error, contain also results fruitful of immorality. The religious and moral law which the Creator imposed upon the human race was necessarily imperfect, vitiated like the creation itself. Perfection accordingly consisted in getting freed from it. Many Gnostics, it is true, distinguished in this law different elements, a vicious and transitory element, and an element good in itself. But many of them also passed from despising the work of the Creator to despise the moral precepts which had formed, from the time of the Creation to that of the Redemption, the conscience of the human race.

3. Besides, as the universe was composed of two principles, the one spiritual and pure, the other material and impure, so religion contained two parts correlative to these two principles: the material part, the body, the letter of the law, which requires or forbids external actions; and the spiritual part, the spirit of the law, which produces internal perfection, the liberty of the sons of God, freed from the yoke of the letter. The imperfect, the weak, adhere to the letter of the law. But the true Gnostic, who is in possession of the spiritual sense, rises to a virtue so sub-

lime that all distinction of good and evil in external actions disappears to his eyes. This distinction is as the phantom of virtue, a spectre without reality, which appears in the night of human mind, and which vanishes when, from the heights of science (gnosis), the soul sees the light of the Pleroma dawn, and the divine day begin.

4. History has preserved scarcely anything but faint indications of the application of the Gnostic metaphysics to the laws of human society. We see, however, that Epiphanes, who appears to have belonged to the pantheistic school, had conceived a sort of political pantheism, which had for its basis absolute social unity, or the abolition of property and marriage, in place of which he substituted community of women and of goods: a unity which destroys itself, since it can produce nothing but division and complete anarchy. Other Gnostics derived from their dualism the distinction of the human race into two species, the one inferior or evil, the other superior or good. Most of the philosophers of antiquity, when they desired to justify slavery and the establishment of castes, have resorted to similar ideas. Gnosticism thus touched, as far as we know anything of its social doctrines, upon the two extreme terms, which are perpetually reproducing each other, anarchy and servitude, conceived as the natural and necessary laws of human society.

MANICHEISM.

Historical Notices.

MANES, born in Persia about the beginning of the third century, appears to have drawn his doctrine from the lectures and writings of a personage named Terebinthus, who took also the Hindu name of

Buddha. He endeavoured to combine the Persian dualism with the doctrines of Christianity. After travelling over a great part of the East, he returned to Persia, where he preached anew his doctrine. He was condemned to death and executed about the year 274, by order of the King Behram I.

Exposition.

The principal elements of Manicheism belong originally either to Gnosticism, or to the doctrines of the Persian Magi, who had corrupted the ancient teaching of Zoroaster. We have, therefore, to recall those elements to mind merely to note the modifications to which Manicheism subjected them.

The doctrine of two principles, the spirit-light, and the dark matter personified in Satan, is evidently derived from the sources just indicated, as well as the pantheistic conception, according to which all souls are nothing but God himself individualizing himself, as all bodies and all demons are the individualization of Satan and of matter. It is curious to see under what later form these old ideas reappeared at the overthrow of the pagan world. On this point we may consult two remarkable passages from the writings of Manes, preserved by Saint Augustine.* It is there observed, among other things, that Manes did not insist, like the Gnostics, upon the idea of the primitive abyss, the divine shadows which envelope the Unknown Father. The eternal distinction of the two principles undoubtedly appeared to him irreconcilable with a doctrine which placed night at the birth of good as well as at the source of evil, and thus confounded them in an identical origin. In this respect the system of Manes bore to Gnosticism the same relation as the Vedanta system in India

* Lib. contr. Epist. fundament.

bore to the primitive doctrines of the Vedas. Like Vendantism, it represented intelligence, the light, as that which was primitive in God. It confounded the manifestation, the expression of the substance with the substance itself.

Manes explained the mixed state, the blending of good and evil, by the violent desire which impelled the powers of darkness to unite themselves with the light. This idea, as we have seen, belongs to some of the Gnostics. But Manes wished to improve it by answering an ulterior question implied in it. If the empire of good and evil, if God and matter were originally separate from each other, without contact, without communication, in what way could the evil beings even perceive the kingdom of good? Evil, matter, replied Manes, is naturally in a state of discord; discord begets war; war necessitates movements, evolutions in space; and at length, in the sequel of these evolutions, the powers of darkness came to break through the interval which separated them from the light. This explanation, whether it had in the mind of Manes a symbolical meaning, or whether he understood it in a literal sense, contains at least implicitly this principle, that evil is forced in some respects to propel beings towards goodness, and, therefore, always contains some degree of good: a principle which itself supposes the predominance of the good being.

The divine essence, defiled in the souls which are emanations from it, the human will subjected to the double fatality which results from the double agency of God and of matter: these are the two consequences which necessarily flow both from pantheism, when it continues to retain the notion of evil, and from dualism. They are expressed in formulas more clear and bold in Manicheism than in most of the

Gnostic systems. The Redemption appears only as the regeneration of God by himself. All these ideas were the fruitful source of immorality without remorse.

Manicheism, in respect to the final consummation of things, agrees with Gnosticism in maintaining the return to God of all purified divine emanations ; but differs from it with regard to the final destination of matter. It did not think that the hylic or material principle could be annihilated ; from the fact that it was uncreated, it must be indestructible. To reconcile the indestructibility of matter with the final triumph of God, it supposed that it would be reduced forever to a sort of cadaverous state ; it attributed to matter a sort of immortal death. Its ashes would be consigned to the abyss from which it issued, and the souls who had suffered themselves to be seduced by it would be condemned to keep guard, motionless and sad, around this eternal sepulchre.

Transformation of Pantheistic and Dualistic modes of thinking, in connexion with questions purely Christian.

These modes of thinking underwent a kind of metempsychosis. The systems in which they had been organized were dissolved by the doctrines of Christianity ; but the modes of thinking themselves passed into other forms. They became imbodyed in shades less grand and powerful, in which something of them was perpetuated.

Arianism was a partial prolongation of Gnostic pantheism, which had given vogue to the doctrine of diminishing divine emanations. The Divine Word was, in the view of the Arians, an emanation inferior to the Father ; and as, at the same time, they conceived him as a creature, the entire creation, of which

the true notion was destroyed, became a series of emanations. The same should be said of the heterodox doctrines concerning the Holy Spirit, which were nothing but Arianism applied to the third person of the divine Trinity.

The consequences of dualism were perpetuated in some heresies, which perverted the ideas of Christianity respecting the fall of man, and the conflict of the flesh and the spirit, in order to calumniate a part of the work of the Creator, and to attack many of the laws which govern humanity.

These two systems reacted also upon the heretical doctrines respecting the incarnation of the Word. The dualists had divided the substantial unity of the Creator into two principles; the Nestorians divided the personal unity of the Redeemer into two persons. Nestorius did not set out precisely from dualist conceptions, but he reached his heresy by arguments corresponding to those by which they had been produced. What he called the antithesis of two wills, two natures, the divine and the human, or the difficulty of conceiving them united in a single person, was the principal basis of his heresy, as the antithesis of spirit and matter, or the difficulty of referring them to a common origin, had been one of the principal bases of dualism.

The doctrine of Eutyches, on the contrary, was a pantheistic mode of thinking applied to the incarnation. Pantheism denied the reality of the finite, and absorbed it into the infinite; Eutychianism denied the reality of the human nature in Christ, and absorbed it into the divine nature. The body of Christ was nothing but a phantom, just as matter, in the view of pantheism, was only an illusion.

In general it is a fact, even with regard to heresies apparently the most limited, that most of the

questions raised by them were resolvable at bottom into very general philosophical questions, which commonly escaped the limited view of most of the sectaries, but which yet influenced unconsciously the blind working of their minds.

SECOND SECTION.

GRÆCO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Historical Notices.

THE expedition of Alexander, and the institutions which succeeded it, had established, as we have already remarked, frequent communications between the Oriental and Greek world. Alexandria, which was, from its geographical position, the centre of commercial relations, became also, under the enlightened reigns of the Ptolemies, the centre of intellectual commerce, the interchange of thought. All doctrines there met together.

The name Alexandrian school sometimes designates all the learned and scientific men of whom the city was the cradle or the asylum. It resembled, in this point of view, a great and free University, representing the different faculties of the human mind, from grammar to astronomy, from philosophy to rhetoric.

But, in its most celebrated meaning, the Alexandrian school is that union, or, rather, succession of philosophers, who, from the third down to the end of the fifth century of the Christian era, endeavoured to unite the Oriental philosophy to the Greek.

Similar attempts had been previously made by Jewish philosophers of Alexandria, perhaps by Aristobulus, certainly by Philo, in the first century. Philo's knowledge of the Greek philosophy began with

Platonism, which he embraced with enthusiasm ; he was also acquainted with the Oriental ideas, especially those of Persia and of Egypt. He attempted to bring these two extremes into agreement by the medium of Biblical doctrines, which he regarded for the most part as allegories that should be interpreted in a sense superior to the literal.

But it was from the bosom of the Alexandrian school, founded in the third century by Plotinus, that sprang the greatest efforts to bring about the union of Orientalism and Hellenism. This union, as it was conceived by that school, implied many subordinate fusions. In the first place, there were in the world two forces, which in certain relations acted in opposite directions, and which mutually repelled each other : the Greek systems and polytheistic worship, the rationalist philosophy and religious rites. It was necessary to unite these. Again, Greek philosophy was divided into contrary systems, religious ritualism into hostile worships. Leaving out of view the atheistic systems, Greek philosophy was represented by Plato and Aristotle : the union of Platonism and Aristotelianism, upon which depended the unity of Greek philosophy in its largest portion, was therefore to be sought for by a more profound interpretation of their doctrines. The union of the polytheistic worships depended, according to the Alexandrians, upon old Oriental doctrines particularly preserved in the Greek mysteries : doctrines which established, they averred, the harmony of all rites and all symbols. But this more elevated Hellenism, which drew into unity all the Greek systems, and the more elevated Orientalism, which drew into unity all worships, were themselves only two sides or two elements of a still higher unity in which they were blended.

The school of which we are speaking has received two names, the Eclectic and the Neo-platonic. These denominations appear to be incompatible ; for attachment to a particular system appears inconsistent with the scope of eclecticism, which is the union of all systems. Both these names are, nevertheless, in some respects perfectly just. Eclecticism is not syncretism, which collects at hazard, without principle and without rule, fragments of theories, and does nothing but put doctrines in a sort of juxtaposition. Eclecticism collects in order to unite, and accordingly presupposes something which is not eclectic. In order really to unite two or more terms, there must needs be a principle of union. Now the Alexandrians sought this principle of union in the higher portion of Platonism. Platonism appeared to them to be only one of the terms which it was the problem to bring together ; but at the bottom it was, in the view of the Alexandrians, the regulator of their theories, the centre from which everything set out, and in which everything terminated. Their school was born Platonic, and became eclectic. In entering into the sphere of eclecticism, it did not travel out of that of Platonism, only it modified it in order to renew and extend it : hence the name of new, Neo-platonic.

Ammonius Saccas, who lived about the end of the second century, and who appears to have been an apostate from the Christian faith, had opened an eclectic school, of which the principal object was to blend together Platonism and Aristotelianism. Potamon also taught eclecticism about the same period ; but we do not know precisely the time in which he lived. The founder of the Neo-platonic school was properly Plotinus, who, under the teaching of Ammonius, was inspired with the idea of a still more comprehensive eclecticism. The principal repre-

sentatives of this school after him were Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus.

PLOTINUS.

HE was born in 203, at Lycopolis, in Egypt. His earliest youth was already passed when he began to attend the different schools of Alexandria. But the state of philosophical instruction was far from satisfying him—it was even the source of profound sorrow—until he came to hear Ammonius, whose lectures he attended for eleven years. To great learning he united an enthusiastic spirit: he maintained that he was in direct communication with the gods. He wrote a great number of works relating to philosophy, and especially to metaphysics. The most celebrated of these is the collection which bears the name of the *Enneades*: it consists of several treatises, which were arranged by his disciple Porphyry. Plotinus had visited the East and Rome. At the latter he resided twenty-six years. He died at Campania in the year 270.

PORPHYRY.

PORPHYRY was born in Syria, in the year 233. Some have supposed he was originally of Jewish origin. It appears, at least, that he was very early in life in relations both with the Jews and with Christians. He was at first a disciple of Longinus, but subsequently of Plotinus, to whom he finally attached himself. The doctrine of his master concerning matter, as the clog of the soul, and his own disposition to melancholy, led him to meditate suicide; but Plotinus deterred him from it. Porphyry likewise believed himself favoured with supernatural visions. After having travelled very extensively, he died at

Rome about the year 304. He was a bitter adversary to Christianity. Most of his writings are lost. Among those which have survived, the most remarkable are, the *Life of Pythagoras*, the *Life of Plotinus*, a *Treatise of Predicables*, and one *On Pythagorean Abstinence*.

IAMBLICHUS.

IAMBLICHUS, the disciple of Porphyry, was originally from Chalcis, in Cœlo-Syria, and flourished about the year 310. He devoted himself to theurgical sciences and to the mathematics. Many of his writings were devoted to the philosophy of Pythagoras, whose life he also wrote. His book upon the *Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, etc.*, contains valuable indications respecting Oriental doctrines. Iamblichus died in 333.

HIEROCLES.

LITTLE is known of his life. Alexandria was his birthplace, and he lived in the fifth century. To him are attributed a book on *Providence and Destiny*, and a *Commentary on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras*. Hierocles attempted to reconcile the doctrine of the Alexandrians with the Christian doctrine concerning the creation of matter.

PROCLUS.

PROCLUS, born in 412, at Xanthus or at Byzantium, attended at an early age the schools of Alexandria, and afterward betook himself to Athens, where he studied the Greek philosophy. He opened a school, and numerous disciples attended his lectures. After travelling in Asia, he returned to the land of Plato, resumed his labours as a teacher, and died in

483. His life has been written by Marinus, and, though containing much that must be held as fabulous, it shows that, like the other Alexandrians, Proclus believed himself to be favoured with supernatural intercourse with the gods. He wrote a great number of works, of which a considerable portion is lost. The edition published by Mr. Cousin contains many treatises before unprinted.

Exposition.

In the primary unity, pure and absolute, there exists no distinction, not even the distinction between the object and subject of cognition. We should not attribute to it any of the qualities of which we are able to form an idea: the notion of unity excludes them. From this unity emanates the intelligence, which is its reflection; but this emanation is necessarily inferior to the principle from which it flows. This emanation produced another emanation inferior to itself; this is the soul, which not being, like the intelligence, the immanent image of the immutable unity, is a native force, or the principle of motion.

Plotinus opposed this triad to the Christian Trinity. Some of the Alexandrians, and Proclus in particular, modified this doctrine in order to bring it nearer to the Christian doctrine, of which they felt the superiority. They maintained the primeval unity to have developed itself in three decreasing emanations: Being, which produced Intelligence; Intelligence, which produced the Soul; and the Soul, which produced all other beings.

When the unity had produced intelligence, when the distinction between the known and the knowing commenced, then also commenced duality, the source of number. Unity became multiple.

The intelligence, which contains all the ideas of

possible things, contains in this relation the multiple also. Ideas being at once intelligence and the object of intelligence, there is an absolute identity between ideas and realities : that which knows and that which is known are one and the same thing. But, from the very fact that ideas exist in the intelligence as in a subject, there exists also the distinction between the form and the matter. Ideas are the forms ; intelligence, in so far as it is the subject of ideas, is their matter. In Plotinus ideas received the name of the intelligible gods.

The soul, the principle of motion, the active, expansive force, tends necessarily to produce ideas outwardly ; and the ideas produced are the different souls. But ideas or forms can exist only in a subject : it must needs be, therefore, that the soul, in producing ideas or forms, should produce also their matter. Matter is the habitation, the temple, which the soul itself constructs in order to dispose in it its forms. But how is matter in itself produced ? The soul, which partakes of the infinite light of the intelligence, yet, as an inferior emanation, participates it only in a limited degree. It perceives at the boundaries of its own light the darkness upon which it impresses its forms, and this darkness becomes the matter, or receptacle of ideas. The Alexandrians also conceived matter as a direct derivation from the intelligible world. This conception, which is full of obscurity and vagueness, has probably its foundation in the principle which we have before referred to, namely, that ideas reside in the intelligence as in a subject or matter.

Matter, which in itself is an indeterminate subject, destitute of qualities, is a simple power, or capacity rather, of receiving them. When it receives them, it passes from potentiality into action. The union

of the potentiality and the act produces the compound, corporeity or body.

From all this it follows that the world is only a great soul, informing, giving form to, matter by the ideas or the souls which it produces. Proclus, however, and some other Alexandrians, distinguish two souls, the supermundane soul, and the soul of the world, an emanation from the former. Either way, however, the world is eternal, because the soul could never have been an inactive principle. It preceded the world by a priority of principle, but not by a priority of time.

In the production of the world concurred both intelligence, the subject of ideas, and the soul, the principle of motion ; from this union proceeded the seminal reason of the world, which is the collective whole of the ideas endowed by the soul with activity and life. This seminal reason, which is the immediate principle of all things, is particularized in the various phenomena, because there are necessarily as many seminal reasons in the world as there are ideas in the intelligence.

Although the world is but one, it is divided into the intellectual and the sensible world. They are the same world, considered either in itself or in its image.

The world is governed by necessity. As the great soul could not but have produced it, so all the souls which emanated from it act like it from the impulse of their essence ; their will is nothing but their essence in activity. Everything that exists, everything that takes place, is determined by ideas, of which the universe is the necessary manifestation. The wheel of events revolves by the fatality of ideas. And, as the sensible world is parallel to the intellectual, its archetype, this correlation is the foundation

of astrology and magic. It follows from hence that the world is perfect, everything is good. Evil is nothing but the inequality of souls, or the manifestation of that inequality. The Alexandrians also assigned to evil another origin, which they ascribed to matter. All this portion of their doctrine is very obscure.

From this general notion of the world we pass to some details.

The sensible world being only the image of the intellectual world, it follows that the whole universe, all parts of the universe, contain souls, which are the ideas produced. But the souls, although all engendered by the soul of the world, form different classes.

1. The intellectual gods, exempt from all suffering and all passion, dwell in the contemplation of the intellectual gods, or ideas not produced. They animate or govern the heavens and the stars.

2. The gods and men are as two extreme terms in a proposition, of which heroes and demons are the middle terms. The first are nearer to the nature of the gods, the second nearer to the nature of men. The first administer the universe and direct the creative forces; the second, who direct the vital forces, preside over the government of human affairs. But both have the common office of being in various respects mediators between the gods and men.

3. Below the human souls, of which we shall presently speak, are placed the souls of animals, of plants, and of other parts of nature: the soul of the world, united to vegetable and brute bodies, exists in them in a state of torpidity.

We will now consider their doctrine concerning man. All souls born of the supreme soul have descended from the intellectual to the lower world. Souls in the intellectual world have no bodies: they

are clothed with bodies only at their entrance into the terrestrial world.

The human soul, indivisible so far as it proceeds from the intellectual world, is susceptible of a certain divisibility in as far as it is united to a body, in the sense that, remaining in some part in the intellectual world, it descends, as it were, by another part of itself into the corporeal world.

The Alexandrians admitted two souls: the one, derived from the intellectual world, is independent of nature; the other is produced in man by the circular motion of the celestial world; it is dependant in its actions upon the revolutions of the stars.

The soul is present entire in every part of the body. The body is in it rather than it in the body. For it is not present except in the vegetative and sensitive life; it escapes in the intelligence.

The soul, which is active in its essence, is not passive in the impression of sensible objects. This impression has its seat in the body; but when it has taken place, the soul perceives it out of itself by directing its attention to it; it perceives actively the passive state of the body.

Souls, which are emanations from the great soul, are, like it, indivisible, indestructible, imperishable. Involved in the bonds of nature, their tendency is to break free in order to ascend to their primitive state, to be transformed into the great soul, to be confounded in the divine essence. By the evolution of the creation, souls, which are the last of the intellectual principles, and the first principle of sensible things, are alienated from God. There needs another evolution, which may recall them to God. But this return depends on certain conditions. Those who, through abuse of their senses, have degraded themselves below even the sensitive life, will after death

be born again into the bonds of the vegetative life of plants. Those who have lived only a sensitive life will be born again under the form of animals. Those who have lived a merely human life will take again a human body. Those only who have developed in themselves the divine life will return to God.

The development of the divine life is subordinated to two conditions: the efforts of man, and the aid of the gods.

The efforts of man are relative to his intelligence and his will; they produce science and virtue.

The intelligence has two modes, the one imperfect, the other perfect. The first consists in what is commonly called science, which rests upon various logical processes, by means of which man combines ideas. This science is good, useful; it is a preparation for a superior knowledge. This part of the doctrine of the Alexandrians has been specially treated by Porphyry, who has endeavoured to make the logical categories of Aristotle harmonize with the objective categories or development of the emanations.

But this science is necessarily imperfect, because God, the pure, infinite unity, is above all these formulas. True science is acquired by means of illumination. It is less a science than an intimate presence of God in the soul. The soul can attain to this by placing itself, in virtue of a power innate to itself, in the state in which it was before descending from the intellectual world.

The virtues correspond to science. Some of them are nothing but a preparation for the theurgical and divine virtues. Such are the physical virtues, which are relative to the improvement of the body; the moral and political virtues, which comprehend the duties of man as a social being; the purgative virtues, by

which man abstains from corporeal actions and affections; the theoretical virtues, which are the contemplation of the soul by itself. It is in passing through these different degrees that men arrive at the superior virtues called theurgical. He who possesses these, admitted to converse with the gods, can evoke them, can control the demons, and free himself from the conditions of humanity. The last degree of the theurgical virtues constitutes the divine virtues, which effect the transformation of the soul into God. This moral theory has been particularly expounded by Iamblichus.

But the development of the divine life depends, above all, upon the assistance of the gods. The gods communicate to us their power, both by means of prayer, which is only an impulse which they impress upon the soul in order to raise it to themselves, and by means of symbols and external rites. All sensible things are an image of intellectual things, and the gods are drawn to descend to those images in which they recognise themselves. This is the reason why symbols and rites, which are the most perfect representation of divine things, have a wonderful efficacy in attracting the gods. Iamblichus deduced from these principles the theory of sacrifices, of divination, of idolatry, and of all parts of the pagan worship.

The soul, made free by the concurrence of all these means, is transformed into the gods: souls which neglect these means will be subjected, according to the ancient ideas of the Hindu philosophy, to the law of transmigration or metempsychosis, of which we have already stated the effects.

Such is the collective body of the Alexandrian notions. The metaphysical part was chiefly developed by Plotinus, the logical part by Porphyry, the

theosophic and liturgical part by Iamblichus. Proclus, combining the ideas of his predecessors, devoted himself specially to giving them systematic connexion.

Observations.

1. Generally speaking, the Alexandrian philosophy contains no element which is not to be found in anterior doctrines. Its distinctive characteristic is the syncretism of those doctrines. This syncretism was at first confused; it was gradually organized into eclecticism; and the merit of Proclus consisted in elevating this eclecticism to its highest degree, by seeking to demonstrate strictly the unity and harmony of those different elements.

2. From the foregoing exposition, it is seen why and how the Alexandrians flattered themselves with having wrought a fusion, a harmonious blending of doctrines. In the first place, they united the Oriental philosophy by their ideas touching unity, emanations, matter, the law of transmigration, and final absorption.

3. They connected together also in many ways the Greek philosophy represented by Plato and Aristotle. Their conceptions concerning the primitive triad, composed of unity, intelligence, and the soul; many of their conceptions concerning the nature and functions of the soul of the world, the distinction of the world of ideas from the sensible world, demons, etc., contain Platonic elements, though modified or corrupted. They applied, on the other hand, the logical conceptions of Aristotle to the system of emanations. The distinction of form and matter, which plays so important a part in the philosophy of Aristotle, became also, as has been seen, one of the keys to the Alexandrian system.

4. In respect to the condition of the human mind, their cultivation of logic as the instrument of science conciliated the Greek philosophical spirit, while, at the same time, their theory of illumination, of enthusiastic intuition, flattered the Oriental mind.

5. By their doctrine concerning emanation, combined with their doctrine of ideas personified as gods, heroes, and men, who governed and animated all parts of nature, they allowed an apology to be drawn for all worships, particularly for the worship of the stars and elements.

6. The Alexandrians pretended also to possess all that was true in Christianity, from which they borrowed numerous particulars. We shall indicate only a few of them. They endeavoured to approximate in some respects, as has been indicated, to the doctrine of the Trinity, though they profoundly corrupted it. The Alexandrian doctrine contains also fragments of the high doctrine of Christianity concerning the necessity of a Mediator. Iamblichus, in his theory of symbolic rites as the channels of divine grace, copied the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments.

NOTE CONCERNING THE CABALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

THE Jews gave the name of Cabala to a philosophical doctrine which they pretended was perpetuated among them by a secret tradition, anterior to Christianity, and ascending to a remote antiquity. The Rabbins, in the first centuries of the Christian era, wrote concerning this doctrine. It makes a great figure in the Talmud. As it presents scarcely anything in its bases but ideas common to most of the pantheistic systems of the East, clothed in singular symbols, it will be enough, in order to avoid repetition, to notice the following conceptions :

1. The primary substance is represented as an

Ocean of Light. The creation, or, rather, emanation, is represented as a veil which the infinite light has spread out before itself, and upon which it wrote the forms of things.

2. There was a primitive emanation, which, under the name of Adam Kadmon, is at once the image of God and the type of man, and from which proceed decreasing stages of emanations, called Sephiroth.

3. Matter has only an ideal existence, because it is nothing but the obscuration of the divine rays when arrived at the last stage of emanation. It is a sort of carbonization of the divine substance.

SECOND CLASS.

SPECULATIONS IN GENERAL HARMONIZING WITH THE CHRISTIAN CREED.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

ALTHOUGH our summaries of the other philosophical doctrines have been in general very brief, our survey of the philosophy of the Christian fathers, we ought to say beforehand, besides being still briefer, will also be even relatively very incomplete. The speculations of the doctors of the Church, perpetually intermingled with scriptural doctrines as their basis or their rule, could be placed in just light only by connecting with them a full exposition of Christian orthodoxy, in its relations to a multitude of philosophical questions, upon which it touches at all points. We do not take upon ourselves here this labour. Besides, as the views of the Christian fathers ought to be taken up successively in the theoretical portion of a course of philosophical study, in connexion with

the proof or explanation of various positions, it is the less necessary to give a full exposition of them in the historical part.

We shall first say a few words respecting the principal Christian philosophers of the first centuries. We shall then cast a glance over some of their speculations respecting the most general questions.

JUSTIN MARTYR.

Historical Notices.

JUSTIN MARTYR, born about the year 103 in Palestine, studied philosophy in Egypt, and there embraced Christianity. He founded afterward a school of Christian philosophy at Rome, where he died a martyr in 167.

The history of his conversion to Christianity, related by himself, reveals the state in which the philosophy of his age left minds that were in search of salutary convictions: convictions corresponding to the moral wants of man. He first addressed himself to the Stoic school; but, although the ethics of Stoicism contained elevated maxims, it was radically corrupted by its theoretical paradoxes. The Peripatetics, to whom also Justin turned for that light which is the life of the soul, offered him only dialectical abstractions. He knocked at the gate of the Pythagorean school: there he was told that he could not attain to true wisdom till he had studied music, astronomy, and geometry. Platonism was more in harmony with the wants of his soul; but he soon learned that what he admired in Platonism was at the bottom but a preparation for the Christian faith, and that revelation alone was the source from which man could derive with perfect certainty all the light he needs to make clear his origin, his duties, and his destination.

TATIAN.

TATIAN, born in Syria about the year 130, had been a Platonic philosopher. Being converted to Christianity, he was at first a disciple of Justin. His *Discourse to the Greeks* is the only one of his writings which has come down to us. Although some portions of his work are not free from reproach in respect to orthodoxy, yet it was written before Tatian fell into those great errors which distinguished the sect (Encratitæ or Hydroparastatæ) founded by him : errors analogous to those of many of the Gnostics.

While Justin Martyr combined with Christianity a portion of the Greek philosophy, seeking at the same time to purify it, Tatian endeavoured to Christianize the Oriental philosophy. But it is to be feared, from some passages of the work referred to, that the Catholic doctrines concerning the generation of the Word and the production of creatures was corrupted by the doctrine of emanation. He appears also to have held the notion of a universal soul, the source of all the souls, diffused through all parts of nature. The human soul is in a state of darkness and corruption ; it is separated from the Holy Spirit, and tends towards matter. The Redemption has radically re-established its union with the Holy Spirit, and restored to it the divine life. But this regeneration can be established in each individual only by the concurrence of his own free will. By the doctrine of freedom, Tatian excludes the immoral consequences which flow from the Oriental philosophy. As to the rest, it is clear that he attributed a great superiority to Greek philosophy, which he regarded as only a regeneration of more ancient doctrines, corrupted by idolatry.

IRENÆUS.—HERMIAS.

OF the life of Hermias, a Christian philosopher of the second century, little is known. Irenæus, who was born about 120, was the disciple of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, who was himself the disciple of St. John. He was sent into Gaul to preach Christianity there ; and, after having governed the Church at Lyons for many years, he sealed his faith with his blood about the commencement of the third century.

In his book entitled *A Laugh at the Gentile Philosophers*, Hermias attacked particularly the errors of Greek philosophy, while Irenæus, in his treatise *Against Heresies*, set himself chiefly to refute the Oriental errors which had invaded the Græco-Roman world, and which were attempting to corrupt Christianity. He showed that the doctrine of emanation destroyed the indivisible unity of the divine substance, or its incorruptible purity. If the emanations became separate from God, the divine essence becomes divided ; if they take place within the bosom of God, the divine essence is corrupted by imperfection, ignorance, evil. The work of Irenæus contains a multitude of matters of information useful for the history of the Oriental philosophy, which the Gnostics were at that time reviving.

ATHENAGORAS.—TERTULLIAN.

ATHENAGORAS, originally of Athens, lived in the second century. He opened a school of Christian philosophy at Alexandria.

Tertullian, born at Carthage about the year 160, had been at first extremely hostile to Christianity. The courage of the martyrs made a deep impression upon him. After his conversion he wrote a great

number of works, which are remarkable for their energy of style. He died about the year 245.

The *Apology for the Christians*, by Athenagoras, presents a series of speculations and of philosophical arguments corresponding to the doctrines of revelation. Tertullian, who joined to his apologetic writings a multitude of other productions, is less remarkable for his theories than for his high and lively insight into the moral grandeur of Christianity. He understood it much better as a life than as a light. The speculative portion of his writings contains, nevertheless, speculative considerations, in which elevation of ideas is united with singular vigour of reasoning. He excelled especially in polemics. But he was led into exaggeration, and ended by straying from the path of orthodoxy into the errors of the Montanists.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

HE lived about the end of the second century. Born of pagan parents, he was converted by Pantænus, a Christian philosopher of Alexandria. He was one of the most illustrious expounders of Christian science in the capital of Egypt. He died in 217.

The most celebrated work of Clement of Alexandria is that which bears the title of *Stromata*, so called, in allusion to carpet or tapestry-work, to denote the miscellaneous nature of its contents. It contains an immense variety of facts and speculations, which may be classified under three principal heads. The *historical* portion is a rich mine, from which has been drawn, and may still be drawn, great light concerning the ancient world. We owe to him a great many indications, which shed light upon the history of philosophy, both Greek and Oriental.—To the *logical* part belong considerations relating to the distinction

between faith and science, as well as to the basis and the rule of rational investigations.—The *theoretical* part embraces the moral doctrines of Christianity, considered in a philosophical point of view.

WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE.

WE mention these works immediately after those of Clement of Alexandria, not because we pretend that they may not be of a more ancient date, but because we do not believe that a more recent date can be assigned to them; because we cannot fix their origin, as many critics have done, in the fifth century. The book of *Divine Names* was unquestionably earlier than the time of Origen, for he quotes it; and the book on the *Celestial Hierarchy*, always joined with the first, is by the same author. We shall see presently an extract from the philosophical views which these works contain: views which have been the object of ignorant and unjust scorn on the part of the exclusive admirers of Greek philosophy.

ORIGEN.

ORIGEN was born at Alexandria about the year 183. The repeated persecutions which his zeal for the spread of Christianity drew upon him, did not prevent his giving himself with indefatigable ardour to the study of theology, philosophy, history, and languages. He was for many ages at the head of the Christian school at Alexandria. His principal works are the book on *First Principles*, and that *Against Celsus*. He died in 253.

The philosophy of Origen bears the impress of the Oriental genius. God is the creator, because he is omnipotent: he is from all eternity lord and master: he must, therefore, from eternity have created

beings subject to his empire. He produced something passive, which is the subject of forms. This something passive is matter, but not bodies, of which the origin was subsequent. Spirit, which informs matter, is the intelligent, active principle ; it is of the same nature as the Divine Logos, but circumscribed by matter. Spirits existed at first in the state of perfect intelligences, living a pure divine life. Love, being cooled in a certain number of spirits, through abuse of their freedom, became hardened, and this hardening produced bodies. Thus the intelligences fell from the state of souls, and bodies became the prison of those fallen spirits. The creation—not creation in general, but the formation of the actual world—is not, therefore, properly speaking, a creation, but a catastrophe, a fall. The prison of spirits varies according to the degree of their demerit. Those whose guilt was less have the stars for their corporeal envelope. Hence the reason why it is right to say that the stars are intelligent, that they may be virtuous or vicious, that they supplicate and adore. The fallen world is subject to a law of restoration, which is fulfilled in a long series of periods. Spirits pass successively through different states till they are all purified ; then matter itself will receive a glorious transfiguration, and God will be all in all.

From these principles Origen deduced a philosophy of humanity, which partakes of an influence from what of heterodoxy there is in the general theory, but which, at the same time, in its union with Christianity, projected a dazzling light upon questions the most profound.

ARNOBIUS.—LACTANTIUS.

THEY belong to the third and fourth centuries. Numidia was their common country. The *Seven*

Books against the Gentiles, by Arnobius, though remarkable in a philosophical point of view, are nevertheless inferior in merit to the *Divine Institutes* of his disciple Lactantius, who was surnamed the Christian Cicero. The excellence of Christianity, compared with philosophy and with idolatry, is treated in this work with equal talent and learning. Lactantius is believed to have died at Treves, in Gaul, about the year 325.

SAINT AUGUSTINE.

BORN at Tagaste, in Africa, in 354. Augustine was attached during his youth to the heresy of the Manicheans. St. Ambrose brought him back to the bosom of the Church, of which he became one of its most illustrious doctors. He died Bishop of Hippo in 430, while the Vandals were besieging that city. St. Augustine combated all the errors of his time. Among his numerous writings there are two which are chiefly the reflections of his heart. In his *Confessions* he relates the history of his mind: in his book of *Retractions* he corrects what appeared to him incorrect in his other works. This work was, as it were, a confession of the intellect, which often costs self-love more than one of the heart.

The views of Augustine, in spite of the variety of questions which they embrace, may be reduced to unity in the following manner.

In his discussions with the philosophers, he treats chiefly of the question of creation, or of the infinite and finite. This question comes up again, under a special aspect, in his controversy with the Manicheans, where the creation was considered in the point of view relative to good and evil. The question of the relation of the infinite to the finite is presented under still another aspect in the attacks which he

directed against Pelagianism. Manicheism destroyed human freedom: Pelagianism was a reaction against Manichean fatality. But in maintaining human freedom it took away the influence of the divine will, or grace. St. Augustine maintained the necessity of admitting at once both the freedom of the finite will and the action of the divine will. In the part of his writings in which he treats of the relations of faith and science, he shows also that the human element, reasoning, ought to have as its point of support a divine element, revelation or faith. Finally, the great idea which reigns in his book, the *City of God*, is, that all human events are only the accomplishment of the plan of Providence, who, without destroying their freedom, makes all finite wills concur to the ends of infinite wisdom.

The writings of Eusebius of Cesarea, of Didymus of Alexandria, of Gregory of Nyssen, of Synesius, of Marius Victorinus, and of others who might be named, contain also various classes of speculations which should have a place in a picture of the Christian philosophy of the first centuries.

Exposition.

The Divine Unity.

Although there can be in God no succession, we are obliged, by the necessity of our modes of thinking, to represent in him a priority as respects our own reason. All the notions which we can form of the divine essence, according to the fathers, ascend and meet at last in a radical notion, beyond which the mind cannot go: that notion is the idea of substantial unity.

This unity is ineffable in itself; that is, it is susceptible of no particular name; it is indistinct, invisible,

concealed, in such a sense that it presents to our minds no special quality upon which it can seize.

"As all notions refer to existences, that which is above all existence evades all notion. It falls neither under the senses, nor the imagination, nor thought, nor language. It is the One, unknown, supersubstantial, who is Goodness itself."—*Lib. de divin. nominibus*.

In the ordinary sense of the words, "the One, if it be allowed so to say, is neither good nor beautiful; for these words express qualities, affections, modes of existence, and the One is conceived as something transcendent, ulterior to every particular quality."—*Pachymeres, Comment. de div. nominibus*.

"The One is infinite, unknown, undistinguishable; he is, properly speaking, the *aorist*, infinity and indeterminateness. . . . We are therefore forced, in speaking of him, to say that his essence, his life, his intelligence, are incomprehensible; that it is beyond everything which can be expressed; and, consequently, that he is without existence, without substance, without intelligence, without life, not by privation of these things, but by *superlation*. Everything which those words express are in fact posterior to his unity."—*Marius Victorinus, against the Arians*, lib. 4.

"We are unable to give to God any particular name; for names have for their object the designation and distinction of things multiple and various."—*Justin, Exhort. to the Greeks*.

But if God cannot receive any particular name, his only possible name is that which expresses being in general: *He is He that is* (I am that I am). If his unity is inconceivable in itself, we conceive it as the principle, the basis of everything which exists, as the root and ground of all being. "All things," says St. Augustine, "exist in as far as they have unity;

and this is a vestige of the hidden unity *through which* they exist."

"Everything is in the unity and with the unity : the One is all, everything."—(*Marius Victorinus*.) John Damascenus designates the being of God by name of the *immense sea of substance*. Gregory Nazianzen, who used the same terms, says (*Orat.* 12, 38) "that we may fix the place of everything in him ; that he contains everything, because every being comes from him ;" and Synesius (*Hymn.* iii., iv.), in his poetical language, calls him the unity of unities, the root of roots, the idea of ideas, the world of worlds.

Observations.

1. The doctrine of the fathers concerning the substantial unity, unknown and hidden, reproduces the ideas we have met with in all old theologies.

2. The fathers distinguish the unity which excludes all idea of any division whatever, from the unity which constitutes only individual existence. The first pertains only to the infinite ; for in every limited being, the limit indicates its division, its separation, from something more complete. Finite beings are susceptible of the second. The first is anterior to number or plurality, the second is the commencement of it.

3. When most of the fathers say that we can affirm everything and deny everything of God, they mean, on the one hand, that he eminently contains everything ; and, on the other hand, that he contains nothing under the various modes of existence which our minds can seize and comprehend, being superior to all such finite modes of conception.

4. The general idea of being is the foundation of all intelligence. We are able to affirm nothing ex-

cept by word *to be*, and every particular affirmation is nothing but a determination, an application of this general idea. We are therefore intelligent only because we know God.

The Creation.

The fathers had to combat pantheism and dualism both at once. Their argumentation against pantheism, according to the formulas in which it was maintained by their adversaries, consisted in proving that it destroyed, in two fundamental respects, the proper notion of God. In the first place, in the system of emanations all beings are fractions, portions of God, who divides himself in producing them; the unity, the essential character of the divine substance, is thereby broken up. Secondly, evil, that is to say, infirmities, errors, crimes, according to this system, attach to the divine essence, inasmuch as created beings, subject to evil, are parts of that essence. The notion of infinite power, intelligence, and love, disappears. The general formula which they opposed to pantheism was therefore this: the divine essence is neither divisible, nor corruptible in any degree, nor under any relation.

Their argumentation against dualism, reduced to its fundamental terms, is parallel with their reasonings against pantheism. They showed that, in attributing eternity, independence, and necessary being to matter, that is, to the variable and divisible, the very notion of God was destroyed, by taking from him his proper and incommunicable attributes: attributes for which there can be found no ground in the essence of matter, because the variable and indivisible have not the ground of their existence in themselves, but presuppose an invariable term, an ulterior unity. They showed equally that the necessary eternal ex-

istence of what was considered the Evil principle would impair the notion of infinite power, intelligence, and love ; of infinite power, since that principle was held to be independent of God ; of infinite intelligence, since matter, as essentially dark, was incomprehensible even to God ; of infinite love, since the divine goodness was resisted and checked by an infinite principle of hatred, discord, and destruction. The general formula of Catholic doctrine, as exclusive of dualism, was this : God has made everything which exists out of that which did not before exist, that is, without pre-existent matter.

But it should be remarked that these antipanthestic and antidualistic reasonings obliged reason to take refuge in the Catholic faith, not as thereby explaining the great act of creation, properly so called, but as showing the impossibility of stopping in either one or the other of those two opposite views. They are not a tenable post for the human intellect ; we must therefore admit simultaneously that all things come from God, and nevertheless they are neither parts nor simply forms of God : such is the substance of the polemics and of the fathers. But how did finite beings proceed from the infinite ? This ulterior question has no solution in their polemics. In this respect the Christian metaphysicians maintained, in general terms, that the act of creation contains an inevitable mystery ; or, to translate these ancient thoughts into modern language, that the relation of the finite to the infinite necessarily implies for man a question radically insolvable, since, in order to comprehend completely this relation, it would be necessary to embrace both the terms ; that is to say, that it would be necessary for the finite intelligence to transform itself into infinite intelligence. But, while altogether insisting upon this mystery,

many Christian philosophers endeavoured to throw some rays of intelligence into the depths of this abyss. The most lofty, perhaps, and the boldest theory which was imagined at that period, was that of the celebrated Catholic Orientalist whose writings pass under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. We will briefly sum up this theory ; but, in order to comprehend it, we shall have to recur to some notions which have been already indicated.

1. That which we conceive as primitive in God (that is, primitive in a logical sense, relatively to our necessary order of thinking) is being in its transcendent idea, meaning thereby that which is beyond all our modes of conceiving this or that particular being : it is that something which is the support, the *substratum* of wisdom, of the divine life, and of all the other attributes of God ; in a word, radical and absolute unity. Considered in this relation, God is not only incomprehensible, he is ineffable, *unnameable*. Being is a dark abyss, an infinite mystery. Consequently, under this first point of view the human mind cannot attain it in the way of knowledge, properly called ; and, as it cannot comprehend it except as the incomprehensible, nor name it except as the *unnameable*, nor reach it except as the inaccessible, the intelligence arrives at the idea of God only in the way of ignorance, that wise and enlightened ignorance which is the highest form of science in relation to the infinite ; for the faculty of conception represents the infinite only in a finite manner, while this ignorance, being, like its subject, without limits, is in one sense adequate to it.

2. God, in as far as he can fall within the cognition of man, is not known directly, as he is radically in himself, but we conceive of him by the divine attributes, of which, in a limited degree, his creatures

partake. When we call him wise, good, powerful, we designate by these expressions only the divine virtues which are derived to us from God. But how do they exist in their principle and in their proper seat? No human thought can conceive.

3. Our knowledge of God is therefore compounded at once of science and ignorance. God is at once the unknown and the known, and both in the highest degree, since on the one hand everything which we know is derived from him, and on the other he is, as infinite, above all our conceptions.

4. Considered in relation to that which is primitive in him in the radical Unity of Being, God is neither substance, nor power, nor intelligence, nor speech, nor goodness, nor life, nor spirit; for all these terms designate affections, qualities, and he is infinitely above and beyond all the affections, all the qualities which fall under our intelligence. And as, to speak of him less imperfectly, we must seek phraseologies as absolute as himself, we must say at first of him that he is nothing.

5. But, on the other hand, he comprehends and contains everything in an absolute and unlimited manner; he is the prototypical, final, efficient, and formal principle of all things; he is the productive ground of all beings: and so, to employ again an absolute phraseology, we must say that God is everything.

6. Thus, in order to approximate to the true idea of God, it is necessary to define him by the contraries which unite in him. He is the super-substance residing incorruptibly in all substances, and he is distinct and separate from every substance: he is unity inexhaustible, and multiplicity indivisible: he is without form, and, at the same time, the universal form: in a word, God is the Being of whom it may be said,

at the same time, that he is everything and that he is nothing.

7. Creatures can accordingly be conceived as existing only by communication from God, and this idea of communication is the key to the mystery of creation. In order to conceive the creation, it is necessary to distinguish three things: God, individual beings, and an intermediate order of realities called communications.

God, so far forth as infinite, is essentially incommunicable.

Individual beings, inasmuch as they are, as individual, necessarily finite, are the opposites of God.

The communications are certain divine properties, attributes, or virtues, as power, wisdom, goodness, life, etc., which exist in creatures in finite degrees.

They should be considered in two relations :

In as far as they are divine properties, they exist in God ; infinite, like himself, they are God himself.

In as far as they are communicated in finite degrees, they sustain, besides, two different relations, one with God, the other with individual beings.

In relation to God, they are created by him, they are his work ; for nothing finite can be God, and everything that bears the character of finite must necessarily be created. They exist, therefore, out of God, and on this account they are called the divine processions.

In relation to individuals, they are their constituent principles ; created themselves, they are in turn the principle of every particular creation.

It is for this reason that, without possessing the mode of duration peculiar to God, they may be conceived, nevertheless, as having been created before the beginning of time, meaning by time the measure of the duration of individual beings, and these prop-

erties, as the constituent principles of particular beings, may be considered as anterior to the beings themselves.

Summarily, these communications, in as far as they exist in God, are out of individual beings ; in as far as they are the efficient principles of every individual or limited being, they exist out of God, and thus form the union of every particular being with God.

The Trinity.

The doctrine of the fathers concerning the Trinity has been summarily given in many writings, among others, in a learned work by Thomassin.* There are two parts, in their view, which should be distinguished ; the exposition of the doctrine, and the ideas by which they endeavoured, not to make radically comprehensible the mystery of the eternal productivity of the infinite, but, leaving the mystery to itself, to point out its analogies with the purest and most elevated conceptions which human reason can form. It is on this side that we should be exposed, in setting out from phraseologies ill understood, to the danger of deducing the most false consequences respecting the philosophy of the fathers, unless we began with a clear and fully developed exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity itself, and of the formulas by which it is expressed, particularly in relation to the errors, often extremely subtle and complicated, which those formulas were intended to exclude. This would lead us into a dissertation from which we must abstain. We must therefore abstain also from analyzing the philosophical conceptions of the fathers respecting the doctrine. Every philosophical professor can judge, from the time at his disposal, how

* *Tract. de Sanctissima Trinitate : Dogm. Theolog., t. iii.*

far he can go into the development of this subject, which is as delicate as it is fundamental, and in which inaccuracies of language, apparently the slightest, may altogether corrupt the notion of the highest of truths.

Of the Logos or Divine Word, in relation to the Creation.

“Where is the truly religious man,” says St. Augustine (*De Quæst. Octogint. trib.* 46), “who, though he cannot have a clear vision of things, will dare deny, or, rather, will not acknowledge, that all the various beings, that is, all things which have a nature of their own, circumscribed by limits, have received their being by creation from God? that every living thing lives by him? that his supreme laws contain and govern, not only the order of the universe, by which the permanent integrity of the whole is secured, but also that order of things, in virtue of which the variable parts fulfil, according to fixed laws, their natural evolutions? This being admitted, who will dare say that God produced things irrationally? If they have been created by reason, the creation of man did not have the same reason as that of the horse: for every being there was the proper reason for its creation. Where shall we place the reasons of things but in the intelligence of the Creator? For he did not contemplate any model lying out of himself, of which the creation might be a copy. Now there is nothing in the divine intelligence which is not eternal and immutable. Thus those reasons, those principles of things, which Plato calls ideas, are not merely ideas, but their essence is in the true supreme essence, since they are immutable and eternal, and since everything which exists, in whatever way it exists, comes to existence only by communication from them.”

"Can we conceive," says Origen (*in Evang. Johan.*), "that he who is called the firstborn of every creature is the world taken in a certain sense, particularly in as far as it is *multiform* wisdom? The reason of things lying, according to the words of the prophet, in the Wisdom by which everything was made, it follows that a world existed there, more beautiful, more vast than the sensible world, by all the superiority of pure reason to material realities."

"It is evident," says Athanasius (*Orat. 3, contr. Arcan.*), "that the Word is called the firstborn, not as though he were himself anything created, not as though he had any relation, any affinity of essence with creatures, but because, in forming them at the beginning, he proportioned himself to them, he reduced himself to their measure, in order that they might arrive to existence: they could never have sustained any relation to the nature of the Word, to the indefectible brightness of the Father, if, according to the love of the Father to mankind, the Word had not accommodated himself to the condition of created things, extending to them, so to say, a hand to raise them up to capacity of being."

Observations.

1. The fathers regard the divine intelligence under two relations: first, as the most absolute unity, since it is infinite intelligence; secondly, as containing in this unity the principle, the reason of diversity, that is, ideas, the types of all created things. It is under the second relation that they represent the Word as proportioning itself to the condition of creatures. We see also, in the passage from Athanasius, that the Word, united with Love, is essentially the eternal mediator between the creation and the Father.

2. The notion of the divine intelligence containing the types, the ideas of things, is found in the Oriental philosophy, as also in Plato ; the latter has particularly developed the notion. Augustine was acquainted with no philosophy more ancient than that which he mentions, but that appeared to him so necessarily the foundation of all wisdom, that he readily believed the philosophy of earlier periods and of other nations was not a stranger to this capital idea. "Plato," he says (*Lib. de Quæst. Octogint. trib. 36*), "was the first who applied the term ideas to this subject ; but if the term did not before exist, it follows not that the things themselves, which he calls ideas, were not comprehended by others under different names. It is, in fact, allowable for every one to give a name to any unknown thing which has not yet acquired a name generally received. It is not likely that there existed no sages before Plato, nor that they failed to perceive a notion in which resides such powerful efficacy that no one could be truly wise who did not rise to this truth. It is rather credible that there were sages among other nations : Plato himself attests this, not only by the travels he undertook to improve himself in wisdom, but by the memorials of them which he has preserved in his writings. If, therefore, sages existed, we cannot believe them ignorant of ideas, though they might have employed different denominations to express them."

Of Evil.

Evil, considered generally, is not anything positive, but a simple privation of good.

"We fear not to say that evil cannot proceed from good, and, if it proceed from good, it is not evil. It is not in the nature of heat to produce cold, nor in the nature of that which is good to produce that

which is not good. If everything which exists comes from the good—for it is the nature of goodness to produce and to preserve, as that of evil is to corrupt and destroy—nothing which exists comes from evil, and evil cannot exist through itself, since it would then be evil for itself, and, consequently, self-destructive. Evil can exist, therefore, only as something not absolutely evil, as containing some portion of good, which is all there is positive.”—(*De divin. nomin.*, c. 4.)

“Everything which is, is good; and evil, of which I sought the origin, cannot be a substance. If it were a substance, it would be good. Incorruptible, it would be a chief good; corruptible, it could be corrupted only as having been previously good.”—(*August., Confess.*, 7, 12.) “It is easy to see that corruption can do injury only because it attacks the natural state of a being, and, consequently, it is not its natural state, but contrary to its nature.”—(*Contr. Epist. fundament.*, 33.) “Variable good was created and is governed only by the immutable good. It is good, because it comes from the supreme good; it is variable, because it was made, not of him, but of nothing.”—(*Contr. advers. legis et proph.*, i., 6.) “All natures are good, because their author is supremely good; but because they are not, like him, supremely and immutably good, their goodness can be augmented or diminished; now the diminution of goodness is evil.”—(*Enchir.*, 12.) “If, before the blending of good and evil, of which the Manicheans speak, good existed in no degree in that which they call the supreme evil, how could there be found in it any knowledge of good, and whence, then, could come that so praiseworthy movement which, according to them, impelled the supreme evil to seek to unite itself with the good?”—(*De duab. anim. contr.*

Manich., 12.) “Evil,” says St. Ambrose (*Lib. de Isaac.*, 7), “is only the destitution of good.”

Evil is not in the universe as a whole, for as a whole the universe tends towards God.

“Everything is referable to good, everything tends towards it: spiritual and intelligent beings, consciously; purely sensitive beings, by the instinct of feeling; beings destitute of feeling, by the innate motion of vital appetency; beings destitute of life, and possessing only mere existence, by an inclination which produces in them the want of participation in the essential being.”—(*De divin. nomin.*, 4.) “There is no evil to thee, O God, nor to thy creation as a whole, because there is nothing from without thee which can break in and disturb that order which thou hast appointed. . . . Superior natures are better than the inferior, but all together are better than the superior natures if they existed alone.”—(*August., Conf.*, vii., 13.)

The mutability, that is, the birth and dissolution of things, is the necessary means by which the creation tends to its accomplishment.

“Things begin to be; then they grow that they may attain perfection; then they wax old and wither; and all grow not old, but all wither. Thus, when they begin and tend to be, the more rapidly they grow towards being, the more quickly they haste towards non-existence. Such is their law. But they are parts of a whole, and the decay and succession of the parts is the progress of the whole. It is with the completion of the universe as with a human discourse composed of words. The discourse would never exist complete if each word, after having sounded out its syllables, did not withdraw to give place to another. . . . Yet thou wouldst not have the syllables remain fixed, but fly away that others may come,

that thou mayst understand the whole discourse. . . . Thus is completed this lower universe in all its parts. But do I withdraw myself? says the Word of God. There, then, fix thy dwelling, there intrust whatsoever thou hast, O my soul, tired with vanities."—(*August., Conf., iv., 10, 11.*)

Moral evil or sin, which proceeds from the free-will of intelligent creatures, does not destroy in their being the predominance of good over evil.

"As a horse which strays is better than a stone which is incapable of straying, because it is destitute of sense and motion, so a creature who sins by his free-will is more excellent than one that sins not, because destitute of free-will. . . . Although our soul be corrupted by sin, it is better than though it were changed into corporeal light; and yet how many souls, plunged in sense, do not praise God for creating that pre-eminent light. Because you blame souls that sin, do not let yourselves be so disturbed as to say that it would have been better if they had not existed."—(*August., de lib. arbit., iii., 3.*)

Observations.

1. We have indicated merely some general principles. Their consequences, their application to the question of the origin of evil, belongs to the theoretical part of a course of philosophical study.

2. Christian metaphysics considers moral evil as not being in any degree the product of necessity, but of created free-will. Theoretically superior to dualism and to pantheism—of which the one breaks the unity of the infinite to pieces, and the other soils its purity—it is superior to them still more decidedly in relation to morals. The eternity and necessity—that is to say, at bottom, the divinity—of evil is not only the justification of all vice, but it contains its apothe-

osis. It is a doctrine which makes the cry of disorder reverberate without end throughout the abyss of being; it is as an eternal word of destruction and death, which comes down to man to reveal to him the law of crime. The frightful practical consequences which antiquity saw spring from it, have disappeared only under the influence of the Christian doctrine. Now experience of their practical working in the moral sphere of things is the surest criterion of metaphysical doctrines, just as the application of physical systems to the wants of man is their best test. The principles on which the Christian philosophers grounded a metaphysical theory concerning evil, and which the teaching of the Church has introduced into the mind of the mass of the people, have had the effect of purifying the moral atmosphere. If the pantheistic or the dualistic solution were either of them theoretically preferable, there would be a contradiction between the laws of the intelligence and the will, between reason and conscience.

3. Whatever light an elevated metaphysics may throw upon this question, it implies, nevertheless, a mystery, that is, a limit, beyond which human reason cannot pass. We have seen that the coexistence of the infinite and the finite, or the question how it is to be explained that anything can exist which is not infinite, contains an incomprehensible element. From this primordial mystery is derived, at every step, at every stage of the human reason, corresponding obscurities. The coexistence of a Supreme Good and of Evil is an example. This question is the first transformation of the problem of the coexistence of the infinite and finite; and we must not, therefore, be surprised at the obscurities which it involves, since, touching immediately upon the generative source of all other mysteries, it falls

within the thickest shadows which that mystery of mysteries casts. And in this connexion we may remark a law of the intelligence. The more closely any question is connected with the radical question concerning the infinite and finite, the more, on one of its sides, is it illuminated by the rays which escape from the Being of beings, the only true source of intellectual light ; and the more, also, on the other side, the side which is turned towards the primitive mystery, is it overshadowed with clouds. In proportion as the question is removed from that fundamental problem, obscurities less sensible appear along with rays less distinct, until at last, abstracting the idea of being in itself to consider merely its limitations, reason encounters nothing but utter darkness ; for the limitations of all reality can be made clear only when put in relation with the reality itself.

4. The Christian doctrine, which puts the supremacy of good in opposition to dualism, has entered so deeply into the human mind that it has changed the conditions and character of the error itself. Dualism has been brought out in two forms : at one time it has conceived two principles, under the notion of absolute good and evil, maintaining an eternal war ; at another time it has conceived them merely under the notion of spirit and matter, two substances harmoniously united to form the universe, just as the soul and the body are united to form man. This latter form of dualism, the physiological dualism, has made its appearance in modern times ; the other, the moral dualism, can never again take root in any philosophical theory, so predominant has the idea of good become.

Mind and Matter.

The fathers agreed in admitting two general elements of the creation, the spiritual principle and the material principle. They considered matter as something inert and passive, as a blind and opaque substance, at the lowest degree of existence; St. Augustine calls it an *almost non-existence*, and says that if there were a word which signified at once something which is and something which is not, he would give that name to matter. Spirit, or the superior principle, borders upon God, as matter borders upon nothing. It is the source of activity and motion, of intelligence and life: spirit is the image of God, matter nothing but the shadow.

Some writers have fallen into a great error in attributing a materialist doctrine to most of the Christian fathers of the first centuries. Independently of all quotations, it may be at once remarked that spiritualism was the proclaimed doctrine both of the New Platonism of the Alexandrians and of Gnosticism. It would have been natural, then, that the fathers, in combating Alexandrianism and Gnosticism, should have preferred, on the question of the spirituality of the soul, the Epicurean system, which on all other points they combated, to the philosophy of Plato, though so analogous, as they themselves remark, on many points to the doctrines of Christianity. The materialism of the fathers could not have been the coarse sketch of a newly-forming philosophy, as yet but little familiarized with higher speculations: it would have been a deliberate, chosen resistance to a pre-existing and advanced spiritualism, and this resistance having, too, its chief motive in their attachment to Christianity, which, on the contrary, tends to spiritualize man! In order to establish such

an anomaly as this would be, and so opposed to all the known laws of intellectual development, it would be necessary to adduce a mass of quite positive testimonies. That two or three ecclesiastical writers may have expressed themselves in a way to authorize, in regard to themselves, the imputation of materialism, is of little moment. But this imputation, applied in general to the Christian philosophers of that period, is based only upon a false interpretation of their doctrines.

In the first place, in our philosophical language the word *soul* always designates the thinking, intelligent substance. But it was not so in the philosophical language of the times of which we are speaking. We know that many schools of antiquity distinguished in man the body, *corpus*, *σῶμα*; the soul, *anima*, *ψυχή*; the spirit or intelligence, *spiritus*, *mens*, *πνεῦμα*. The principle of the organic life common to man and to the brutes, designated by the name *anima*, *ψυχή*, was considered either as the most subtile form of matter, or as containing something material, or, lastly, as an essence intermediate between matter and spirit. Some of the fathers adopted this opinion, and thus phrases or parts of phrases, in which they explain themselves respecting the soul (*anima*, *ψυχή*), as something distinct from the intelligent principle (*spiritus*, *mens*, *πνεῦμα*), have been taken by some modern writers as if the fathers had been speaking of the intelligent principle itself; although in other passages, and sometimes in the same passages, they formally lay it down that the *spiritus*, *mens*, which is the thinking principle in man, partakes of the spiritual nature of God.

But there is another and more general cause of the mistake by which they have been accused of materialism. They were not all of one opinion on the

question whether *all created intelligences* are circumscribed by a something which, by analogy, may be called *their body*. On this point the doctors of the first ages of the Christian era were divided into three classes.

The *first class* embraces those who thought that spirits superior to man, known under different names in the traditions of all people, and whom the Catholic theology designates by the name of angels, are not without some material envelopment. Some of these writers, as Justyn Martyr and Tertullian, appear to have thought that the angels are clothed with bodies analogous to ours: but this opinion was generally rejected. The fathers, who admitted in a certain sense that the angels are united to bodies, distinguished between bodies of different kinds, or, rather, between bodies which are matter existing in a certain state, corresponding to the human organization, and matter in general, which may exist in a multitude of different states. We will cite some of the passages which express this opinion, because it is necessary to have them before the eye in order to explain the confusion of ideas on which rests, in great part, the reproach of materialism which has been cast upon them.

Origen says it is peculiar to God that he can be conceived as existing without any material substance and without any sort of corporeal adjuncts. According to Methodius, the angels possess for bodies a substance formed of pure air and of fire which has no terrestrial quality.

Angels, souls, demons, considered in their subsistence, figure, and image, are very subtile bodies, says Macarius, just as our subsistence consists in a gross body. Cæsarius says that the angels are incorporeal in comparison with us, but corporeal in compar-

ison with God. We know nothing, says St. Ambrose, which is free from all material composition, except the substance of the adorable Trinity, which, pure and simple, alone possesses a nature absolutely exempt from all mixture.

St. Augustine, who in some places calls the angels aërial animals, makes this remark : " Our bodies undoubtedly have life, and yet, compared with our future bodies, such as the angels have, they would seem as dead, although they still contain our souls." The same father, in many passages of his writings, maintains that the angels are united to bodies, different from ours.

Claudian Mamertius says that man is composed of a corporeal nature and of an incorporeal nature which are to be raised to a more perfect state : that the angels are composed of a body and of a spirit which both surpass in perfection all other creatures ; for their spirits are more powerful than all other created spirits, and their sublime bodies are formed of the purest elements. They are incorporeal in that part of their nature which renders God visible to them, and corporeal in that part which renders them visible to men.

Although we may say, observes Cassian, that the angels and other celestial powers are of a spiritual nature, yet we are not to believe that they are absolutely incorporeal ; and he supports this opinion by the words of the apostle, who recognises celestial bodies, spiritual bodies. In his treatise on the Trinity, Fulgentius says that the same is the opinion of learned and great men, who thus interpret the words of Scripture : *Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flaming fire.*

We do not here examine theologically the opinion we have just signalized ; we only state it as a fact

which it is essential to take into account in order to resolve the objection under consideration.

The *second class*, which is also very numerous, comprehends those fathers and ecclesiastical writers who, making, like the first, a distinction between such bodies as are known to men, and the different states in which the corporeal substance or matter *may* exist, maintain that angels are free, not only from bodies properly speaking, but from all material envelopment whatever.

In a *third class* should, we think, be placed those fathers who, without going into the distinction before mentioned, confine themselves to giving to angels the name of spirits, spiritual, intellectual, incorporeal natures. As the fathers who maintain that the angels are clothed with a material envelope applied the same terms, these expressions would not, in themselves, be the formula of a contrary opinion. They prove, however, that the ecclesiastical writers who employ them, without discussing philosophically the relation of matter to spirit, intended to proscribe the anthropomorphism which was blended with the ideas of Justin and Tertullian concerning the angels.

It is easy to see from all this into what confusion of ideas one must fall who does examine carefully and discriminatingly the opinions of the fathers on this question. When some of them say that the angels are corporeal, material, like human souls; and when others affirm that they are incorporeal, immaterial, in opposition to the corporeal or material soul of man, these expressions refer, with rare exceptions perhaps, not to the nature of spirits angelical or human, but only to their union with some material envelopment. On the contrary, in the present language of modern philosophy, such expressions would signify the materiality of the soul

properly speaking. When, therefore, in the interpretation of those ancient speculations, any one sets out with attaching to their language the sense of modern phraseologies, misconceptions are inevitable. This method has been the source of innumerable errors in the history of philosophy.

General Observations.

The works of the Christian writers of the first centuries may be divided into two classes: the first comprehends treatises or parts of treatises whose sole object is to expound to the faithful the doctrines of the Gospel, the precepts of morality, and the rites of worship. These writings, as a body, form, properly speaking, only a great catechism, of which the forms, sometimes very simple, at others more elevated, are almost always animated by a lively and natural eloquence. This first class of writings is in itself foreign to the proper scope of a summary of the history of philosophy.

2. The works which belong to the second class do not limit themselves to a simple exposition of truths which are objects of faith, but relate to the harmony of faith and reason. Here the history of philosophy passes over everything in this class of writings which relates solely to the *historical proofs* of Divine Revelation. It concerns itself only with the speculative conceptions of the fathers. These conceptions are brought out either in a polemic form, as when they combat the anti-Christian philosophy, or in a didactic form, as when they develop their own thoughts.

3. Their philosophy, considered in general, had two principal objects: first, to prove the necessity of taking revelation as the basis or rule of rational speculations; secondly, to construct an order of

speculations in harmony with revealed doctrines. These speculations had not their central point in themselves, but out of themselves in revelation.

4. The philosophy of the fathers has always reference to a practical object. Doubt was withering men's minds; faith, revelation, was the remedy they offered them to save them from this mortal malady. The great systems of pantheism and dualism had corrupted to the core the notion of God, the source of all duty, and with it all the notions derived from it. Christian philosophy would re-establish the notion of God and of the creation in its purity, and would deduce from it a moral order, firm in its basis and perfected. The fathers always regarded science in its relation to virtue; all intellectual regeneration should resolve itself into a moral regeneration. Metaphysics, cosmology, logic, psychology, were in their view only means: a moral life was the immediate end, the salvation of man the definitive end.

5. As they did not philosophize for the pleasure of it, none of them so much pretended to establish a theory more or less complete, as desired to throw light upon points which seemed to them to require explanation, conformably with the practical scope of all their writings. Most of their works contain the partial elements of a Christian philosophy, which appears only in their writings taken as a body.

6. Considered in relation to the anterior philosophies, the philosophy of the fathers takes the character of a vast eclecticism. They selected from all the schools the conceptions which, it seemed to them, could be best harmonized in the unity of revealed doctrine.

In every eclecticism which does not rest upon the basis of faith, the principle of the union of the theories which it is wished to reconcile is taken in a the-

ory which stands on an equal footing : the rule for appreciation is of the same nature as the things which it is the problem to appreciate. It was not so with the eclecticism of the fathers : its centre and its rule was a principle of an order superior to the philosophical theories to which it was applied.

7. It should be remarked, that, as philosophers, some of them drew particularly from Oriental sources ; as, for example, the author of the books attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, Pantæus, Origen, etc., form, as it were, an Oriental school ; while Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine, and many others, pertain to what might be called the Greek school. Clement of Alexandria belongs to both of these schools.

In order to form a correct estimation of the philosophy of the fathers as a whole, we should observe that it was requisite it should meet the wants of humanity, which were to be satisfied successively. It had first to purify the human mind from the errors propagated by false systems of philosophy. The genius of Christianity completely attained this result ; those errors gradually gave way, and then disappeared before it. It had, in the next place, to organize all the sciences upon the basis of a Christian philosophy. The fathers made magnificent attempts in this direction ; but all great things have need of Time. The labours of the fathers were repressed by the downfall of the Roman world.

Y

FOURTH PERIOD.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

TRANSITION FROM THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

THE period of time which extends from the sixth to about the ninth century, forms the transition from the ancient philosophy to the philosophical development of the Middle Ages. It constitutes, in the history of the human mind, an epoch by itself. The commencement of this epoch is marked by the interruption of the great philosophical movement of the first centuries of the Christian era : an interruption occasioned by the overthrow and confusion of everything, which followed the invasions of the barbarians. The end of this epoch coincides with the awakening of the spirit of reflection in the West. This lapse of time does not, however, form a philosophical period, because philosophy makes no appearance in it but as an exception.

BOETHIUS.

IN the West, Boethius appeared about the end of the fifth century. This illustrious Roman senator, born in 470, lived at the court of the Emperor Theodoric, who caused him to be unjustly put to death. Boethius forms a link which unites the philosophy of antiquity with that of the Middle Ages. It is probable that he had attended the lectures of Proclus, and that he studied under him Greek philosophy in its noblest productions, Platonism and Aristotelianism ; and, as his mind was profoundly occupied with the doctrines of Christianity, he incorporated science

with faith. An ancient philosopher in one aspect, a Christian theologian in another, he became a high authority in succeeding centuries. His name sounded for a long time in the schools, and his writings were classical works. He attempted to transmit to future ages the heritage of his science by translations and commentaries, but his book on the *Consolations of Philosophy*—a venerable testament of his mind, written in the depths of a prison, in the prospect of death—reveals his true genius. The conceptions of antiquity are there presented under the form of a Christian eclecticism, which predominates to purify them, and purifies to unite them.

With Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Claudian Mamertius in the sixth century, Isidore of Seville in the seventh, Bede and Egbert, the master of Alcuinus, in the eighth, form, in Italy, Gaul, Spain, and England, focal points, which sent out rays of light upon the poor pale schools that glimmer remotely through the shades of barbarism.

JOHN OF DAMASCUS.

IN the East, John Philoponus, and especially John of Damascus—the first towards the end of the sixth century, the second in the first half of the eighth—performed in the literary world an office similar to that of Boethius in the West. They preserved the tradition of philosophical knowledge, and particularly Aristotelianism. John of Damascus, born at the court of the Caliphs, was there promoted to high dignities. He afterward withdrew to the monastery of St. Saba, to give himself up to the study of philosophy and theology. Like Boethius, he united these sciences together. His works at a later period obtained great credit in the schools of the West.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

Setting out from the last years of the eighth century, two philosophical movements commence: the first springs up in Arabia, the other in France. We will first cast a glance over the brilliant period of the Arabian philosophy—a period which extends from the ninth century to the beginning of the thirteenth—in order that we may then follow, without interruption, the progress of philosophy in Christian nations.

*Philosophical Development among the Arabians.**Historical Notices.—Exposition.*

The Arabians received the germes of their philosophy from the Christians. John Philoponus, Mesue of Damascus, Honain, and many other learned Christians, directed their intellectual education. The writings of Aristotle, with the commentaries of the New-Platonists, were communicated to them.

The philosophical culture of the Arabians dates particularly from the reign of the Caliphs Haroun Al Raschid and Al Mamoun. According to the testimony of Abulfeda, these princes, full of zeal for science, requested of the Greek emperors the philosophical books which they possessed, and had them translated into their own language. Geuzi, an Arabic writer, relates, however, that Al Mamoun caused the texts to be burned when the translations were completed.

These two caliphs were engaged in promoting the spread of science in the East at the same time that it was awakening in the West at the voice of Charlemagne. It is a matter worthy of remark, that this intellectual movement should display itself at the same epoch among the two races which possessed

the military preponderance, the Franks and the Saracens. It should be remarked, also, that this impulse was derived from Greece. Worn out by disputes, the Greek genius had run its course; but before its extinction, like one dying of old age, it had distributed to new or rejuvenated nations the archives of philosophy. Charles the Great and Al Mamoun were the testamentary executors.

Derived from Aristotelianism, the Arabic philosophy particularly developed the logical element; but, as we shall see, another element was also there produced.

Logical Works.

Alkendi, originally of Bassora, a city built by Omar near the Persian Gulf, stands at the head of the series of Arabian philosophers, which begins under Al Mamoun about the year 800. He wrote an *Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy*, and various treatises on the *Categories*, the *Predicaments*, *Sophisms*, and other parts of logic. He considered the mathematics as a necessary preparation for philosophy. Metaphysics, regarded from the Aristotelian point of view, that is to say, as a body of logical abstractions, was equally the object of his meditations.

Such was also the predominant character of the works of Al Farabi, born at Belah. He had studied at Bagdad under John Mesue. His writings were the complement of the teaching of Alkendi. "He penetrated," says Abulfeda, "the very depths of logic, revealed its secrets, and facilitated the understanding of it. The writings which he composed are filled with clear observations and acute conceptions." He connected with this science metaphysical, physical, and political treatises. He died about the middle of the tenth century.

From these brief observations it may be seen what was the original state of Arabian philosophy. But, while imbibing from the writings of Aristotle a prodigious taste for dialectics, it also found in the New-Platonic commentaries traces of another mode of philosophizing. Through the complicated scaffolding of the Greek logic it had, therefore, got a sight of the bold processes of Oriental intuition. This gave rise to two schools, the one dialectical and rationalistic, the other intuitive and enthusiastic.

RATIONALISTIC SCHOOL.

WHILE still it continued its labours upon logic, the Arabian philosophy undertook to resolve by logical processes the problems of the moral and of the physical world.

Metaphysical and Moral Speculations.

From the earliest times of the Hegira, the question concerning the origin of evil, and especially of moral evil, had perplexed the Mohammedan theologians. Some of them, in order to reconcile the existence of evil with the wisdom and holiness of God, denied his omnipotence. According to them, the actions of men were out of the empire of the divine power. This doctrine sprung up in the sect of the Motazalians. Other sectaries, and particularly that of the Al Jahamians, sacrificed the wisdom and goodness of God to his omnipotence. God, they said, does everything in all things, good as well as evil: the will of man is only an appearance; the divine will alone really acts.

Placed between these two solutions, reason fluctuated between pantheism and atheism in germe. Abu Ali Al Jobba cut the difficulty by denying the existence of evil. He maintained that everything

which befalls every man is for his best good. Al Jobba was embarrassed in attempting to prove directly his thesis of optimism: but he felt himself strong in insisting upon the injurious consequences of the two other systems, and he presented his own as a refuge in the midst of these two rocks. To escape from his arguments, it was necessary to find an intermediate solution. This was reduced to a definitive form by Al Asshari and some of his disciples.

Al Asshari had been at first a disciple of Al Jobba. The Arabian writers have preserved a curious specimen of the attacks he made upon the doctrine of his master. In one of their disputations the following dialogue is represented as held between them:

Al Asshari. I will suppose three brothers, of whom one has lived in obedience to God, the second in disobedience, the third died in infancy: what think you of these persons?

Al Jobba. The first will go to paradise, the second to hell, the third will neither be rewarded nor punished.

Al Asshari. What would God answer if the third should say, Lord, better would it have been for me that thou hadst permitted me to live, in order that I might have gained entrance into paradise with my brother?

Al Jobba. The Lord would answer, I know thee; if thy life had been prolonged, thou wouldst have committed crimes which would have carried thee to hell.

Al Asshari. But then the second will say, Lord, why didst thou not cause me to die in infancy, like my brother, that I might have avoided the crimes for which I now suffer?

Al Jobba. God prolonged his life that he might

have it in his power to merit the highest reward, and that itself was a greater favour.

Al Asshari. If that be so, why then did not God prolong the life of the third? for that would equally have been the greater favour.

“It is the Devil that instigates thy words,” replies the master, disconcerted. The disciple triumphed: but it was not enough to have put to silence the optimist doctor; it was necessary, in order not to fall into a difficulty at least equally great, to find a system in which one could admit the existence of evil without destroying either the notion of God or of man. If God was the author of men’s actions, and if some of those actions were evil, God, they would tell him, was the author of evil. If, on the other hand, God was not the author of men’s actions, they escaped the divine influence, and God ceases to be omnipotent.

Al Asshari considered men’s actions as produced by a concurrence of the human will with the divine, and his disciples, developing his fundamental idea, have said that God created the actions of men in as far as they are the result of a force, and that in this relation they are something purely physical, and have no quality of obedience or disobedience, virtue or vice, but that the human connects itself with the divine operation, and by this conjunction impresses a character of obedience or disobedience upon the physical act. This solution prevailed over the other systems, and the Arabian schoolmen have placed Al Asshari in the rank of their first doctors.

Speculations relative to the Material World.

The material part of Arabic philosophy is particularly represented by Avicenna, who was surnamed the prince of physicians. He was born towards the

end of the tenth century (980), at Assena, near Bochara. Partaking the taste of his nation, he devoted himself passionately to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle, and applied them to the study of the material world. From the combination of that vast system of abstractions with the phenomena of nature resulted a fantastic physics, which might be designated by the name of logical alchymy. The phenomena were connected according to an order determined by the categories of logic. The most general abstract notions expressed the primary causes, the great powers of nature: from whence it followed that, by stripping these primitive agents of the circumstances in which each particular phenomenon clothed them, by endeavouring to seize them in a state of separation corresponding to the abstract formulas of the categories, the philosopher could have at his disposal the causes in themselves, and, by directing their action, could produce wonderful effects. This alchymy, or transcendental physics, which consisted in supposing a perfect correlation, an intimate equation between the operations of nature and the operations of the human mind, had for its object the attainment of a point at which the different realities of nature and the different categories of the mind would be lost in a primitive abstraction, which was at once idea and cause, and from which might be deduced, by correlative evolutions, both formulas and facts. We know too little of the writings of Avicenna to be able to certify whether he himself perfectly understood the essence of his logical alchymy; but such was the tendency, perceived or unperceived, of his manner of philosophizing. As to the rest, his works contain two parts: the one is a syncretism quite confused of anterior physical knowledge borrowed from the Greek wri-

ters, the other a chaos of abstractions. The first is the subject matter of his philosophy, the second its form.

Skepticism.

Skepticism displayed itself in the Arabian philosophy in two degrees. There was a scientific skepticism, which did not deny that man might have certain knowledge of truth, but only maintained that there was no other way of attaining it than by faith in the Koran. There was also an absolute skepticism, which maintained the equal uncertainty of all things.

The scientific skepticism was maintained by Al Gazel, born at Tus about the year 1038. As a defender of Islamism he excited great enthusiasm; he composed a refutation of Christianity, of Judaism, of Paganism and Magism. As a philosopher his reputation was not less. He wrote upon almost all branches of dogmatic philosophy, whether physical or moral. But he afterward turned philosophy against itself. In his book on the *Destruction of Philosophers*, he employed all the resources of dialectics to batter to pieces all dogmatic systems, from whence resulted, according to him, the necessity of resorting to the revelation of the Koran in order to avoid absolute skepticism. Al Gazel thus displayed himself in three characters: as a Mussulman theologian, a dogmatic philosopher, and, finally, a skeptic philosopher in the interest of theology. This celebrated doctor taught at first at Bagdad, with great applause from nobles and people. He afterward visited Syria and Egypt, and returned to die, in 1111, on the scene of his first success.

Absolute skepticism found partisans in the *Med. daberim*, talkers, who devoted themselves particularly to dialectics. Some of them did nothing but ap-

ply an acute argumentation to the Koran ; but most of them played a part similar to that of the Greek sophists. Their philosophy consisted in throwing all questions into obscurity, in maintaining both sides of a contradiction. Truth to them was a word, and not a thing.

INTUITIVE AND MYSTIC SCHOOL.

THE rationalist philosophers regarded the Aristotelian logic as the efficient cause of all science, and they had inferred that, by combining with it the doctrines of the Koran, the mind of man would attain its highest power. But in the view of many Musulman theologians this combination had, on the contrary, the effect of corrupting the doctrine of the Koran on many points. Accordingly, it was necessary either to renounce philosophy, or to seek another philosophical route. Some Arabic doctors denied to logical proofs the validity commonly attributed to them. They regarded them, not as the means of perceiving the truth, but only as an exercise by which the mind of man passes from abstraction to abstraction, till it arrives to a state of complete isolation, where he receives directly the illumination of the truth.

Traces of this intuitive philosophy are found in the writings of Ebn Baiiah, otherwise called Avenpas, originally from Spain, who lived about the middle of the twelfth century. But it has been developed more systematically by Tophäil, originally of Cordova. He flourished about the same time. Along with his doctrine, which was of Oriental origin, reappeared also the forms of the Oriental philosophy. In expounding his ideas he disdained the dry processes of dialectics, and substituted a method more lively and animating. His book, *The Man of*

Nature, or the Philosopher instructed by himself, is a sort of intellectual and mystical epopee, of which the hero is in infancy abandoned in a desert place, where he is nursed by a bitch, and who, without any intercourse with mankind, but solely in communication with nature, advances, as he increases in age, from contemplation to contemplation, to an intuitive union with God. Tophäil at first uses the philosophy of Aristotle as a footstool: he dissertates, in a manner conformed to the peripatetic doctrines, upon bodies, animals, man, the heavens, and the author of the universe. But at length, setting out with the principle that the imagination and the senses perceive only that which passes and perishes, he concludes that reason ought to separate itself from all sensible notions, that it ought to extinguish even the imagination; and, in consequence, he recommends to the philosopher who wishes to rise to the intuition of the truth, to imitate the circular motion of the stars, in order to bring on a giddiness that may efface from his mind every trace, every recollection of the world of phenomena. In this state of isolation, the intelligence of man, freed from all material obstacles, finds itself in direct communication with God. Everything individual has vanished away; being only, the absolute being, appears in his essence, and the mind then comprehends that nothing exists, that nothing can exist out of that essence which is the sole reality.

New development of Spiritualist Philosophy.—Development of Materialism.

The Arabian philosophy had been generally spiritualist: it had acknowledged above the world of the senses a world of intellectual realities. But this spiritualism had been shaken by the disputes of the

different schools, by the dreams of illuminism, and, finally, by the formal attacks of skepticism. This state of things had, on the one hand, prepared the way for a great materialist reaction, and, on the other hand, it had necessitated a reform, a reconstruction of the spiritualist philosophy. Averroes, the most celebrated of the Arabian philosophers, undertook this reconstruction about the end of the twelfth century, while almost at the same time, and in face of this new spiritualism, the materialist philosophy, applied to religion, morals, and politics, had a large number of adepts.

Eclectic Spiritualism.—Averroes.

Averroes, born at Cordova in the twelfth century, died at Morocco in 1198. The writings which he published on the doctrines of Aristotle, whose works he also translated, procured for him the surname of the *Interpreter*.

The philosophy of Averroes presents in certain respects an eclecticism, of which the Aristotelian doctrines are the basis.

Mystical intuition and dialectical methods at that time divided philosophy. Averroes attempted to unite them. His book upon the *Possibility of Communication with God* belongs probably to the mystical philosophy, of which Tophäil had been the principal organ. It is not surprising that Averroes should have gone somewhat in this direction, for he had studied the commentaries of the Alexandrian philosophers upon Aristotle. But the predominant character of his philosophy was logical. In comparing his eclecticism with that of the New-Platonists of Alexandria, we may say that with him logic held the first rank, and mystical intuition the second ;

while the Alexandrian eclecticism regarded logic as nothing but the servant of illuminism.

Averroes explained the origin of things by the Oriental doctrine of emanations, however well or ill they agreed with the logical categories of Aristotle. In this respect he did nothing but renew the ideas of Porphyry.

He distinguished in man the intellect and the soul. By the intellect man knows universal and eternal truths; by the soul he is in relation with the phenomena of the sensible world. The intellect is active intelligence, the soul is passive intelligence. The former is a substance common to all men, but distinct from each individual; the latter is what there is individual in the intelligence of each man. The intellect is eternal and incorruptible; the soul is corruptible and mortal. The union of the two principles produces thought as it appears in man. But what was that universal intellect in the opinion of Averroes? According to some authors, it was the divine intelligence itself, immediately acting in every man; every intellectual operation was, not a human, but a divine act. It is more probable, however, that Averroes considered the intellect as being the last of the spiritual emanations, which came immediately into contact with the sensitive and material soul of man. But the emanations being nothing but a projection of the divine substance, all that doctrine returns necessarily into spiritualist pantheism. As to matter, did Averroes suppose that it also emanated from the divine essence, or, rather, that it existed eternally out of God? Was his philosophy in this respect pantheistic or dualistic? Data are wanting to resolve this question.

Averroes wrote a refutation of Al Gazel's work on the Destruction of Philosophers, entitling his own

performance *The Destruction of the Destruction*. Al Gazel had attacked the opinions of philosophers because they were in opposition to the Mohammedan theology: Averroes could not shut his eyes to that opposition, but, in order to uphold philosophical systems, without appearing to destroy the truth of theological doctrines, he maintained, both in that work and in his other writings, the principle that a proposition true in theology may be false in philosophy, and reciprocally. This logical dualism, which was, perhaps, on the part of Averroes, nothing but a stroke of tactics to secure him from the charge of heterodoxy, might, however, be connected in his mind with a general theory. Theology, which in his view was nothing but the expression of the popular belief, had only a relative truth; it corresponded, that is, to the intelligence of the mass of men, which could seize only upon the outside of things. Philosophy alone possessed the truth in itself, truth absolute. Accordingly, the same assertion might be absolutely true and relatively false. Perhaps all this doctrine of his was connected with his theory of the intelligence. Theology was truth for the *soul*, philosophy truth for the *intellect*. However this might be, this conception of a double truth, which effected an apparent harmony of contradictions, comported sufficiently well with the eclectic character of the philosophy of Averroes.

But it should not be forgotten that all his eclecticism resolved itself fundamentally into the mere combination with Aristotelianism of some opinions borrowed from other philosophies. Averroes venerated Aristotle as a sort of inspired teacher, as the highest manifestation of the universal intelligence. The doctrine of the Greek philosopher was the religion of the Arabian philosopher.

A portion of the Peripatetic ideas of Averroes were developed by a Jewish disciple of his, Maimonides, who applied them to Judaism, and who raised himself far above the dark chaos of Rabbinical speculations.

Material Pantheism.

A great system of Materialism was organized in the heart of the secret societies principally established in Syria and Egypt. These societies had many degrees of initiation. In the last degree the veil was entirely dropped, and the initiated was admitted to the supreme science, which was reduced to the following maxims: There is no other God than material nature; no other religion than pleasure; no other right than the right of the strongest.

Observations.

In summing up the preceding notices, the episode in the general history of philosophy constituted by the Arabian doctrines may be thus characterized.

The Arabian philosophy, through its whole duration, was eminently dialectical; yet two principal schools divided it, the rationalist and the mystical.

The rationalist school was devoted to moral and physical speculations.

Its speculations relative to the moral order of the universe turned principally upon the question concerning the origin of evil, and upon the compatibility of the divine attributes with human freedom.

We perceive solutions successively produced more or less directly involving atheism and pantheism; then a gross optimism; then attempts to reconcile the free will of man with the influence of the divine will.

Then soon skepticism appears in various degrees in the heart of the rationalist school, and with it de-

spair of science and even of human reason, while the enthusiastic or mystical school, proceeding to deny individual existences, identifies human reason with the infinite intelligence.

Finally, Averroes, seeking to avoid the idealism of the enthusiastic school, attempts to conceive, by means of a logical philosophy, the production of the universe, but falls by his doctrine of emanations into the spiritualist pantheism of the Alexandrians. Other Arabian philosophers, going to the opposite extreme, take refuge in a monstrous doctrine analogous to the materialist system which Spinoza has in modern times developed.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT AMONG CHRISTIAN NATIONS.

WE need not seek for traces of philosophical development in the Lower Empire. The decay of learning from the ninth to the fourteenth century followed the phases of political dissolution, until, in the new Roman empire, founded under the influence of the Papacy, both learning and civil society presented an almost continuous movement of ascension and progress. Not that the Greek empire did not still contain a number of learned men; they were even more numerous than in the Latin empire, at least at the commencement of this epoch. But the Greek mind had lost that vigour without which intellectual labours, so far at least as the benefit of a people is concerned, are nothing but a barren play of the memory. Its old defects remained. The Byzantine despotism, which, after the schism between the Greek and Roman churches, gave law to the Church itself, repressed the civilizing influence of Christianity, and

with it the energies of the mind. Philosophy degenerated into subtleties, as devotion was transformed into minute superstitions. The imbecile sovereigns who presided over this degeneracy and decay felt themselves too weak to stand before a robust science and a generous Christianity; they suffered themselves to be governed by sophists, that they might rule over slaves. Everything was intrigue, even science, even faith; and among the men of talent who kept themselves from these fatal influences, the greatest number contented themselves with preserving some relics of past science, without any view to the future.

History, however, recounts at long intervals some minds truly distinguished. The celebrated *Bibliotheca* of Photius displays great knowledge of ancient philosophy; and the Emperor Leo, the philosopher, the disciple of Photius, distinguished himself by his attainments. In the thirteenth century some inspirations of the metaphysical genius of Plato were displayed by George Pachymeres, the commentator upon the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. The peripatetic philosophy had a learned interpreter in Theodorus Metochites. Michael Psellus, the younger, united with Greek studies the science of the Chaldeans. This latter person, who united and reflected some few pale rays of light from both poles of ancient philosophy, seems to have pronounced the funeral oration over the tomb of the East and of Greece.

But in the West a different spectacle was displayed. The human mind there felt the stirring of a new growth. The remains of science which had escaped in the overthrow of society were not, as in the Lower Empire, like an old tree that crumbles to dust. They were seeds or young shoots full of life,

and the strong hand of the Papacy, everywhere present, directed a great and laborious culture. The popes worked with incredible activity, by their missionaries, their rules, their institutions, to gain a victory over the barbarian element. Under their direction the Roman Catholic clergy broke up the uncultivated soil of the European mind.

The philosophical development of the Middle Ages may be divided into three epochs.

From the ninth to the middle of the eleventh century nothing appears, if we except Erigena, but partial conceptions, without the idea of constructing a philosophy.

About the middle of the eleventh century the project of forming a regular body of philosophical speculations was conceived, adopted, and attempted in the schools: philosophy was gradually becoming organized down to the thirteenth century, when St. Thomas Aquinas, combining and developing the ideas of the preceding times, attempted to reduce all those various elements to systematic unity.

Setting out from this epoch, the philosophical structure of the Middle Ages was the object of a multitude of partial attacks; its unity was disturbed, its various elements thrown into agitation. The want of another scientific development was felt; but there was, as yet, no clear and precise conception what it should be.

We have here to premise an observation already made respecting the philosophy of the first centuries of the Christian era. The philosophy of the Middle Ages is eminently theological. It would be extremely difficult to give an exact idea of it in this relation, without a previous dissertation going to the very grounds of the innumerable theological questions which it embraced. A great many of these ques-

tions must therefore be referred to the theoretical portion of a course of philosophy, where they would find a place without any inconvenience.

FIRST EPOCH.

ALCUINUS.

ALCUINUS occupies a distinguished place in the history of philosophy, though he owes it less to his writings than to the impulse which he gave to his age. Science, such as could exist in those times, had sought an asylum in the remotest bounds of the Occidental world. Great Britain had become a sort of scientific cloister, where learning, timid and isolated, drew its breath under the protection of religion. From thence it was carried by Alcuinus into the tents of the Frankish race, which, possessed already of supremacy of force, was destined, from its propagating disposition, to the intellectual apostolate. The labours of the Anglo-Saxon monk, the preceptor, friend, the *deliciæ*, of Charlemagne, as he was then called, were directed to bring about the union of the two social elements, force and intellect; to make the throne of the one the seat of the other. The work attempted by him was the more bold, inasmuch as the scientific materials at his disposal were very inconsiderable. He was eminently a man of information. He was the professor of his age; he created schools, but not systems.

SCOTUS ERIGENA.

THIS is not true of John Scotus Erigena, a solitary genius, who founded no school, but who in the ninth century constructed a system of philosophy, isolated from all the conceptions of the preceding period, and from all those of the period immediately following.

Confucius, after having heard Lao-Tseu, said to his disciples that that philosopher seemed to him as a mysterious dragon: such in some respects appears Erigena. He is a sphinx stationed at the threshold of the Middle Ages; not that his philosophy is enigmatical, unintelligible, but that the appearance of this philosopher at such an epoch is a singular fact, a sort of historical enigma.

The two names of Scotus Erigena are probably a pleonasm; they seem to have both come from the name of his native country, Ireland, the ancient Erin, which was also called Scotia, a name which subsequently became exclusively appropriated to Scotland. The Emperor Charles the Bald invited him to France, where he found himself the principal centre of intellectual activity. He there passed the greatest part of his life. Some historians have said that he returned at last to England, at the invitation of Alfred, and that he died there in 886.

We pass by those of his writings which relate to questions purely theological. His philosophy is contained in his famous book *De Divisione Naturæ*. In its form, its method, and its dialectics, this work resembles the beautiful productions of Greek philosophy, which were admired by Erigena; but his grounding ideas were of Oriental origin. Michael Balbus, the emperor of the East, had sent to Louis the Good, emperor of the West, a copy of the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite. Charles the Bald, son of Louis, being desirous of knowing its contents, Erigena translated it into Latin. Those writings, as we have said in a preceding page, contained Oriental ideas purified from pantheism, and brought within the limits of orthodoxy. But Erigena, taking up some of these ideas, did not maintain the same reserve, but drew out from them a vast system of pan-

theism. It is, however, difficult to believe that he did not draw also from other sources. Colebrooke remarks, in his memoir upon Kapila, that the book of Erigena begins with a passage which is found almost word for word in the Karika, an ancient document of the Sankhya philosophy. "Nature, the root of everything," says the Karika, "*is not produced*. Seven principles there are which are at once both *produced* and *productive*. Six are *merely products*. The soul is *neither produced nor productive*." Compare with this the passage from Erigena: "Videtur mihi divisio naturæ, per quatuor differentias, quatuor species recipere, quarum prima est quæ *creat et non creatur*; secunda quæ *creatur et creat*; tertia quæ *creatur nec creat*; et quarta denique quæ *neque creatur nec creat*." How could it happen that this formula of Hindu philosophy, expressing an extraordinary class of ideas not to be found in any of the writings known to have been in the hands of Erigena, should have been inscribed, as it were, upon the frontispiece of his philosophy? It would seem to confirm what has been related of his travels into the East, which some historians have treated as fabulous: he might in this way have had access to documents which, nearly a thousand years later, were first to come under the notice of European science. This direct communication of the reviving genius of Europe with the old Oriental genius, effected in the ninth century by Erigena, would be an important fact for the history of philosophy.

"Scotus Erigena," says the Abbé Gerbert, "effected the construction of a system, which in grandeur, in gigantic character, rivalled the bold tentatives of the philosophy of India. He set out, like that philosophy, with the primary unity, that unity represented, according to him, by the word nature,

which comprehends the universal whole. This starting point taken, what would the office of philosophy be? Its object would be to explain how variety has proceeded from the radical unity, and hence the title of his book, *De Divisione Naturæ*. But under all phenomena, all diversities, he acknowledges nothing real but God, because his intelligence embraces all things, and intelligence is all things. This cognitive power knew all things before they existed, and knew them not as out of itself, since out of itself there is nothing, but in itself and as part of itself. If the intelligence is all things, all existence is only an expression of that universal unity. Everything thought and felt is but the apparition of something which in itself appears not, the comprehension of the incomprehensible, the name of the ineffable, the approach of the unapproachable One, the form and the body of that which has neither form nor body, the incarnation of spirit, the number of the innumerable, the localization of that which has no place, the temporary duration of that which is eternal, the circumscription of the uncircumscribed, the apparent boundary of the infinite. Just as our own intelligence, while in itself altogether invisible, materializes itself in sounds and letters; just as, after forming for itself, by means of air and sensible figures, certain vehicles for reaching the senses of other men, it then drops the vehicles, and penetrates alone and pure into the depths of other souls, and blends with other intelligences, and yet remains always in itself unchanged while passing through these different operations, and loses nothing of its essential simplicity; so the ineffable divine goodness, descending from the height of creation, and expanding from degree to degree to the last limits of existence, does all things, subsists in all things, is all things, without its infinite unity being

affected by any alteration or corruption. Everything proceeds from this unity, everything will one day return thither, according to the laws of a progress which will spiritualize all things. In the return to unity the body will be resolved into vital motion, vital motion into sentiment, sentiment into reason, reason into the soul, the soul into the science of all things which are below God, science into wisdom, which is the intimate and immediate contemplation of truth, so far as it can be attained by the creature. At this point of returning progress every spirit becomes as an intellectual star, and thus is accomplished the last consummation : the evening of creation, the lying down to rest of all intelligences in the luminous shadows where lie enshrouded the causes of all things, and then day and night will be one and the same."

"It was not by a logical, but by a powerful intuitive process [contemplative imagination], that Erigena arrived at these conceptions. Logic figures in his book, but always as subordinate to metaphysics; he treats it, not as a sovereign, but as a servant : we can perceive in some passages of the work the thought of constructing a logical system corresponding to the system of nature. The primitive unity is the type of logical synthesis. The universe in which this unity is seen in diversified displays is a great analysis, and all human thoughts, dispersed also by analysis into their countless diversities, must afterward be absorbed by their luminous union into the union of synthesis, just as all beings must return into the divine unity."

"The book of Erigena presents two series of ideas; in as far as he follows philosophical conceptions, he adheres to pantheism; but when he seeks to combine them with Christian ideas, he modifies

and attempts to correct his fundamental system. It is perhaps likely, that if the political chaos of the tenth century had not repressed intellectual freedom, a school would have grown up which, while it avoided the errors of Erigena, would have kept near to the Oriental method.*

SECOND EPOCH.

ST. ANSELM.—ROSCELINUS.

Historical Notices.

ST. ANSELM was born in 1033, at Aost, in a valley of the Alps. He studied under Lanfranc, in the celebrated school of Bec in Normandy, entered the order of St. Benedict, and was afterward made archbishop of Canterbury. He died in 1109. His death was that of a saint, though of a philosophical saint; for his ardour for science glowed upon his deathbed. His disciples were around him, weeping and praying for him; the last holy rites had already enveloped him in the atmosphere of eternity; infinite truth was soon to be unfolded to him in clear vision; when at this last moment he cast his thoughts over the obscurities of earthly science, and, recalling the efforts he had made to render them more clear, said to his disciples, "I should have been glad before my death to have committed to writing my ideas upon the origin of evil, for I had got some explanations which will now be lost." A few moments afterward he gained a better solution of the great problem.

The life of Roscelinus, canon of Compeigne, offers nothing remarkable. His book on *Faith in the Trinity* contained some dangerous or erroneous phrases. St. Anselm refuted those which were contrary to the

* Troisième Conference de Philosophie Catholique, par M. l'Abbé Gerbert.

exact expression of Catholic doctrine, and Roscelinus himself retracted them. He taught about the year 1089.

Exposition.

We unite together here these two philosophers, because they more or less happily discussed the two orders of ideas which together form the essence of philosophy. It is the office of philosophy to furnish a theory of human knowledge and a theory of objects ; it is at once subjective and objective. St. Anselm sought for the general principle of the explanation of all things ; Roscelinus, without, however, perceiving its full extent, raised a fundamental question concerning the theory of human knowledge.

St. Anselm, while altogether admitting the certainty of the mode of knowledge which consists in faith, maintained that the human mind ought always to endeavour to unfold itself in another mode, that of science. According to him, the doctrine revealed by the Divine Word is the basis of metaphysical speculations, just as the phenomena of nature revealed by the senses are the basis and subject matter of physical speculations. Consequently, he undertook to form a systematic body of speculations conformable to the revealed doctrines.

He supposes a man seeking by the force of thinking alone to produce a system of rational cognitions. This idea is analogous to that which lies at the ground of the methodical doubt of Descartes. But it should be remarked that St. Anselm confines himself exclusively within the sphere of science, after having admitted another mode of cognition, that of faith ; that he did not make the process he followed the process of the human mind in scientific development ; and as that implies, to a certain degree, a per-

ception of truth, and as each individual can see the truth only with his own ideas, science, essentially relative for every individual to his own conceptions, is in this sense a product of the activity of his own reason.

Entering, then, into the sphere of science, Anselm very well remarked, that, in constituting it a unity, it was needful to find a general principle for the explanation of things. This principle must unite two characteristics : the character of logical universality, that is to say, it should comprehend all other ideas ; and the character of real or objective universality, that is to say, it should correspond to a reality conceived as the source of all other realities. Without the second of these characteristics, we should be reduced to run round in a series of logical speculations, which might undoubtedly give orderly connexion to the conceptions of the human mind, but which would not attach to the reality of things. Without the first, the principle of the reality of things not presenting itself as also the principle of logical speculations, human ideas could not be connected in an order corresponding to the real connexion of things, and science would cease to be the mirror of reality. In order to establish the radical correspondence of the logical and the real order, it was necessary to find an idea which could not be logically universal without being really so likewise ; or, in other words, a universal idea which could not subsist as a perception of the mind, without equally implying at the same time the reality of its object. St. Anselm endeavoured to show that there is in the human mind an idea which does unite these characters, and that there is but one. It is the idea of infinite perfection, of the supreme good, in a word, of God. If this idea had not a corresponding reality, it would not be the idea of supreme absolute perfection, since then a

greater perfection than that represented by the idea might be conceived; and this greater perfection would be the absolute perfection, not merely as possible, but as existing; for it is more perfect to exist than to be merely possible. The idea of absolute perfection would therefore imply a contradiction, and could not subsist as a perception of the mind, if it had not at the same time an objective reality. This idea has, therefore, logical and real universality both at once: logical universality, since all other ideas are only perceptions of some degree of being or perfection, and thus are contained in the general idea of infinite perfection; objective or real universality, since the infinite reality is the principle of the existence of all finite realities. But it is manifest at the same time that no other idea possesses these characteristics; the notion of a finite perfection can subsist as a perception of the mind without a corresponding finite object actually existing, and has, besides, nothing universal in it. Thus the idea of God is the general principle of science: in the logical sphere God appears at the head of ideas; as in the sphere of reality, the objective sphere, he appears at the head of all beings; and it is necessary to carry the mind up to him, in order to conceive the correspondence and connexion between human conceptions and reality.

Whatever be the value of these arguments of St. Anselm, renewed at a later period by Descartes, it is not the less true that this endeavour to constitute the principle of science is one of the boldest tentatives made in the philosophical world. St. Anselm had attempted this process in his *Monologium*, but in his *Prosologium* he has presented it in strict formulas. A monk named Gunailon attacked it in a treatise entitled *Liber pro insipiente adversus Anselmi in Prosologio ratiocinationem*. This treatise

contains implicitly all the objections which have been brought against Descartes relative to the same class of ideas.

This conception is the most salient point of Anselm's philosophy ; although for the rest his speculations on the divine nature, creation, the relations of man to God, the incarnation, are remarkable for elevation of ideas and systematic connexion.

By his side Roscelinus started a fundamental question which pertains to the very grounds of the theory of human knowledge. He inquired whether general ideas, designated at that time by the name of universals, were merely abstractions of the mind represented by words, or whether they represented realities. He attributed to them only a verbal validity, and was the founder of the school of the *Nominalists*, who had to maintain long disputes with the *Realists*. The controversy excited by Roscelinus had in itself an extensive bearing. If individuals are the only realities, it follows that the senses which perceive individual existences are at bottom the only sources of knowledge : it follows, in the second place, that there can be no absolute affirmation respecting things, since all absolute affirmation implies a general idea, which in this system is destitute of all real validity. Thus we are on the road to skepticism. If, on the contrary, the objects represented by general ideas are the only realities, properly speaking, of which individuals are nothing but the forms, the road which terminates in pantheism is thrown open to the human mind. If, finally, human cognitions contain at once both a general element and a particular element, it becomes the problem to determine the distinction between these two elements, as well as their validity and the laws of their combination. The question was not at the outset conceived in all

its depth ; it was often enveloped in logical subtleties, which diverted the discussion from the course it should have taken. But it was seen, however, from the first that there was at the foundation of the question matter of the greatest importance : it was felt that the destiny of human reason was involved in this controversy. Thus, during their whole duration, the schools of the Middle Ages were disturbed by a question which has been reproduced under different forms in every epoch of philosophy.

WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX.—ABELARD.

Historical Notices.

WILLIAM of Champeaux, in the province of Brie, born about the middle of the eleventh century, taught philosophy at Paris, and died in 1121.

Abelard, his disciple, and afterward his adversary, was born in 1079, near Nantes. His faults, his errors, his genius, filled his life with continual agitation. His history is well known. He died a monk of the Benedictine order, at Chalons sur Saone, in 1142. In seeking to penetrate to the grounds of realism, William of Champeaux had arrived at the theory that universals individualize themselves in particular beings, in such a way that individuals, identical as their essence, differ only by the variety of their accidents or transient forms. Although he did not carry this theory to pantheism, it contained, at least potentially, the germe of pantheism, and we shall see, in fact, some pantheists of the Middle Ages claim it as the basis of their systems.

Abelard attacked the realism of William of Champeaux, but in maintaining nominalism he at the same time modified it. Roscelinus had considered universals as nothing but words, pure conventions ; Abelard

considered them as forms of the mind. Nominalism from that time was divided into two sects, pure nominalists and conceptual nominalists. The first seemed to suppose that the science of universals was nothing but a conventional grammar. The second held it to be at once grammar and psychology; and the grammar, too, far from being merely conventional and arbitrary, was the necessary representation of the conceptions and operations of the mind.

This controversy was not enough for the active mind of Abelard. Like St. Anselm, he undertook to form a system of philosophical knowledge, or an explanation of the universe.

But he appears to have inverted the relations between faith and science acknowledged by the learned Archbishop of Canterbury. The latter established faith as the rule of science; he admitted that faith had its own proper certainty, independent of the philosophical conceptions by which the reason attempts to penetrate to a comprehension of the revealed doctrine. In the system of Abelard faith had certainty only so far as it was transformed into science. Before this transformation it could be nothing but a provisional opinion. This rationalism was attacked with great vigour by St. Bernard, the representative of the principle of faith. That eloquent doctor did not attack the sphere of science, of philosophical investigation, but kept himself on the outside of that sphere. Abelard, who set himself up as the representative of philosophical investigation, unhappily destroyed its necessary rule.

TRIPLE REACTION AGAINST THE ABUSE OF DIALECTICS.

1. *Contemplative School*.—HUGH AND RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR.

THE method in use in the schools tended to dry up the mind. Speculations, founded too often upon abstractions, did not bring science into relation with the inward wants of the soul. The logical faculty, to a certain extent, was satisfied; the other faculties suffered. Hence there sprung up a reaction, with the object of establishing harmony between the mind and the heart, between the faculty of knowing and the faculty of loving. The contemplative school, also called the mystical school, reclaimed all speculation to love; it disdained abstract truth, and rested only in meditations, which are at once light and life. With this temper, the position which it took relative to all disputed questions was in singular contrast with that of the logical schools. We will give simply an example. A scholastic philosopher, who wished to prove by reason the plurality of persons in the Godhead, would have set out from abstract principles furnished by the categories. Richard of St. Victor sets out from the idea of love. There must, says he, exist in God an infinite love, which could not have exercise if there were in God but one person.

It would be inferred, from the fact of this school being a reaction against dialectics, that it would seek for another process by which to attain to science. It preferred that of intuition. The dialecticians, in their theory of knowledge, dividing the human mind into compartments, put all upon the same footing: the contemplatists endeavoured to mark the degrees by which reason is elevated by becoming more and

more pure. With the first the intelligence is a level floor, with the second a ladder. The former laid great stress upon artificial methods, the latter upon moral methods. They insisted upon the efficacy of purity of heart as a condition of science ; and as all truth was, in their view, strictly united to substantial love, so they established, in what may be called their transcendental logic, a strict union between the rational and the emotive faculties.

The productions of these two schools differed not less in their forms than in their substance. The dialecticians, who considered beings only in the light of abstractions, employed a dry style, without animation, without figures, even though ideas referring to the senses played a great part in their philosophy. The more spiritual philosophy of the contemplative school spoke in a language brilliant with imagery. As the contemplative philosophers considered beings in their real living condition, and that, in reality, bodies and spirits, the sensible and the intellectual world, are intimately united, they borrowed from external nature a vast body of symbols. The same difference was manifested in Greece between Platonism and Aristotelianism.

The metaphysics attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, which, as has already several times been said, is a Christian emanation from Oriental philosophy, occupied in the estimation of the contemplative school the same rank which logic, the emanation from the Greek philosophy, had in the estimation of the other school.

For the rest, we are not to suppose that the contemplative philosophers confined themselves to solitary meditations. The two principal chiefs of this school, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, the one originally from Belgium, the other from Scotland, and both

monks of the Abbey of St. Victor at Paris, embraced all the knowledge of their times. But science and knowledge were for them only as the pedestal for the intellectual statue, whose type they carried in their souls, and which they endeavoured to realize. Their writings deserve to be studied, not only as philosophical, but as literary monuments. Hugo, born about the end of the eleventh century, died in 1140; Richard, his disciple, died in 1175.

To the contemplative school should also be referred some writings of Hildegarde, and also the celebrated work on the *Invitation of Christ*, although they represent only the tendencies of the school. The latter bears evident marks of a reaction against the dialectic method. "What have we to do with the disputes about genera and species?" it is said at the beginning of the book; "he for whom the eternal Word is enough, is freed from an infinite perplexity of opinions." But, leaving speculations alone, the writer contents himself with giving friendly counsels for the heart of man, which purify and console it. In the works of Hildegarde, ideas greatly elevated, but forming no part of a philosophical whole, appear under a symbolic style, which resembles the Oriental genius.

2. *Recall to Positive Studies.*—PETER LOMBARD.

The labours of Peter Lombard may be considered as a moderate reaction against the abuse of dialectics. He was born at Novarre, in Lombardy, in the twelfth century; pursued his studies at Paris, of which he became bishop, after having taught philosophy and theology at the Abbey of St. Genevieve. He died in 1160. He is chiefly known by his work entitled *The Master of Sentences*. It is a collection of the opinions of the fathers upon the principal points

of theology and philosophy. The influence of this work, which for a long time was a classical text-book for the explanations of professors, has been differently estimated : it has been pretended that it could have had no other effect than to excite more and more the mania for dialectics : it has also been said that it was eminently calculated to calm and moderate it. These contradictory judgments are neither of them correct. It is very true that Peter Lombard sacrificed to the subtle genius of his age : it is also true that, in referring, upon controverted questions, to the various opinions of the fathers of the Church, he furnished new food for disputation. But, on the other hand, he recalled the minds of men to positive studies ; he led them to consecrate to the ancient documents of Christian philosophy a portion of the time they had spent in idle quarrels ; and certainly the revival of historical inquiries in any degree could not but have the effect of diminishing in the same degree the abuse of dialectics.

3. *Criticism of the Abuse of Dialectics.*—JOHN OF SALISBURY.

John of Salisbury was born in England at the beginning of the twelfth century. He studied in France, and, after his return to his own country, he kept up frequent communications with the French schools, and often revisited that centre of the intellectual activity of his age. Associated in the struggles which Thomas à Becket had to maintain, he was the companion of his exile. After seven years absence he returned to England, but upon the death of his friend he repaired again to France, where he died Bishop of Chartres in 1180.

John of Salisbury distinguished himself by a vigorous criticism directed against the vicious modes of

instruction. He very truly observed that dialectics remains a barren, or, rather, is a dead science, if it does not receive fruitfulness and life from other sciences: he reproached the dialecticians with never arriving at any applicable conclusions, and with reversing the natural order of science. His works, which treat of physical, moral, and political philosophy, contain also valuable materials for the history of scholasticism.

The philosophers of whom we have just spoken as connected with this reaction against scholastic dialectics, while endeavouring in various ways to give a better direction to the intellectual progress of the age, were influenced probably by a sort of presentiment of the approaching results which were coming from the vicious methods in use. The moment was arriving when pantheism was about to appear anew, like a great phantom, at the threshold of the schools of the Middle Ages.

Pantheistic Systems.—AMAURY DE CHARTRES. DAVID DE DINANT.

Amaury was born at Bene, in the province of Chartres, about the end of the twelfth century. David de Dinant was his disciple.

Gerson has summed the ideas of Amaury de Chartres in the following manner: "Everything is God, and God is everything. The creator and the creature are one and the same being. *Ideas are at once creative and created.* God is the end of all things, in the sense that all things must return to him in order to constitute with him an immutable individuality. Just as Abraham and Isaac are nothing but individualizations of human nature, so all beings are only individual forms of one sole essence." This is ideal pantheism; ideas are the sole reality, all the rest is only a manifestation.

The doctrine of David de Dinant is that of material pantheism. God is the universal matter : the forms, that is, everything not material, are but imaginary accidents.

Amaury probably derived his ideas from the writings of Erigena ; but it is probable, also, that he was led to adopt this philosophy by the realist doctrine of William of Champeaux, who, as we have seen, destroyed the notion of individuality. He had laid down principles of which the philosophy of Erigena was, in the view of Amaury, the inevitable corollary.

David de Dinant modified this system by combining it with the doctrine of Aristotle concerning primary matter. This matter, destitute of every quality, and conceived, nevertheless, as something positive, must, it appeared to him, be the common ground both of what is designated by the term spirit and of what is designated by the term body ; and, as it must necessarily be everywhere identical for the very reason that it had no especial qualities, he inferred the absolute identity of all things. When he said that God is matter, he doubtless did not understand the word in the sense it has when applied solely to bodies ; but his system none the less runs into material pantheism, since, on the one hand, he radically identifies spirit with matter, and, on the other hand, he represents the universal substance under the notion of matter.

Philosophy of the Middle Ages in its highest ascension.

The diffusion of the complete works of Aristotle in the schools which had before been acquainted with only a portion of them, and the appearance of the Arabian philosophy, gave a new activity to philosophical speculations in the last half of the twelfth

century ; they found in the system of human knowledge, as it had been conceived and developed by Aristotle, a new aliment. Alexander of Hales, who distinguished himself by his rigorous logic, and Albert the Great, born in 1205, who possessed extensive learning, founded, properly speaking, the peripateticism of the Middle Ages. Around them are grouped the names of Alain de Lille, Hugo Eterianus, Raymond, Pennafort, Vincent de Beauvais, William of Auvergne, Alfred the Philosopher, and Robert Capito. Then soon all anterior conceptions were summed up, co-ordinated, and enlarged by the labours of the two most celebrated doctors of the Middle Ages, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas. The first sought to establish the union of the Peripatetic philosophy with the doctrines of the contemplative school, the union of logic and intuition ; the other reared upon the basis of logic a vast edifice, of which the different stories corresponded to all orders of human knowledge.

BONAVENTURA.

Historical Notices.

BONAVENTURA was born in Tuscany in 1221. Entering the order of minor friars, he studied at Paris under Alexander of Hales. He was made cardinal by Gregory X. When the hat was brought him he was engaged in washing dishes. He sat in the second council of Lyons, where he died in 1274.

Exposition.

Brucker has given a clear and precise exposition of the philosophy of St. Bonaventura, which we here extract :

“ Every good and perfect gift descends from the

Father of Light, but the light which emanates from this source is manifold. Although all illumination be internal, we may nevertheless distinguish four modes of the communication of the light: the external light, which explains the mechanical arts; the inferior light, which produces sensitive knowledge; the internal light, or philosophical knowledge; the superior light, which comes from Grace and the Holy Scriptures.

“The light which illustrates the mechanic arts was designed to subserve the corporeal wants of man; it is divided into seven species of art, relating to weaving, the fabrication of arms, agriculture, hunting, navigation, theatricals, and medicine.

“The light which produces sensitive knowledge enlightens external forms. The sensitive spirit is of a luminous nature; it resides in the nerves, whose essence is multiplied in the five senses.

“The light of philosophical knowledge produces the vision of intellectual truths. It is called the internal light, because it seeks out hidden causes by means of principles of truth which are contained in the nature of man. Now the truths naturally known are of three sorts; they are relative either to words, or to things, or to actions. Philosophy, therefore, is divided into three branches; it is either Rational, or Natural, or Moral. *Rational* philosophy, taken in relation to the expression of ideas, is grammar, which refers to reason so far forth as the faculty of apprehension; taken in relation to teaching, it is logic, which refers to reason as indicative; and, finally, when its object is to produce emotions, it is rhetoric, which refers to reason as a motive principle. *Natural* philosophy comprehends physics, which considers the generation and decay of things by natural forces; mathematics, which considers abstract forms

according to intellectual principles; metaphysics, which, embracing the universe of beings, refers them back, according to typical ideas, to the source from which they sprang, that is, to God, as the principle, the end, and exemplar of all things. *Moral* philosophy is divided into monastic, economic, and political, according as it relates to the individual, to the family, or to the state.

“The light of Grace and of Holy Scripture gives knowledge of truths that sanctify: it is called the superior light, because it elevates man by manifesting to him that which is above reason. This light is simple and single in as far as it makes known the literal sense of revelation; it is threefold in as far as it makes known the spiritual sense, which is either allegorical, or moral, or anagogical. The whole doctrine of Holy Scripture refers to three points: the eternal generation and the incarnation of the Logos or Word, the rule of life, and the union of God and the soul; the first is treated by the doctors, the second by the preachers, the third by the contemplatists.

“All the illuminations of science, which are as so many days for the soul, corresponding to the six days of creation, have their evening; but they will be followed by a day of rest without night, because it is the eternal illumination.”

Bonaventura then seeks out, in the mechanic arts and in the sphere of sensitive knowledge, for images of the generation of the Logos, of the rule of life, and of the alliance of the soul with God.

The mysteries of the Logos are represented in rational philosophy by an internal word, the product and expression of an idea, which is clothed with a form by the voice; in natural philosophy by the seminal principles of material things, and by the in-

tellectual principles residing in the soul, both which are a shadow, an image of the ideal reason which is in God ; in moral philosophy by the theory of the union of extremes, which aids us to conceive that the union of God with man must be brought about by the God-man. These different philosophies concur also, each in its own way, in the service of divine science, which instructs us concerning the rule of life ; and, on whatever side the mind turns its regards, it meets with wonderful figures, the prophetic emblems of the eternal union of the soul with God.

Thus it is that the wisdom, one and multiform, which is contained in Scripture, lies enfolded in all knowledge and in all things ; whereby we may see how broad is the path of illumination, since everything felt or known is a sanctuary that enshrines the deity.

So much for the framework, direction, and scope of the philosophy of Bonaventura. This sketch might be enlivened, if there were space, with some of the pure and brilliant ideas scattered through the works of this contemplative genius.

THOMAS AQUINAS.

THIS philosopher, commonly called St. Thomas, and styled also the Angelical Doctor, was born in the kingdom of Naples in 1227. He embraced a religious life of the order of St. Dominic. After studying philosophy and theology at Bologna under Albert the Great, he followed his teacher to Paris, and taught there with the most brilliant success. In all the controversies which he was obliged to maintain, he always displayed great moderation. Bonaventura, though his rival in science, was his friend. He died in an Italian monastery in 1274. His numerous writings all bear the impress of his powerful

mind. His *Summa Theologica*, his *Commentaries* upon all parts of the philosophy of Aristotle, and several special *Treatises* upon metaphysical and moral questions, are the works from which particularly may be gathered a knowledge of his philosophy.

Exposition.

Human sciences have one sole object, the perfection of man. As, therefore, many things refer to one and the same object, there ought to be a regulative principle of their common action. The sciences form, therefore, a society, as individual men do : a society which, like a political association, implies a power to co-ordinate and direct. We see that in political society the power belongs to intellect ; men of robust bodies but of feeble minds are destined to be ruled by those in whom intellect predominates. So the science which regulates all the others should be the most intellectual, that is, which occupies itself with objects of the most intellectual kind. The intellectual sphere may be considered under three relations. First, the knowledge of causes, in as far as it contains a certain explanation of effects, affords the mind a light superior to the simple knowledge of effects. Secondly, the intellect differs from the senses in this, that the senses refer to particular things, while the intellect embraces the universal. Thirdly, the intelligibility of things depends upon their proportion to the intellect, which is the greater the more it is freed from material conditions : things are therefore the more intelligible the more they are separated from matter. From this it follows that the most intellectual science, and, consequently, the regulative science, is metaphysics, since, as the science of being in general and its properties, it considers primary causes in their greatest generality, in their

greatest purity. All other speculative sciences consider being only under a particular and subordinate point of view ; and as to the practical sciences, they are evidently destitute in themselves of the greatest generality, since they are relative to the particular activity of man.

The radical unity of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is found in his metaphysics. Being, possibility, existence, one and many, cause and effect, action and passion, are as the matter of his central doctrine. But these notions are developed in a framework of extremely complicated divisions and subdivisions. They cannot be reproduced in a clear and distinct manner in this summary ; and yet, in order to apprehend the collective body of the ideas of this philosopher, it would be necessary to go into these explanations. The bond which unites all parts of his speculations has its twistings and tyings in the depth of these categories.

Having conceived the unity of science, it is necessary to see upon what basis it rests. Relatively to human science, Thomas Aquinas proposes this question : Do its principles result from a pre-existing experimental knowledge ? In answering this fundamental question, he distinguishes two elements in the principles of science ; the terms, which are the matter of these principles ; and the relations of these terms. Thus in the principle, *the whole is greater than its part*, the ideas of whole and part are the terms of the principle ; the idea of greater extension is the relation of the terms. In the principle, *the affirmative and the negative cannot be both true at the same time*, the ideas of affirmation and negation are the terms, of which the mind perceives the relation. Setting out with this distinction, he replies that the knowledge of the terms of a principle depends upon

a notion furnished by experience ; but that the knowledge of their relation, or, to speak in his own language, the *complexus* of the terms, is not derived from experience. In the same way, he says, as the habit of a virtue exists prior to the act, and consists in a natural inclination, which is that virtue in incipency, and which by exercise attains at length to its consummation, so the acquisition of science implies that there pre-existed in our minds the germes of rational conceptions. This solution resembles in some respects the idea of Kant ; but the philosopher of the Middle Ages and the modern German differ fundamentally with respect to the validity of these conceptions. The former attributes to them an objective validity which is denied by the latter.

According to the principles laid down by Thomas Aquinas respecting science, every demonstration results from the union of two elements, the one empirical, the other rational. The one is the matter of the demonstration, the other its productive form. In this relation logic corresponds to ontology, where the union of matter and form sustains so important a part.

Here comes in the opinion held by Thomas Aquinas respecting the question of universals. He resolved it by applying his ideas concerning form and matter. Universals may be considered either in regard to their matter or in regard to their form. The matter of the universal idea of *man*, for example, is the union of the attributes of human nature. In this point of view universals are *à parte rei* ; their matter exists solely in each individual. Their form is the character of universality applied to this matter : this character of universality is obtained only by abstracting what is peculiar to each individual in order to consider what is common to all. In this point of view universals are *à parte intellectûs*.

The method followed by St. Thomas to demonstrate the existence of God, exhibits to us an application of his principles respecting science in general. But, in order to comprehend here his mode of proceeding, it is necessary first to notice the distinction he made between two kinds of demonstration. In every demonstration the principle is anterior to the consequence. Now there are two species of anteriority: absolute, which is in things, in the objects of cognition; and relative, which resides only in the cognitive subject, the mind of man. When we demonstrate effects by setting out from the cause, the relative priority agrees with the absolute: that which is conceived as the principle of the demonstration is conceived at the same time as the principle of things; the logical process corresponds with the order of reality. When, on the contrary, we demonstrate the cause by setting out from the effects, this correspondence does not exist; the principle of the demonstration is anterior to the consequence only relatively to our mode of cognition; it is the principle of the demonstration because it is more easily, more immediately known, and not because in the order of reality it precedes the consequence.

This being laid down, Aquinas maintains that the being of God cannot be proved by the first kind of demonstration, but only by the second. Logical processes applied to the existence of God cannot reproduce the real order of things, since God would appear in the demonstration as the consequence, while in the real order he is the universal principle. The philosopher can therefore arrive at a demonstration of God only by following an order relative to the human mind, by taking effects as the principle of the demonstration, in order to ascend to the cause as a logical consequence.

In proceeding thus, we may, according to St. Thomas, arrive at a demonstration of the existence of God in five different ways.

1. Experience establishes that there is motion in the world. Now everything that is moved is put in motion by something else. For, on the one hand, an object is not moved except in as far as it is potential relatively to the object towards which it is moved; and, on the other hand, an object is not a mover except in as far as it is in action. To move is nothing but to make pass from the potential to the active state. Now an object can pass from the potential to the active only by the influence of a being which is in action itself, just as, for example, wood, which is only potentially hot, can come to the state of actual heat only by the influence of fire, where the heat is already in a state of action. But, in another view, it is impossible that the same thing should be in the same relation both potential and active; that which is actually hot cannot at the same time be actually cold, but only potentially so; thus mutable things, that is to say, things which potentially have motion, cannot have the same motion in action. The collective whole of mutable things cannot, then, pass from the potential to the active state, except there exist a being that has motion in act, without having it in mere potentiality, or, in other words, a being that can cause to move without being himself mutable. This immutable prime mover is God.

2. Experience establishes that there exists in the sensible world a series of causes and effects. This laid down, everything is cause and effect, or there exists a being who is cause without being effect. The first supposition is contradictory, since then either we must suppose a being who is at once cause and effect of himself, which is absurd, for to be a

cause he must act, and to act he must exist ; or we must admit an infinite series of causes and effects, which is equally inadmissible, for that series is actually determinate, and reason cannot conceive the last term of a series without conceiving a first term.

3. Experience establishes that there exists in nature a law of generation and dissolution of things : now everything that is subject to this law is, as such, simply possible, and not necessary, since there was a time when it did not yet exist. But the possible supposes the necessary ; for if there was a time when everything was simply possible, nothing would ever have existed, since nothing could have been produced. Therefore, since something exists, there exists a being who is not simply possible, but necessary.

4. Observation recognises in the various beings that compose the universe various degrees of goodness and perfection. But the more or less of perfection cannot be conceived except as a greater or less participation of a perfection which admits of no degrees of more or less.

5. It is also a matter of experience, that beings destitute of intelligence, such as the bodies which together compose the world, tend constantly in their operations to a good and useful end. There is, then, intention, design in nature. But things destitute of intelligence cannot tend to an end except so far as they are directed by an intelligence, as the arrow is directed to its mark by the archer. There exists, therefore, an ordaining intelligence.

It should be observed, that in each of these demonstrations there is a double element : an element furnished by experience, and a rational element.

The element furnished by experience is, in the first demonstration, the existence of motion ; in the second, the connexion, at least apparent, of cause and

effect; in the third, the fact of the generation and dissolution of things; in the fourth, variety of beings with common qualities; in the fifth, operations of nature having well-being for their result.

In the first demonstration the rational element is this: *all motion supposes an immutable principle*; in the second, *every series of effects supposes a primary cause*; in the third, *the possible supposes the necessary*; in the fourth, *the relative supposes the absolute*; in the fifth, *order supposes intelligence*. All these rational principles are themselves deduced from two notions: 1. The notion of necessary and absolute existence, without which the relative and contingent are not conceivable; this is the foundation of the third and fourth demonstration: 2. The notion of cause, without which neither succession, nor motion, nor order of phenomena could be conceived. The second demonstration considers cause in general; the first considers it as a moving cause; the fifth as an intelligent cause.

It is also seen, from the preceding expositions, in what sense Thomas Aquinas says that effects are a principle of demonstration. By the term effect he does not mean the fact merely as furnished by experience, but also as it is the matter of a rational conception which is applied to it.

In treating the relations of the universe to God, Aquinas reproduced, against dualism and against pantheism, the reasoning of the fathers of the Church, combined with the categories of scholastic metaphysics respecting being, substance, and cause. He argues for creation properly called. He says, indeed, that the creation is the emanation of all beings, inasmuch as they all proceed from the primary cause; but he expressly excludes the pantheistic sense of the word emanation. Just as the generation of a

man, he says, is preceded by *the non-being of that man*, so the creation, which is the emanation of all being, is preceded by *non-being*. He makes the observation on this subject that the expression out of nothing, *ex nihilo*, does not designate the material cause of the creation, but the relation of two states, or the passage from non-existence to existence. Nevertheless, in maintaining creation in its proper sense, St. Thomas did not believe reason could demonstrate that the world did not exist from all eternity, seeing that God could eternally have exercised his creative power. In default of demonstration on this point, he referred to the teachings of revelation.

He connected the theory of the universe with God, cosmology with theology, by considering nature as a representative of that which is in God, as a mirror of the divine essence. But he distinguished a double representation of cause by the effect. The effect can represent the cause merely so far forth as cause: it is thus that the smoke represents the fire. This representation is not an image, but a *vestige*, which, without reproducing the form of the cause, merely attests its action, and, so to say, its passage. Representation in the way of *image* reproduces the form of the cause; it is thus that one fire represents another fire from which it emanates. All creatures, rational and irrational, are, as creatures, the representation of the Trinity in the way of vestige. Each creature, in as far as it possesses being, in as far as it is a created substance, represents particularly the cause and principle, and contains thus a vestige of the Father, the principle without principle. In as far as it has a special form, it presents a vestige of the Logos, the Son, in the same way as the form of a work relates to the conception of the workman. In as far as it has relations of order with something dis-

ting from itself, it preserves a vestige of the Spirit of Love, the Holy Spirit, because the co-ordination of an effect to another thing depends upon the will of the Creator moved by love. Independently of this representation, common to all creatures, spirits and bodies represent the divine Trinity according to a mode which is peculiar to them. Spirits, which are, as immaterial beings, an image of the Father, the principle of being, are also, as intelligent beings, an image of the Son, the Word, and, as endowed with will, an image of the Holy Spirit. Bodies exhibit vestiges of the Trinity under the triple relation of measure, number, and weight : measure relates to their substance as limited by their causes or principles ; number to the form which distinguishes them ; weight to the relation of order with other bodies. Thomas Aquinas has here reproduced analytically conceptions borrowed from the ancient fathers, particularly Augustine.

In comparing the changes of created things with their immutable principle, we form the idea of the duration of things. Eternity is the measure of the absolute permanence of being, that is, of God, who is not only unchangeable in his essence, but is not subject to any accidental modifications. Created things stand in various degrees of distance from this absolute permanence. There are some whose essence is permanent, but who are subject to variable modifications : the measure of their duration is an *ævum*. There are others whose essence itself is in perpetual mutation : the measure of their duration is time. Intelligent creatures, in as far as they are subjects of successive modifications, are in time ; in as far as their essence subsists incorruptible under those modifications, they correspond to the *ævum* ; in as far as they are destined to be united to God by intuitive vision, they partake of eternity.

Created beings are divided into three great classes: beings absolutely immaterial, beings material, and beings composed of spirit and matter.

The perfection of the universe implies the existence of beings free from everything material. The chief end of God in the creation is goodness, or assimilation to God. Now the perfect assimilation of the effect to the cause exists only when the effect imitates the cause in its mode of operation. God creates by his intelligence and will; there should exist, therefore, creatures intellectual as he is: but intelligence can never be an act of body; for body, corresponding solely to a point of space and time, has always a determinate where and when, *hic et nunc*. The intelligence, on the contrary, corresponds to what is universal and eternal in itself.

In respect to corporeal beings, Thomas Aquinas refutes the opinion of Origen, who maintained that bodies were created only to punish the faults of intelligent creatures; that they were the prison of the soul; and, accordingly, that their creation was not a part of the primitive plan of God. According to St. Thomas, bodies, from the very fact of their substantial existence, must partake of the quality of good, and are an effect of the divine goodness: they concur to the perfection of the universe, which ought to comprehend a hierarchy of beings subordinate one to another, according to the degrees of perfection they possess. Bodies should not be considered separately, but as parts of a whole which is itself co-ordinated by God. The more they are considered separately, the more their variety is manifested; but it is not so when we regard them as existing for the sake of spirits, because everything which relates to the spiritual order appears the more grand the more profoundly the idea is considered.

The theory of spirits and the theory of bodies come together in the science which has man for its object, in whom the two worlds unite.

We may say there are three souls in man, in this sense only, however, that the mind, which in its essence is one, possesses a threefold life : the rational life, which exerts its functions without any corporeal organ ; the sensitive life, which has need of a corporeal organ ; and the vegetative life, which needs not only a corporeal organ, but a corporeal force besides. Nutrition and spontaneous locomotion belong to the vegetative life. Here St. Thomas has a very complicated theory concerning this triple life. That of the rational life is divided into two branches, corresponding to intelligence and will.

The human intelligence, united to a body, resides on the confines of two horizons : the horizon of infinite, eternal realities, and the horizon of finite and changeable things. It is the same with the will, which exerts itself on the confines of the double horizon of absolute good and of relative good.

The philosophy of the angelical doctor contained also political speculations. We should not, however, seek for them in the book *de Regimine Principis* attributed to Thomas Aquinas by some writers. It is extremely probable that this work was written by some other person. The political ideas of Aquinas are the combination of two principles. As the necessary means of order, power represents God ; as residing in such or such individuals, it represents the community.

We have now given some sketches which may serve to indicate the general character of the theories of Thomas Aquinas ; but these sketches, we repeat, are by no means an analysis of his philosophy. That philosophy is an infinite world of questions :

the *Summa Theologica* alone is a vast encyclopedia, of which all the parts are regularly arranged and united by a wonderful logical chain. But in the intellectual world of the angelical doctor a language is spoken very different from the language of modern science. To be able to know one's place in that world, to travel through it, one must begin by learning the vocabulary of its language. This observation applies likewise to nearly all the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

THIRD EPOCH.

IN the phasis which we have just been considering, the philosophy of the Middle Ages exhibits an ascending progress, a tendency to organize into a vast body of doctrines all the knowledge of the epoch. This was eminently the work of Thomas Aquinas. In the succeeding phasis, a movement in some respects the inverse is perceptible. This movement which took place in the heart of the schools tended in many directions to modify the scientific organization, and to prepare the way for another method of philosophizing. Three principal causes conspired to this result :

1. The want of experimental studies began to be felt.

2. The inconveniences of the excessive importance attached to logical and dialectical combinations manifested themselves in a striking manner.

3. The continuation of the disputes between the realists and nominalists, having resulted in no new solution, led men to feel the need of seeking, in relation to the theory of the human mind, another order of ideas and other points of view than those that had hitherto been taken.

1. *The want of experimental studies begins to be felt.*
—Roger Bacon.

Roger Bacon, born in England in 1214, died in 1294, pursued his studies at Oxford and at Paris. He perceived very clearly that the logical categories, when applied to physical phenomena, gave no real explanation of them, and that every theory of the physical world should have its basis in observation of the processes of nature. He saw, also, that to simple observation must be joined experiment. He was in this double relation the precursor of the scientific method founded upon experience, and began the work which Francis Bacon completed about the beginning of the seventeenth century. Roger Bacon united practice to theory. He did not confine himself to laying down the principles of the scientific reformation of which he saw the necessity; he justified his principles by their results. From his letter upon the secret operations of art and nature, and upon the folly of magic, it is evident that he had made or that he had a presentiment of many of the most important discoveries of modern science. Roger Bacon was a Franciscan; his manuscripts, or copies of them, had been deposited in the library of a convent of his order in England. The convent was stormed, and his writings committed to the flames, in the earliest days of the Reformation.

2. *Inconveniences of the excessive importance attached to logic and dialectics begin to appear.*—Duns Scotus.—Raymond Lully.

John Duns Scotus was born in Great Britain about 1275. He founded a school opposed to that of Thomas Aquinas. The principal point of separation was the opinion of Scotus on the question of realism.

According to him, the intelligence did not concur in any respect in the formation of universals, which he considered as indeterminate entities really subsisting out of the mind. In the production of particular beings he supposed the intervention of another entity, which was the principle whereby universals were individualized. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that this combination of two efficient principles, of which one is the principle of beings so far as beings, and the other the principle of their individualization, was an idea peculiar to Duns Scotus. This solution is to be found in many philosophers of the Middle Ages who were anterior to him. He did nothing but modify it. But while he represented the intelligence as entirely passive in the formation of universals, he conceived on another subject the activity of the human free-will in a point of view which has led some of his adversaries to accuse him of Pelagianism, although he did not really deny the existence of divine grace.

While certainly the questions started by Scotus excited earnest discussion, yet the school founded by him exerted more influence upon the destinies of philosophy in the Middle Ages by the method it followed than by the opinions peculiar to it. Scotus advanced the pretension of improving philosophy by bringing more precision into the investigation of the problems that engaged men's minds; but this pretension degenerated into a rage for dialectic subtleties, which obscured instead of explaining things. By an infinite division and subdivision of logical notions, science went backward instead of advancing; and the very excesses in which the purely dialectic method resulted revealed the vices of the method itself.

The logical works of Raymond Lully (born in 1234, in the island of Majorca) contributed to the

same result, although their first and immediate effect was in a contrary direction. His *Ars Magna* made the mind a sort of automaton, whose action consisted in combining mechanically tables of ideas disposed in such a way that their different correlations would furnish answers to all imaginable questions. The invention of Raymond Lully was really ingenious; and that universal instrument, whose easy application was to dispense with all other labour, excited at first some enthusiasm in a number of the schools; but the barrenness of that mere verbal science was not long in showing itself; and as that intellectual mechanism was nothing but the dialectic method carried to its last consequences, the discredit into which it fell reacted against the method itself.

3. *The continuance of the disputes between the nominalists and realists producing no new solution, makes felt the need of seeking for another order of ideas and other points of view with respect to the theory of the human mind.*

This discussion was continued, in behalf of absolute nominalism, by William Occam, John Buridan, Peter d'Ailly, and Gregory Rimini, in the fourteenth century; by Vassel Gansfort, Gabriel Biel, and James Almain, in the fifteenth: on the side of absolute realism, by Francis of Mayron, surnamed the master of abstractions, and by other strict disciples of Scotus, who belonged to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: on the side of a doctrine both nominal and realist, according to the point of view given by the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, by Giles Colonna, who died at the commencement of the fourteenth century, and by most of the doctors of the Thomist school.

While these discussions went on without produ-

cing any result proportioned to the intellectual activity displayed, the symptoms of a double reaction against the scholastic philosophy appeared. The intuitive or mystical philosophy was revived by Gerson, who excelled, however, in the logical method, which he regarded solely as preparative to a higher mode of knowledge. From his writings it may also be seen that Oriental mysticism had reappeared ; for he refutes a contemporaneous book in which the doctrine of the final transformation of all creatures into pure divine ideas, or their absorption into God, had been expressly maintained. Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, was born in 1363, and died in 1429. The *Natural Theology* of Raymond of Sebond was, in the fifteenth century, the index of another tendency opposed to the dialectic philosophy ; a tendency which had for its object to unite religious speculations with the observation of nature and of man.

Observations on the Philosophy of the Middle Ages.

1. The philosophical conceptions of the Middle Ages, with a very few exceptions, are directed in their results to proving truths which are the principle and the sanction of virtue. This philosophy, while labouring, even at the expense of variety in its systems, to strengthen in men's minds the foundations of moral order, has more effectually served the cause of humanity than it could have done by giving itself to more various but contradictory speculations, which would have compromised those great foundations. Thanks to the intellectual unity, formed in the schools of the Middle Ages, the European mind acquired, while springing up, a temperament singularly robust : the errors even into which it has since fallen, in passing through three centuries of immense

discussions, have not been able to exhaust its original strength.

2. Christianity, in freeing the mind from ancient pantheism and from atheism, had rooted in the human intelligence two fundamental ideas, that of God and that of the creature. The philosophy of the Middle Ages was particularly engaged, as Christian philosophy has always been, with the relation of these two terms.

3. Many of the metaphysical and moral conceptions of the scholastic philosophy are still fundamentally living. What was in germe has been developed; what was restricted to a particular order of ideas has been at a later day combined with other classes of ideas; but the substance of those conceptions remains, the forms only have changed.

4. In respect to the human faculties, it is acknowledged that the great logical force which distinguishes the modern mind is due to the education received in the Middle Ages. Intuition, as we have seen, was also represented in the schools of that epoch.

5. But the philosophical method generally employed during that period was radically vicious. The schoolmen sought in conceptions purely logical the principle of the explanation of things, whereas such conceptions can furnish nothing but the means of scientific classification and arrangement. They reared upon this basis an edifice of abstractions, often very ingeniously constructed, often very vast, but which was not at all a representation of the real world.

6. Thereby came the excessive importance attached to dialectics, which combines words without seizing the true relations of things. Subtleties and cavils could not but spring from this abuse.

7. The part of the philosophy of the Middle Ages which comprises speculations relative to the physical

world, was most of all affected by this vicious method. These speculations, which do not relate to an order of necessary truths, can be established only on a large basis given by observation. That basis was wanting in the philosophy of the schoolmen; and as, on the other hand, their categories embraced the universal whole of things, they were led to propose and to resolve many questions in physics without having previously acquired the elements of the solution.

8. Philosophical speculations concerning man, and especially social man, have need equally of observation of the facts unfolded in the history of the human world. Historical knowledge was at that time so limited that this portion of the scholastic philosophy could not but present considerable defects.


9. All these causes naturally conspired to produce the decline of the scholastic philosophy. At first the barrenness of the dialectic method, as a method of discovery, was to be finally displayed. Then, farther, when the study of facts, whether in physics or history, had made some progress, there arose a great disproportion between those particular sciences and philosophy, then insufficient to embrace and systematize them. Now philosophy is the general science, *scientia universalis*, and can exist only on condition of constituting the unity of the different sciences.

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